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Abstract 
 
Assessing and communicating the risks posed by natural hazards requires not only a 
thorough understanding of the hazards themselves but also an understanding of the spatial 
and temporal impact of successive events from the same source(s). This approach is 
enhanced by the lens of time, which is often missing from modern responses to recent 
hazards. Archaeological studies, in contrast, examine the long-term consequences of 
hazardous events, but often lack details of the event chronology and immediate human 
impact that are available for recent events. Here we show ways in which historical 
records can bridge the gap between modern and prehistoric studies. We focus on the 
volcanically and seismically active region that hosts the capital city of Guatemala, a city 
that has been relocated twice in response to hazardous events since its original founding 
in 1527. More specifically, we examine documents –  “Autos Hechos Sobre el Lastimoso, 
Estrago y Ruina que Padecio esta Ciudad de Guatemala …"  [Autos] – that were 
collected in response to a cascading sequence of volcanic, seismic and mudflow events in 
1717 to support a request to the Spanish government to relocate the capital city for a 
second time. These documents provide exceptional detail about the location of the 
witnesses, the nature of the hazardous activity and the response of local communities. 
This detail allows us not only to reconstruct the sequence of events but also to link 
volcanic activity at Volcán de Fuego to local seismicity and mudflows from Volcán de 
Agua, which we interpret as triggered by magma intruded after the eruption of Fuego 
ceased. At the same time, the long and well documented history of the region allows us to 
examine ways in which a single catastrophic event – in this case a large rainfall-triggered 
debris flow from Agua in 1541, which destroyed the first capital city – can reverberate 
through the centuries and affect the response of the local community almost 200 years 
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later, in 1717. The long-term effects are particularly apparent because both the origin and 
affected area of the mudflow hazard was very different in the two cases. This example 
thus illustrates the importance of “memorability” (e.g., Slovic, 2000) in both the 
perception of, and response to, hazardous events. 
 
1. Introduction 
 Recent volcanic eruptions, such as that of Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland in 
2010, have stimulated important interactions among scientists, social scientists and 
emergency managers. Such studies of recent events tend naturally to focus on immediate 
impacts; associated hazard management studies focus on responses to immediate physical 
impacts of hazard (vulnerability), often at the expense of developing long-term (and 
sustainable) strategies for hazard mitigation (resilience; e.g., White et al., 2001). This 
approach ignores the ‘long shadow’ (e.g., Grattan and Torrence, 2007) of such disasters, 
where ‘long’ refers to time scales relevant for either political or cultural change (e.g., 
Birkmann et al., 2010; Diamond and Robinson, 2010). A long view is provided, in 
contrast, by archaeological studies of the impact of past volcanic disasters on human 
societies (e.g., Sheets and Grayson, 1979). A challenge to archaeological studies, 
however, is that causality must be assumed rather than proven (Coombes and Barber 
2005; Leroy 2006). The time gap between archaeological and present day research can be 
bridged by the historical record, which contributes robust chronologies that allow cause 
and effect to be linked (e.g., Vittori et al., 2007).  
Here we draw on documentary sources from eighteenth century Guatemala to 
examine an unusual cascading sequence of events that affected the second capital of 
Guatemala, Santiago de Guatemala (now Antigua; Fig. 1), in August and September 
1717. The experiences of 1717 prompted debate among Santiago’s inhabitants regarding 
the situation of the city, which had been relocated to this (higher) site in the aftermath of 
a disastrous mudflow from the dormant Volcán de Agua that destroyed the original 
Spanish capital in 1541 (14 years after it was founded). Debate after the 1717 events 
centered on the precise nature of the hazards and risks posed to the city by nearby 
volcanoes, specifically Agua and neighboring, frequently active, Volcán de Fuego. The 
extensive documentation generated as these risks and hazards were assessed reveals a 
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range of perspectives and understandings; particularly striking, however, is the extent to 
which the 1541 event loomed large in the memory of the city’s population, and served to 
inform the arguments of those who supported a second relocation of the Guatemalan 
capital. This is the side of the debate that is reflected in the Autos. Detailed analysis of 
these documents allows us not only to reconstruct the sequence, and analyse the nature, 
of the events that occurred in 1717, but also to explore the role of past events on the 
response of the population to an immediate crisis.  
 
2. Background 
It is well known that disastrous events can act as natural experiments (Diamond 
and Robinson, 2010) and/or catalysts of change (e.g., Burby et al., 2000; Perez, 2001; 
Birkmann et al., 2010). Change may occur by migration (abandoning the hazardous 
location) or adaptation, such as risk-based land use planning. To be effective, such 
planning must balance the benefits, as well as the drawbacks, of living in hazardous areas 
(e.g., White et al. 2001; Glavovic et al., 2010), and engage both community members and 
government officials (e.g., Cronin et al., 2004; Cashman and Cronin, 2008; Ricci et al., 
2013). A key factor that affects community perceptions of risk is the memorability (and 
imaginability) of individual hazards (e.g., Slovic, 2000), such that an event that is 
memorable within the community for its real or perceived impact will be weighted more 
heavily in planning decisions than an event that is not as easily imagined. A modern 
example is the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear accident in the US and the effect of that 
accident on perceptions of risk related to nuclear power (e.g., Slovic et al., 1982; 
Kasperson et al., 1988). A different perspective on memorability can be found in studies 
of oral traditions. When stories must be passed orally from generation to generation, a 
community disaster may become “a defining experience that passes into shared memory” 
(Perez, 2001). In this way, inherited stories, whether oral or written, are often preserved 
where the knowledge contained is critical to community survival (e.g., Barber and 
Barber, 2006), and thus may influence community planning of future generations.  
 The long history (~ 300 years) of Spanish colonisation in Guatemala, which was 
centered on the city of Santiago, produced an extensive written record of hazard events in 
the area around Volcán de Fuego [Fuego] and neighboring Volcán de Agua [Agua]. Both 
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volcanoes form part of the central Guatemala arc (Fig. 1). Fuego has been one of the most 
persistently active of the Guatemalan volcanoes, with 57 confirmed eruptions, and 
several more unconfirmed, since the arrival of Spanish colonists in 1524 (Smithsonian 
Institute, Global Volcanism Program [GVP] database). Agua, in contrast, has no 
documented eruptions in the Holocene (Bonis and Salazar, 1973; Schilling et al., 2001; 
GVP). It has had, instead, numerous mudflows that have typically affected the area to the 
north of the volcano, including the first capital city (Peraldo Huertas and Montero Pohly, 
1996). 
 Fuego is basaltic andesite in composition, and most of its eruptions have been 
moderate in size and intensity (VEI 2 or 3; GVP). At the extremes are periods of 
persistent low level ‘open vent’ activity (Lyons et al., 2010), and larger (VEI 4) eruptions 
(Rose et al., 1978; Lyons et al., 2010; GVP). Recorded activity is episodic, with four 20-
70 year periods of high activity accounting for 75% of the total number of eruptions (Fig. 
2). Interestingly, this episodicity appears to be regional, such that activity at Fuego 
mirrors the rest of the Central American volcanoes (Martin and Rose, 1981). More 
importantly, as evidenced by the Autos, the frequent activity meant that the inhabitants of 
Santiago de Guatemala in 1717 were familiar with Fuego’s range of volcanic activity. 
 Mudflows from Agua also vary in intensity, the most severe being that of 
September 1541 (Schilling et. al., 2001). The mudflow was caused by a debris flow that 
originated from the volcano’s summit after unusually heavy rainfall. In this respect the 
event was similar to the devastating debris avalanche and resulting debris flow from 
dormant Casitas volcano, Nicaragua, in 1998, that was caused by intense rainfall 
associated with Hurricane Mitch (e.g., Schilling et al., 2001; Scott et al., 2005). The most 
recent mudflow to affect the area near Agua was also caused by heavy rains associated 
with Tropical Storm Agatha in 2010; again the flows travelled northward towards what is 
now the aldea (canton) of San Miguel Escobar in Ciudad Vieja, which occupies the same 
site as the capital that was destroyed in 1541 (Matthew, 2012). Mudflows that affect other 
sectors of the volcano are rare. One such event occurred in September 1717, when 
mudflows associated with a large regional earthquake devastated areas on the southwest 
flank of the volcano. These flows are the focus of our study. 
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In 1717, Guatemala was part of the Spanish Empire. Ruled by the Spanish 
monarch, it was governed at a regional level by a complex hierarchy of royal officials, of 
whom the most senior was the President of the Audiencia, who resided in Guatemala and 
had oversight over a vast area comprising almost the whole of Central America. 
Municipal affairs at the level of the city were in the hands of the cabildo, or council, 
staffed by prominent members of the local community. The Autos analysed in this paper 
were the product of the efforts of cabildo officials in Santiago de Guatemala (Antigua). 
They were compiled in the aftermath of the events of August-September 1717 in 
response to the demands of many of its residents to relocate the city. Cabildo officials 
were themselves residents of long-standing, had experienced similar events before, and 
thus shared the view of many other city dwellers regarding the need for relocation. It was 
with this purpose in mind that the cabildo empowered alcalde ordinario Juan de Rubayo 
Morante to initiate inspections of the local area, interview key witnesses, and dispatch 
these testimonies and inspection reports to the Crown, whose approval was required 
before any process of relocation could begin. The resulting file, comprising over 250 
manuscript pages, was entitled “Autos Hechos Sobre el Lastimoso, Estrago y Ruina que 
Padecio esta Ciudad de Guatemala …"  (henceforth, Autos), a copy of which is housed in 
the Archivo General de Centro América (AGCA) in Guatemala City.  
The 1717 evidence-gathering exercise failed to gain the Crown’s support for 
relocation, and the capital was moved to its current location, Guatemala City, after the 
earthquake of 1773 (Lutz, 1994; Musset, 1996; Peraldo Huertas and Montero Pohly, 
1996). Despite their lack of political success, however, the Autos remain an exceptionally 
valuable source for scholars. They describe a succession of natural disasters in 1717 that 
began with a VEI 4 eruption (GVP) of Volcán de Fuego on August 27-29 and culminated 
with a series of severe local earthquakes and major mudflows from Volcán de Agua in 
late September and early October. Taken together, these testimonies represent a 
remarkable historical record of scientific and social significance. From a scientific 
perspective, they provide important insight into a rare example of cascading hazards, 
where activity at one volcano appears to have triggered events at a neighboring volcano. 
From a social science perspective, these documents show that the (over-) reaction that 
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prompted this early example of hazard data collection derived explicitly from memories 
of the catastrophic (defining) event in 1541.  
 
3. Methods 
 
The Autos comprise 45 separate documents, including the testimonies of 20 
individuals, among whom were municipal officials and other vecinos who had witnessed 
these (and in many cases prior) events, as well as residents of distant towns consulted for 
the specific purpose of recording distal effects. The sources are by no means 
unproblematic. The motives that informed local officials as they gathered testimonies and 
wrote their reports – that is, production of the Autos to support the cabildo’s case for the 
city’s relocation – raises the possibility that some of the language was embellished for 
effect. Yet close analysis of the documents reveals a striking similarity among the 
accounts with regard to both the timing and nature of the activity; the accounts also show 
that the events of 1717 were both distinct from, and in combination more severe than, 
those that had occurred within living memory. 
Critical for our analysis of the source material has been collaboration across 
disciplines, and the pooling of expertise in both volcanology and the history of colonial 
Spanish America. This multi-faceted approach to translating and interpreting the 
evidence contained in the testimonies and reports has enabled us to contextualize and 
extract (1) geologic information, (2) details of event timing and (3) information about 
event impact. We have also been able to place the witnesses in specific (and various) 
locations at the time the events occurred, and to record these in a GIS database, which in 
turn allowed us to assess the spatial as well as temporal reach of the events experienced 
(Fig. 3). In the text below, we reference individual testimonies by number (T1, T2, etc.), 
which are keyed to witness locations shown in Figure 3 and included in Table S1 
(Supplementary Material). Where individuals occupied multiple locations in the 
aftermath of the events, they are shown in multiple places on the maps. Throughout this 
process we have also considered ways in which the community perceived and responded 
to the events of 1717, in particular how these were shaped by the memory of the disaster 
that destroyed the original city of Santiago de los Caballeros in 1541. 
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Language also poses challenges. In part this is due to the different meanings that 
certain terms carried in the eighteenth century: vecino, for instance, meaning neighbour in 
modern Spanish, referred at the time to a prominent (Spanish) citizen; identifying 
witnesses as such was likely intended to indicate the reliability of the source and the 
veracity of the evidence they provided. In part it is also because this was a time when 
scientific terms to describe the geological effects of events of this kind had not yet to 
come into common usage. For this reason, eyewitnesses, officials, and inspectors resorted 
to a range of, often impressionistic, terms to convey the impacts they could see, as well as 
the experience of what they had heard and felt. Thus, for example, the source and/or 
morphological changes related to geophysical flows (water, debris, lava) were described 
with a wide range of terms: abra (an opening, potentially also a crack or fissure), boca 
(mouth; a term that is still in use today in Spanish and Italian to refer to a volcanic vent), 
respiradero (vent), reventazon (in this context likely meaning something burst or blown 
up), zanja (ditch) and barranca (ravine or gulley).  
Careful reading of the sources, moreover, alerts us to differences in the words 
chosen by witnesses to describe particular effects and impacts. Especially important in 
this context are words used to describe the variety of sounds associated with the activity 
being experienced. The term ronroneo (purring sounds), for instance, appears in 
descriptions of what we interpret, given the context, as short pulses of steam release from 
Fuego. More ambiguous – even according to the Real Academia Española’s Diccionario 
de la lengua española – are the terms retumbo (rumbling, reverberating, or very loud 
sound), bramido (roaring or bellowing sound), estruendo (very loud sound), and traquido 
(sound associated with a shot from a firearm). Some clarity may be brought to 
understanding the meaning of these terms in the Autos, when we note that whilst retumbo 
and bramido appear in testimonies reporting distal effects (T1, T11, T13), witnesses who 
were present in Santiago de Guatemala or in the vicinity of either Fuego or Agua at the 
time the events took place used the term retumbo and temblor (tremor) to describe 
activity that was ongoing from the end of August and into October, and estruendo and 
traquido only when describing the sounds associated with the beginnings of activity at 
Fuego (end of August), and/or immediately preceding the mudflow from Agua at the end 
of September (e.g. T5, T7). We return to these distinctions in the discussion. 
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4. Results 
 
The Autos describe a sequence of natural events that began with a large eruption 
at Fuego on August 27-29, 1717, and ended with a destructive local earthquake on 
September 29 and subsequent south-traveling mudflows from Agua. Below we 
summarize observations of the eruption, the subsequent geophysical activity, and the 
events of late September.  
 
4.1 Eruption of Fuego, August 27-29, 1717  
Eighteen of the documents in the Autos describe the eruption of Fuego. All concur 
that the eruption occurred on August 27th and 28th (e.g., T5), although some witnesses say 
that it continued into August 29th (T7, T8 and T14). The first signs of activity were small 
ash pulses early in the evening of August 27th (T14); the main phase started later that 
evening (T11, T16, T34). For many of the witnesses, the first indications of activity were 
not visual, but rather audible, with the term estruendos being used to convey the idea that 
the sounds were both frightening and loud; there are also indications that these became 
increasingly so as the night wore on (T8). By the following day, emitted ash obscured the 
daylight and witnesses described “rivers of fire” descending from the summit; these 
“rivers” contained variously sized rocks and traveled with such force that they uprooted 
trees (T44). We interpret these to be pyroclastic flows produced by deposition either 
directly from the eruption column or from collapse of advancing lava flows, as seen at 
Fuego in 1974 (Rose et al., 1978). 
Predictably, accounts of the activity vary with witness location (Fig. 4). Witnesses 
who were relatively close to the volcano (within 20 km; e.g., T1, T34, T44) focused on 
the plume that reached “high” into the air, starting on August 27th. They described 
estruendos, retumbos (rumbles), temblores (tremors), and shaking of the ground during 
the eruptive activity (T1, T5, T34). Confirmation comes from a witness in San Pedro 
Metapán (El Salvador; located approximately 50 leagues from Santiago de Guatemala), 
who reported tall llamas (flames) of fire on the night of August 28th (T11). Retumbos 
were also heard at great distances from the volcano, as reported by the two witnesses in 
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San Pedro and San Miguel (El Salvador), who either ‘experienced’ (T13) or ‘heard’ 
(T11) retumbos during the August 27-28 eruptive activity.  
Direct damage from the eruption was worst in the valley between Fuego and 
Agua, including the pueblos of Alotenango and Ciudad Vieja (T26). Although the 
inhabitants of Santiago de Guatemala were not directly affected by the eruption, many 
were terrified by the combination of the fire, rocks, smoke and ash: 
 
“… Que es cierto … que los terremotos y otros graves perjuicios, que se 
han experimentado en esta ciudad, provienen de los volcanes inmediatos a 
ella, como se ha experimentado en muchas ocasiones, y especialmente la 
noche del día veinte y siete de Agosto pasado de este presente año, y el día 
siguiente en que el uno de ellos abortó voraces lenguas de fuego y humo, 
cuyo estruendo aterrorizó a todos los habitadores de esta ciudad…”  
 
“It is true … that the earthquakes and other serious afflictions that have 
been experienced in this city, derive from the volcanoes which lie nearby, 
as has been experienced on many occasions, and especially on the night of 
27 August of this year and the following day when one of these aborted 
voracious tongues of fire and smoke, the noise of which terrorized all of the 
inhabitants of this city.” (T5) 
 
4.2 Post-eruptive activity – August 29 – September 29, 1717 
 
During, and for at least 33 days following, the eruption of Fuego on August 
27th, the volcano showed signs of unrest in the form of both retumbos and 
temblores (T1, T8, T14, T44). According to accounts in the Autos, retumbos 
were primarily heard (T5, T10), although in some instances they were also felt 
(T1, T14); the temblores often mentioned in the same context were always felt 
(ground shaking). Witnesses in proximal locations insisted that both were from 
sources near (T10), or even “inside” (T5), the volcano. 
During the same period, the Autos also provide numerous descriptions of 
abras (openings), bocas (mouths), respiraderos (vents) zanjas (ditches), and 
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barrancas (ravines), the latter said to have increased from meters to tens to 
hundreds of meters in width and depth (T2, T5, T8, T10; T14, T15, T27, T28). It 
is unclear from the accounts how many of the barrancas formed during, as 
opposed to after, the August eruption. The testimonies are clear, however, that 
there were major changes in geomorphology on Fuego during this time period  
(e.g. T5, T7, T17):  
 
“…con la ocasión del reconocimiento que hizo del dicho Volcán de Fuego, 
temiendo el que sus piedras no atajasen el dicho rio desagüe de esta 
ciudad y de dichas haciendas, subió parte de el arriba como hasta más que 
medio volcán, y vio una barranca que corre a la cima para abajo, tan 
profunda que le causó terror y miedo, que al parecer tendrá como hasta 
cien varas de hondura, y de ancho como media cuadra, la cual le dijo un 
indio que llevaba en su compañía que era nuevamente abierta con la 
ocasión del fuego que había echado porque antes de él solo era una 
pequeña barranquilla de vara y media de hondo, por donde con facilidad 
bajaban y conducían madera…” 
 
“…at the time of the survey of Volcán de Fuego which he conducted … 
[due to concerns] that its rocks might block the river drainage of this city 
and [surrounding] haciendas, he climbed more than half-way up the 
volcano and saw a ravine that ran from the summit downwards, so deep 
that [on seeing it] he felt terror and fear.  It appears to be up to 100 varas 
in depth [~83m], and about a half cuadra in width [125m], and according 
to an Indian who accompanied him, it had opened recently, at the same 
time as the fire spewed [by the volcano], because previously it was only a 
shallow ravine, 1.5 varas in depth, down which they comfortably 
transported wood…”  
(T5) 
 
This witness also noted that the barranca must have carried a large current of water 
because of the branches and trees that it had transported to the river. Other witnesses 
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claimed that another barranca had formed from the volcano’s summit to the south (T14, 
T17), and that additional openings produced smoke or steam, and emanated heat and a 
stench so unpleasant that it made people feel ill (T14, T15).   
 During the same period, seven of the accounts in Autos describe an unusual 
sensation that they felt when traveling near the volcano, which they likened to walking on 
hollow ground, or the noise made by horses or carriages in motion (T1, T7, T14, T17, 
T29, T44). A report from the eastern slopes of Fuego (T15) recounts more specifically 
the sensation that the volcano was either hollow (perhaps reinforced by the appearance of 
sinkholes (hoyo and apertura) near Alotenango, T6, T17, T29), or that there was a 
subterranean bóveda (vault) beneath it: 
“…y que …las cabalgaduras … con su piso parecía pisaban sobre una 
bóveda y así mismo vieron salir algún humo del centro de dicho barranca 
como de unos ronroneos expeliendo tanto calor y hedor…” 
 
“…And .. it felt as though their horses were treading over a vault and they 
also saw some steam rise from the said ravine, like purrs releasing a lot of 
heat and odor…”  
 
4.3 Earthquake of September 29, 1717 
 
On the evening of September 29, 1717, several large earthquakes inflicted 
significant damage on Santiago de Guatemala and the surrounding pueblos, with some 
loss of life (T1). One eyewitness estimated that the earthquakes destroyed half the capital 
(T31). Although bias could have led to exaggerated impacts, the adverse impacts were 
real, as indicated by one account that provided a detailed and specific list of the damages 
to important religious and government buildings (T32). Outside the capital, it was said 
that the earthquakes were felt on the Costa de Escuintla (then called Costa de 
Escuintepeque), about 70 km south of Santiago de Guatemala (Fig. 4). The most severe 
damage, however, was reported in Alotenango and Ciudad Vieja, which lie between, and 
close to, both volcanoes (T10, T12, T29; Fig. 4). Evidence that no earthquake was felt in 
El Salvador, and the earthquakes were felt most strongly in the vicinity of the volcanoes 
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(T10, T11, T13, T18), is consistent with a local origin, and indeed many witnesses (T5, 
T14, T15) were convinced that the earthquakes were caused by the volcanoes:   
 
“…Y que el asentar que dichos terremotos provienen de los volcanes es 
porque tiene el declarante su residencia en las haciendas que fueron del 
Capitán Don Joseph de Castillo, que están casi en la falda del Volcán de 
Fuego por un lado, y por el otro lado con inmediación al de Agua, y por ello 
hallándose en el campo le cogieron dichos terremotos, en el, los cuales 
sintió con imponderable fuerza, o estrépito, y tal que fue preciso arrodillado 
acercarse de un palo para poderse mantener, y como estaba en la frente del 
dicho Volcán de Fuego, sintió que el ruido y fuerza de los terremotos salían 
de él, cuya presunción le confirman los retumbos que hacen mover la tierra 
porque los oye en el dicho volcán, el que tiene profundas barrancas, o abras 
recientes…”  
 
“... Because the witness resides in the haciendas … which on one side 
extend almost to the slopes of Volcán de Fuego, and on the other lie close 
to [Volcán] de Agua, he can assert that said earthquakes come from the 
volcanoes … he found himself in his fields when the earthquakes struck, 
with such strength  … that, kneeling, he had to lean on a stick to steady 
himself. And as he was in front of Volcán de Fuego, he felt that the noise 
and force of the earthquakes came from it [the volcano]. His assumption is 
confirmed by the retumbos that make the earth move, because he hears 
them in said volcano [Fuego] which has [formed] new deep barrancas or 
openings…”  
(T5) 
 
4.4  Mudflow from Volcán de Agua, September 29, 1717  
The impact of the September 29 earthquakes was compounded by mudflows from 
Agua that were apparently triggered by the seismic activity. The flows originated high on 
the southwest slopes of the volcano and travelled south, away from the primary 
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population centers, and, it was said, eventually reached the ocean (Fig. 5). Not 
surprisingly, the pueblos of Masagua and Mistlan on the Rio Guacalate were most 
impacted by the mudflows (T12). The most detailed description of the source of the 
mudflows comes from a witness from the pueblo of Escuintla (T23). He was, he said, 
‘four leagues’ up the slopes of Volcán de Agua when the flows prevented him from 
continuing, so he climbed a small hill to get a better view. He describes three separate 
flows from upslope that first combined, and then split, around the high point where he 
was standing. The two resulting flows eventually merged into a single flow south 
downslope from his location (Fig. 6) and continued down the southwest flank of the 
volcano to join the Rio Guacalate near Escuintla. This account provides the critical 
observation that the flows originated from new ‘abras’ (openings) on the upper slopes of 
the volcano that hadn’t been there before; for this reason witnesses attributed the flows 
directly to the September 29th earthquake (e.g., T12).  
Several witnesses assert that the resulting mudflow moved with great force, was 
very large, and carried sizeable sticks and rocks that were deposited along its path (T12, 
T15, T21). In this respect it sounds like a ‘normal’ debris flow. However, some witnesses 
also noted that the mudflows had unusual properties: they carried a particularly large 
volume (sufficient to kill fish in the river) and they were yellow (turning to red as it 
reached the coast; e.g., T22, T25, T39). These descriptions demonstrate that, in both their 
source and their character, the mudflows of September 29-30 were different from typical 
rainfall-triggered mudflows at Agua that (1) originate at the volcano’s summit, (2) travel 
north toward Ciudad Vieja (e.g., Matthews, 2012), and (3) lack unusual properties such 
as new ‘openings’ and a yellow color.  
Retumbos were also heard during the mudflows (T14). This association led 
witnesses to relate the September 29 earthquakes, the mudflows, and activity of both 
volcanoes: 
 
“…y que los retumbos que hacen mover la tierra y se continúan hasta hoy 
los tiene causados del dicho volcán, por la dicha razón de la inmediación 
con que está la casa de su habitación, y así por esto como por las abras 
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que tiene dicho volcán de agua y la que por ellas se dice ha arrojado así a 
la banda del sur…”   
 
“…And that the retumbos that make the earth move and which continue to 
this day and he believes to be caused by the said volcano [on the basis 
that] the house in which he lives is near to it and … because of the 
openings that have appeared on Volcán de Agua and down which it has 
expelled [material] towards the south …” (T10) 
 
Additional tremors (T11) and mudflows (T22, T23) were reported in October, 
although the peak of the activity was on September 29-30. Mudflow activity, in contrast, 
continued to increase over the following days (T22). These events prompted great 
concerns, particularly that Agua volcano would “entirely burst” and flood the city of 
Santiago (T18). For this reason, two government officials were instructed to survey both 
volcanoes, paying particular attention to Agua (reported in T19-T30). Of most concern to 
the inhabitants of Santiago de Guatemala was the possibility that additional disturbances 
to either Volcán de Agua or Volcán de Fuego could trigger a collapse from the slopes of 
one volcano that would block the city’s only drainage, the Rio de Magdalena. They also 
considered that if Agua experienced another mudflow of the same magnitude but directed 
to the north, it would “undoubtedly” inundate the city (T6, T7, T8).   
 
5. Discussion 
 As described above, the Autos provide detailed spatial and temporal information 
about the cascading hazards that commenced with the late August awakening of Volcán 
de Fuego and ended with damaging local earthquakes, as well as mudflows from Volcán 
de Agua. They also provide important insight into the (mis)perceptions of some of the 
population about the nature of those hazards and their potential impact on the capital city. 
Here we first provide a geologic interpretation of the volcanic activity, the subsequent 
earthquakes and the culminating mudflows from Volcán de Agua. We then examine the 
local response to these events, particularly the perception of the people of Santiago de 
Guatemala that their city was in an unsafe location. 
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5.1 Interpretation of the events of August-September 1717 
 The evidence provided above supports previous interpretations of the August 27-
29, 1717 eruption as a VEI 4 event (GVP), particularly when compared with detailed 
descriptions of the most recent VEI 4 eruption in 1974 (Rose et al., 1978). Similarities 
between the two eruptions include the small precursory episodes of ash release, the high 
ash plumes that characterized the peak activity, and the accompanying ‘rivers of fire’ 
(pyroclastic flows). Eruptive activity in 1717 appears, however, to have peaked more 
quickly (between August 27 and 29), and decayed more rapidly, than the 1974 activity, 
which continued for two weeks. Another similarity is the formation of hot and steaming 
abras (openings, fissures) on the volcano. In 1717, openings variously described as 
abras, bocas, zanjas, and barrancas appeared on both the south flank and on the east 
flank (toward Agua). In 1974, fissures and seismicity defined a dominant structural trend 
along a NNE-SSW axis, while a weakness to the east was suggested by microseismicity 
immediately following the 1974 activity (Rose et al., 1978). 
Several months of microseismicity recorded after the 1974 Volcán de Fuego 
eruption were interpreted to result from continued activity of the dyke-like conduit 
responsible for feeding the eruptive activity (Rose et al., 1978). Similar near-surface 
magma migration may have continued after the end of the visible eruption in 1717. 
Evidence for continued magmatic activity includes the numerous reported retumbos 
(heard) and temblores (felt) earthquakes in September (Fig. 3). Descriptions of barrancas 
and the widely reported sensation of ‘hollow ground’ underfoot in the region between 
Fuego and Agua may also record surface and near-surface openings created by extension 
above intruding magma, although this sensation may also record properties of fresh 
(unconsolidated) volcanic deposits. Heat from young pyroclastic debris, perhaps 
enhanced by hydrothermal waters, could explain the numerous observations of steam. 
The most unusual element of the post-eruption unrest was its culmination in 
several strong earthquakes on September 29, 1717. Witness testimonies indicate that 
these events were local, and not regional. Support for this interpretation comes from 
accounts that show that, although the earthquakes clearly affected parts of the capital city 
Santiago de Guatemala and were felt to a lesser degree along the Costa de Escuintla (over 
70 km to the south), they were felt most intensely in Alotenango and Ciudad Vieja (that 
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is between Volcán de Agua and Volcán de Fuego; T5; Fig. 4). In fact, some testimonies 
state explicitly that the earthquake activity was hardly experienced outside of those towns 
(e.g., T10), and that the towns most severely affected were those on the slopes of Volcán 
de Agua (T12). This pattern of impact strongly suggests that seismic activity was related 
to the volcano(es), as so many of the witnesses claimed.  
Even more unusual were the mudflows from Agua, which several witnesses 
claimed to have been triggered by – and coincided precisely with – the seismic activity 
(e.g. T5). Evidence for triggering includes not only the synchroneity of the events but 
also emanation of the mudflows from new abras on the SW flanks of the volcano (Fig. 6) 
and abundance of yellow mud, both of which suggest involvement of a hydrothermal 
system within Agua’s edifice. Witnesses also note that the mudflows were accompanied 
by loud sounds described as estruendos. Here the interpretation of the language is 
important. T10, who was in Ciudad Vieja when the earthquake took place, stated that 
‘such was the noise that the said volcano [Agua] was making that it terrified him’, 
thinking it to indicate that it had ‘burst’. T5’s testimony specifically differentiates 
retumbos heard in or from Fuego at the time of the earthquake, and the traquido that 
came from Agua a short while after, at precisely the moment that he (and, he said, many 
others) heard a large volume of water ‘sprout’ from it as well. Thus although it is possible 
that the estruendos may have been generated by sustained crashing of debris carried 
within the mudflows, we favor the interpretation that this term referred to an explosive 
source, particularly because the term is sometimes accompanied by strong qualifying 
adjectives such as ‘terrifying’ and ‘horrifying’ (T17). Also important is the absence of 
reports of heavy rain in 1717 of the kind that was widely reported in relation to the events 
of 1541 (e.g. in the Autos). From this we conclude that the mudflows could not have been 
generated by excessive rainfall, but instead resulted from groundwater emerging from 
within the volcano.  
Taken together, we hypothesize that a magmatic intrusion from Fuego (probably 
in the form of a dyke) triggered both the September 29 earthquakes and the mudflows 
from Agua. Support for this hypothesis comes not only from the timing of the events and 
the nature of the mudflow activity (from apparently new openings and directed down 
southern, rather than northern, drainages, as well as the large volume of water and 
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description of yellow mud), but also from reports of increased flow intensity over the 
next few days (T22), continued flow through October 13 (T22), and a new flow on Oct 
15 (T23). Continued emanation of water from these new vents is not consistent with a 
rainfall-triggered flood, particularly as there is no description of unusual rainfall during 
this time period. Instead, it strongly suggests rupturing of Agua’s hydrothermal system, 
most likely as a consequence of faulting related to magma movement from Fuego. 
 
5.2 Other examples of cascading volcano hazards involving hydrothermal systems 
Magma-induced changes in subsurface hydrologic systems are not uncommon. 
Manifestations of such changes include phreatic (steam-driven) explosions, changes in 
hydrothermal systems, groundwater-triggered mudflows and elevated fluxes in local 
rivers (e.g., Gadow, 1930; Roobol and Smith, 1975; Witze and Kanipe, 2014) or even 
large landslides (e.g., Voight et al., 1981, 1983; Siebert, 2002). Less common, although 
not unheard of, is disturbance of a hydrothermal system in one volcano by magmatic 
activity at a neighboring volcano. Perhaps the most dramatic example of such triggered 
activity is provided by the 1792 eruption of Unzen volcano, Japan (e.g., Siebert et al., 
1987; Siebert, 2002).  
Mount Unzen is a volcanic complex that includes the active peak – Fugen-dake – 
and an older (dormant) peak, the Mayu-yama dome. Fugen-dake erupted on February 10, 
1792, after three months of precursory seismicity and phreatic eruptions. Explosive 
activity gave way to lava flows on March 1; by late April, seismic activity (both felt and 
heard) had propagated to Mayu-yama, 5 km to the east. An earthquake on April 29 
caused the dome to slide 200m, and prompted evacuation of the local population. Three 
weeks later, on May 21, two strong earthquakes triggered a debris avalanche from Mayu-
yama that traveled to the sea; the resulting tsunami killed ~15,000 people, making it the 
most devastating volcanic disaster in Japanese history (e.g., Siebert et al., 1987). In the 
weeks following the collapse, hot water continued to flow from the scarp, consistent with 
release of a pressurized hydrothermal system (Siebert, 2002).  
The collapse of Mayu-yama dome was probably caused by saturation of the 
volcanic edifice as hydrothermal waters migrated in front of advancing magma from 
Fugen-dake. We suggest a similar scenario for the 1717 mudflows from Agua volcano. 
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As in Japan, both seismic activity and fissure formation suggest subterranean magma 
migration between the late August Fuego eruption and the late September earthquakes 
and mudflows from Agua. Also similar is the sustained emission of initially over-
pressured water (sufficient to form new outlets on the flanks of Agua) from a 
hydrothermal system (evidenced by the temperature, color and smell of the mud). 
“Remotely”-triggered activity between nearby active and dormant volcanic systems is not 
often considered in volcanic hazard assessment, either because of its rarity or because 
triggering has not been recognized. In the specific case of Agua, we suggest that this 
event was sufficiently unusual (in both location and in the nature of the flows themselves) 
to add to the anxiety of local communities already stressed by the rather severe eruption 
and the 33 days of subsequent unrest. 
 
5.3 The long shadow of 1541 
 The events of August-September 1717, although clearly disruptive, were not 
catastrophic, at least in comparison with either the events of 1541 or 1773. Since the time 
of settlement, people in this part of Guatemala had lived with frequent volcanic and 
seismic activity, and over time some came to recognize that these geophysical events 
were linked (T36). Why, then, did the events of August to September 1717 provoke such 
a strong reaction, and lead so many of the inhabitants of Santiago de Guatemala to first 
evacuate the city and then demand that a new capital be built at a greater distance from 
Agua? Above we suggest that both the sequence and nature of the events were 
sufficiently unusual to provoke concern. Here we provide a context for this hypothesis by 
reviewing the types of information provided by the eyewitnesses and municipal officials 
regarding previous destructive events related to both eruptions from Fuego and regional 
seismic activity. We then examine the specific nature of threats posed by Agua, 
particularly when placed in the context of memories of the catastrophic 1541 debris 
avalanche and mudflow. 
Volcán de Fuego is frequently active, and has been since the Spanish conquest; in 
fact, Fuego may have been erupting when the Spanish first arrived in the region (Restall 
and Asselbergs, 2007). The Autos demonstrate that local residents were familiar with 
Fuego’s eruptive history. For example, witnesses explicitly mentioned eruptions earlier in 
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the century, while municipal officials drew attention to the fact that much of the land was 
“made by volcanoes” (T17). Official reports about the 1717 events include accounts of 
the 1705 Fuego eruption, particularly the “exceptional quantity of sand and ash that 
obscured the sun and the daylight”. More generally, it is stated that more residents of 
Guatemala had been killed by “fuegos del volcán” than had died from human conflict 
(T46).  
Several of the testimonies in the Autos also relate to seismic activity. One witness 
(T17) stated that the city of Santiago de Guatemala had had to be rebuilt three times since 
the 16th century because of numerous eruptions and earthquakes, and another (T30) noted 
that the terrain was ‘sandy’ (probably covered with volcanic ash) and therefore unstable. 
Accounts documenting damage caused by the earthquake of September 29 include (1) 
descriptions of the unusual places where Mass was being celebrated because of damage 
to churches (T2, T30), (2) the total destruction of Alotenango (T29), (3) the estimated 
costs of rebuilding Santiago de Guatemala (T32, T41), (4) the prominent families who in 
December 1717 were still living on the streets because of earthquake damage and fear of 
further tremors (T37, T44), and (5) the effect of these impacts on tax collection (T40, 
T46). These statements provided the rationale for relocating the city farther away from 
the “pernicious” and “nearby enemy volcanoes”. 
The most striking feature of the Autos, however, is the reaction to the mudflows 
from Agua, which were considered not only unusual but also terrifying. The testimonies 
show that fears provoked by the mudflows were inflated relative to the actual hazard, and 
were deeply rooted in memories of the devastating mudflows that destroyed the original 
capital city in 1541. The 1541 event is specifically invoked by three accounts in the Autos 
(T6, T36, T44), all of which refer to the >600 casualties from that event. This information 
was transmitted in both oral and written form, an example of the latter being the inclusion 
in the Autos of an extract from Franciscan friar and historian Francisco Vasquez’s 1714 
Cronica de la Provincia del Santisimo Nombre de Jesus de Guatemala, in which he 
reviewed the natural disasters that had affected the city since its founding, beginning with 
the “fatal flood” of 1541. In his description of the event he emphasized the heavy 
hurricane-generated rainfall that preceded the 1541 mudflows, as well as the terrible 
noises and ground shaking that accompanied the collapse. Although other witnesses did 
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not refer specifically to the events of 1541, many did express fears of inundation (by 
water) during the night of September 29 (T6, T7, T8, T10, T12, T13, T15, T16, T18, 
T21). More specifically, witnesses were concerned about spontaneous generation of 
mudflows from the flanks of Agua and consequent blockage of the only drainage from 
the city (Rio de Magdalena), which ran between the two volcanoes (Fuego and Agua). 
These fears prompted many to consider moving farther from the volcanoes (T8, T12, 
T16, T17) and underpinned the arguments made at a public meeting on October 20 to 
request permission to relocate the capital city (T42).  
 
5.4 Social memory and hazard perception 
 The critical importance of the 1541 events in the community interpretation of, and 
response to, the cascading hazards of August-September 1717 provides a clear example 
of ‘social memory’ (McIntosh et al., 2000) and the role of past events in determining 
what is perceived to be a disaster (Slovic, 2000; Bankoff, 2004; Perez, 2001). The time 
frame of community memory and vulnerability has been recognized (e.g., Oliver-Smith 
1986; 2002; Bankoff, 2004) but commonly does not find a place within theoretical 
frameworks of disaster and change (e.g., Birkmann et al., 2010). This omission reflects 
(1) recent theoretical advances in disaster studies, which focus on either modern disasters 
or catastrophic collapse of ancient empires, neither of which provide the time resolution 
required for studies of the impacts of social memories (e.g., Diamond and Robinson 
2010; Cooper et al., 2012); (2) the limited number of historical studies of regions prone to 
repeated events (e.g., Chester et al., 2012); and (3) neglect, until recently, of social 
memories preserved within oral traditions (e.g., Masse et al., 2007; Cronin and Cashman 
2008; Cashman and Cronin, 2008; Cashman and Giordano, 2008 and references therein).  
 Here we use the 1717 events to illustrate the power of social memory to drive 
hazard mitigation. For example, population displacement (migration) has been a common 
response to recent disastrous events (Witham, 2005); it also represents an effective long-
term strategy for coping with hazards (Riede, 2014). From this perspective, we can view 
the inhabitants of Santiago de Guatemala as engaging in a response driven not by 
irrational fears or misperceptions of the actual hazards, but by attempts to employ a 
rational strategy to reduce their vulnerability to future events. That they were attempting 
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to do this within the restrictions imposed by a colonial structure – restrictions that 
required extensive evidence-based documentation of the natural events and their impacts 
– provides a unique window into the workings of social memory in a pre-industrial and 
semi-autonomous community.  
The Autos also provide an example of an early systematic survey of both a 
cascade of hazardous events and their impact. The Autos are systematic in the formulaic 
structure of each testimony, which imposes uniformity on eyewitness data collection that 
presages the format of social science surveys developed more than three centuries later. 
Of critical importance to our study are data related to the position of each witness, and 
the extent to which the accounts are based on first hand observations or second hand 
consultation of eyewitnesses. Also interesting is the application of scientific methods to 
establish, for example, the local origin of the September 29 earthquake, which they did 
by soliciting accounts from both local and distant (El Salvador) observers. The Autos thus 
provide “scientific” documentation of hazardous events and their impacts; we suggest 
that this type of historical documentation is critical to improve both scientific 
understanding of specific past events and community resilience in the face of future 
events. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
 Here we have demonstrated ways in which Spanish archival sources provide key 
information about both the physical nature of a cascading sequence of natural hazards 
and a long-term cascade of responses triggered by memories of an early catastrophic 
event. We have also shown that documentation of the 1717 activity in the form of the 
Autos is unusual from the perspective of natural hazard studies, in that it provides an 
early example of both a systematic survey of the physical nature and impact of a complex 
sequence of natural events, as well as a social science survey of human responses to this 
activity.  
The scientific importance of the events of 1717 lies in the suggestion that 
magmatic (and associated seismic) activity at Fuego triggered a disturbance of the 
hydrothermal system at neighbouring Agua. Although not unprecedented (e.g., Siebert et 
al., 1987), remote triggering of hydrothermal activity is unusual, and raises important 
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questions about hazard assessment of apparently dormant volcanoes such as Agua (e.g., 
Schilling et al., 2001). Our interpretation of a cascading sequence of hazards transferred 
from Fuego to Agua also provides a new and integrated perspective of the 1717 activity. 
This integrated view contrasts with previous geologic and historic interpretations, which 
consider, separately, the volcanic (e.g., Vallance et al., 2001; Martin and Rose, 1981), 
seismic (e.g., Feldman, 1993) and hydrologic (e.g., Schilling et al., 2001) events. More 
broadly, our analysis places the August-September, 1717, activity at Fuego and Agua 
within a larger framework of volcano-triggered hydrologic hazards that includes the 
under-appreciated hazard posed by interactions between volcanic systems. 
The historical importance of this work lies in the systematic eyewitness accounts 
assembled in the Autos. Organized scientific responses to volcanic eruptions can be dated 
to the 1883 eruption of Krakatau, which was followed by detailed studies of both regional 
and global impacts of the event (e.g., Simkin and Fiske, 1983). Modern social science 
studies of natural hazards, in contrast, start with seminal work in the 1960s that was 
summarized by Burton et al. (1978). As a social survey, the Autos provide surprising 
detail, particularly given the low physical impact of the events (they did not create a 
natural disaster). From the ‘long shadow’ perspective, the key observation is that this 
response – systematic collection of witness accounts from a broad geographic region – 
can be linked directly to the still-vivid memories of a catastrophic mudflow 176 years 
earlier. The strength of these memories, as demonstrated by the extremity of the response 
(a plea by many citizens to relocate the capital city), not only supports Slovic’s (2000) 
emphasis on memorability as a key element of risk perception, but also shows the 
potential complexity of responses of past societies to hazardous events. This view 
supports the idea that natural disasters may be viewed as both historical processes and 
sequential events (Bankoff, 2004).  
Finally, our research illustrates the challenges and limitations of working with 
archival data, as well as the new insights that historical sources provide into the 
chronology and impact on communities of past natural hazard events. Critical for this 
type of archival research is collaboration among historians and scientists. The witnesses 
lacked formal scientific nomenclature for the events described and so the descriptions in 
the Autos are qualitative and of varying detail; the language is descriptive and often 
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metaphorical, and thus requires (necessarily subjective) translation into modern scientific 
language, which required the input of volcanologists. Additionally, however, information 
gleaned from historical sources requires detailed contextual knowledge of the source and 
the meanings of the words used at the time they were written, as provided by historians. 
For example, collection of the Autos for the express purpose of providing evidence to 
persuade the Spanish government to support the municipal government’s request to 
relocate the capital city led us to consider the degree of exaggeration in the accounts. We 
conclude that this context does not seem to have compromised the veracity of the 
observations of the events themselves and may, if anything, have encouraged the 
witnesses to include key historical details about past eruptions, earthquakes and 
mudflows. Explicit consideration of past events (particularly the 1541 mudflow), in turn, 
helps to explain what appears, initially, to be an extreme over-reaction to a moderate 
eruption and strong, but not unprecedented, earthquakes and mudflows.  
In summary, recent studies have shown the importance of employing the “usable 
past” (Stump, 2013) to provide immediacy to both hazard forecast scenarios and 
evidence-based policy recommendations (Reide, 2014). The mudflows from Agua 
triggered by magmatic activity at Fuego provide such an example, and suggest the 
importance of assessing volcanic hazard from regional, as well as the more typical single-
volcano, perspectives. At the same time, this work illustrates the role of memory in risk 
perception. Understanding communal memories is crucial not only for effective risk 
communication and improved resilience, but also for inferring causal relationships 
between hazardous events and apparent responses in historical and archaeological 
records. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1  Location map showing the three capital cities of Guatemala and the nearby 
volcanoes. The cities are currently known as Ciudad Vieja (formerly Santiago de los 
Caballeros, founded in 1527), Antigua (formerly Santiago de Guatemala, relocated in 
1542), and Guatemala City (relocated in 1773 following a large regional earthquake). The 
volcanoes Atitlan, Fuego, Agua and Pacaya lie along the Central America volcanic arc. 
All have been active during historical times except Agua. 
 
Figure 2  Eruptive history of Fuego volcano since 1524, when the Spanish first arrived in 
the area. Data are from the Smithsonian Global Volcanism Program database 
[http://www.volcano.si.edu/] and provide a measure of the eruption size using the 
Volcano Explosivity Index [http://volcanoes.usgs.gov/images/pglossary/vei.php]. VEI 4 
eruptions of 1717 and 1974 are highlighted, as is the only other VEI 4 eruption between 
1524 and 1717, in 1581. 
 
Figure 3  Map showing the approximate location of witness testimonies. Where the 
witnesses traveled to survey the effects of the different events, they are placed in all 
relevant locations. See Table S1 (Supplementary Material) for details. 
 
Figure 4  Map showing the witness locations and inferred intensity (yellow, low intensity 
to orange, high intensity) of the September 29, 1717 earthquake. Key is the evidence 
from witnesses in El Salvador that they did not feel this event, which means that it was 
local. Also important is the evidence that the damage was most severe in Alotenango, 
which lies between the two volcanoes. 
 
Figure 5  Map showing the witness locations and inferred intensity (pale green, low 
intensity to blue, high intensity) of the September 29 mudflows from Agua. Importantly 
these flows emanated from the southwest slopes of Agua and traveled south, and thus did 
not affect the capital city. 
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Figure 6  Sketch map from the Autos showing the new boccas formed on the flanks of 
Agua that fed the September 29 mudflows (from witness T23). The witness shows the 
flows merging upslope of him, splitting around high ground and converging down slope; 
the flow eventually fed into the Rio Guacalate near Escuintla. Reproduced courtesy of the 
Archivo General de Centro América, Guatemala City. 
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Abstract 
 
Assessing and communicating the risks posed by natural hazards requires not only a 
thorough understanding of the hazards but also an understanding of the spatial and 
temporal impact of successive events from the same source(s). This 4 dimensional 
approach requires the lens of time, which is often missing from modern responses to 
recent hazards, but also details of the event chronology and immediate human impact, 
which must be inferred from archaeological studies. Here we provide an example to 
illustrate the use of historical documents to fill this gap. We focus on the volcanically and 
seismically active region that hosts the capital city of Guatemala, which has be relocated 
twice in response to hazardous events since its original founding in 1524. More 
specifically, we examine documents, entitled “Autos Hechos Sobre el Lastimoso, Estrago 
y Ruina que Padecio esta Ciudad de Guatemala   …"  [Autos] that were collected in 
response to a cascading sequence of volcanic, seismic and mudflow events in 1717 to 
support a request to the Spanish government to relocate the second capital city. These 
documents provide exceptional detail about the location of the witnesses, the nature of 
the hazardous activity and the response of local communities to individual events. This 
detail allows us not only to reconstruct the sequence of events but also to link volcanic 
activity at Volcán de Fuego to both local seismicity and mudflows from Volcán de Agua, 
which we interpret as triggered by intruding magma from Fuego. Additionally, the long 
and well documented history of the region shows how a single catastrophic event – in this 
case a large rainfall-triggered debris flow from Agua in 1541, which destroyed the first 
capital city – can reverberate through the centuries and affect the response of the local 
community almost 200 years later, in 1717, even though the origin and affected area of 
the mudflow hazard was very different in the two cases. This example thus illustrates the 
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importance   of   “memorability”   in   both   the   perception   of,   and   response to, hazardous 
events (e.g., Slovic, 2000). 
 
1. Introduction 
 Recent volcanic eruptions, such as that of Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland in 
2010, have stimulated important interactions among scientists, social scientists and 
emergency managers. However, such studies of recent events tend naturally to focus on 
immediate impacts, with the result that hazard management aims to improve immediate 
physical impacts of hazard (vulnerability), often at the expense of developing long-term 
(and sustainable) strategies for hazard mitigation (resilience; e.g., White et al., 2001). 
This  approach,  however,  ignores  the  ‘long  shadow’  (e.g.,  Grattan  and  Torrence,  2007)  of  
such  disasters,  where  ‘long’   refers   to   time  scales   relevant   for  either  political  or  cultural  
change (e.g., Birkmann et al., 2010; Diamond and Robinson, 2010). A long view is 
provided, in contrast, by archaeological studies of the impact of past volcanic disasters on 
human societies (e.g., Sheets and Grayson, 1979). A challenge to archaeological studies, 
however, is causality must be assumed rather than proven (Coombes and Barber 2005; 
Leroy 2006). The time gap between archaeological and present day research is the realm 
of history, which can contribute robust chronologies that allow cause and effect to be 
linked (e.g., Vittori et al., 2007).  
Here we use the historical record of Spanish colonial Guatemala to improve 
fundamental understanding of volcano-related hazards in the region, and to examine the 
role of past events on the response of the local population to an unusual cascading 
sequence of hazards in August and September of 1717. The written record of the area is 
extensive, because the events of interest occurred near the second location of the capital 
city of Guatemala, Santiago de Guatemala (now known as Antigua; Fig. 1), which lies 
close to the active Volcán de Fuego and dormant Volcán de Agua. Importantly, the first 
capital city – Santiago de los Caballeros – was destroyed by a disastrous mudflow from 
nearby Volcán de Agua in 1541, only 17 years after it was founded. The immediate 
consequence was relocation of the city to higher ground; the much more profound, and 
longer lasting, consequence was not only extended scientific debate about the mudflow 
origin (e.g., Maudsley, 1899; Anderson, 1908; Carmak, 1973), but also the extent to 
which the destruction of Santiago de los Caballeros still looms large in the minds of local 
inhabitants. Here we examine the impact of the 1541 mudflow as viewed through the lens 
of a cascading sequence of hazardous events involving both Volcán de Agua and 
neighboring Volcán de Fuego in 1717 almost two centuries later, events that prompted 
local citizens to demand relocation of the capital city for a second time. 
 
2. Background 
It is well known that disastrous events can act as natural experiments (Diamond 
and Robinson, 2010) and/or catalysts of change (e.g., Burby et al., 2000; Perez, 2001; 
Birkmann et al., 2010). Change may occur by migration (abandoning the hazardous 
location) or adaptation, such as risk-based land use planning. To be effective, such 
planning must balance the benefits, as well as the drawbacks, of living in hazardous areas 
(e.g., White et al. 2001; Glavovic et al., 2010), and engage both community members and 
government officials (e.g., Cronin et al., 2004; Cashman and Cronin, 2008; Ricci et al., 
2013). A key factor that affects community perceptions of risk is the memorability (and 
imaginability) of individual hazards (e.g., Slovic, 2000), such that an event that is 
memorable within the community for its real or perceived impact will be weighted more 
heavily in planning decisions than an event that is not as easily imagined. A modern 
example is the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear accident and the effect of that accident on 
perceptions of risk related to nuclear power (e.g., Slovic et al., 1982; Kasperson et al., 
1988). A different perspective on memorability can be found in studies of oral traditions. 
When stories must be passed orally from generation to generation, a community disaster 
may  become  “a  defining   experience   that  passes   into   shared  memory”   (Perez,  2001).   In  
this way, inherited stories, whether oral or written, are often preserved where the 
knowledge contained is critical to community survival (e.g., Barber and Barber, 2006), 
and thus may critically influence community planning of future generations.  
 The long history (~ 300 years) of Spanish occupation of the area around Volcán 
de Fuego [Fuego] and neighboring Volcán de Agua [Agua] provides an unusual 
opportunity to evaluate both the behavior of the volcanoes and the communities that have 
grown up in their shadows. Both volcanoes form part of the central Guatemala arc (Fig. 
1). Fuego has been one of the most persistently active of the Guatemalan volcanoes, with 
57 confirmed eruptions, and several more unconfirmed, since the arrival of Spanish 
colonists in 1524 (Smithsonian Institute, Global Volcanism Program [GVP] database). 
Documentation   of   Fuego’s   activity   is   reasonably   good   because   of   its   proximity   to   the  
original capital city of Santiago de los Caballeros, and to the relocated city of Santiago de 
Guatemala. Agua, in contrast, has no documented eruptions in the Holocene (Bonis and 
Salazar, 1973; Schilling et al., 2001; GVP). It has had, instead, numerous mudflows that 
have affected the area to the north of the volcano, including the area occupied by the first 
capital city (now Ciudad Vieja). 
 Fuego is basaltic andesite in composition, and most of its eruptions have been 
moderate in size and intensity (VEI 2 or 3; GVP). At the extremes are periods of 
persistent  low  level  ‘open  vent’  activity  (Lyons  et  al., 2010), and larger (VEI 4) eruptions 
(Rose et al., 1978; Lyons et al., 2010; GVP). Recorded activity is episodic, with four 20-
70 year periods of high activity accounting for 75% of the total (Fig. 2).  Interestingly, 
this episodicity appears to be regional, such that activity at Fuego mirrors the rest of the 
Central American volcanoes (Martin and Rose, 1981). More importantly, by 1717, 
inhabitants  of  Santiago  de  Guatemala  were  very  familiar  with  Fuego’s  range  of  volcanic  
activity. 
 Mudflows from Agua also vary in intensity, with the most severe being that of 
September 1541. The mudflow was caused by a debris flow that originated from the 
volcano’s   summit   after   unusually   heavy   rainfall.   In this the event was similar to the 
devastating debris avalanche and resulting debris flow from dormant Casitas volcano, 
Nicaragua, in 1998, that was caused by intense rainfall associated with Hurricane Mitch 
(e.g., Schilling et al., 2001; Scott et al., 2005). The most recent mudflow to affect the area 
was caused by heavy rains associated with Tropical Storm Agatha in 2010. Much more 
unusual are mudflows that affect other sectors of the volcano. One such event occurred in 
September 1717, when mudflows associated with a large regional earthquake devastated 
areas on the southwest flank of the volcano. It is this event – both its cause and its impact 
on the local communities – that are the subject of this paper. 
In 1717, Guatemala was part of the Spanish Empire; it was ruled by the Spanish 
monarch, but governed by a complex hierarchy of royal officials at the regional and local 
level. The historical sources that we analyze here were produced by municipal officials in 
Santiago de Guatemala (Antigua) in the aftermath of the events of August-September of 
that year, and in response to demands by many of its residents that the city be relocated. 
Officials within the cabildo, or municipal government, themselves residents of long-
standing, shared the view that in the light of the extent of the damage suffered by the city 
as a result of the recent earthquake, it was imperative to obtain the required formal royal 
approval to initiate the process of relocation. It was with this purpose in mind that the 
cabildo empowered alcalde ordinario Juan de Rubayo Morante to carry out 
investigations in the local area, to interview key witnesses, and to dispatch their 
testimonies, along with other evidence in support of their case, to Spain. The resulting 
file, comprising nearly 180 densely-written and bound pages, was entitled “Autos Hechos 
Sobre el Lastimoso, Estrago y Ruina que Padecio esta Ciudad de Guatemala   …"  
(henceforth, Autos), a copy of which is housed in the Archivo General de Centro América 
(AGCA) in Guatemala City.  
Individual testimonies contained in the Autos describe a succession of natural 
disasters, beginning with a VEI 4 eruption (GVP) of Volcán de Fuego on August 27th 
and 28th of 1717 and culminating with a series of severe local earthquakes and major 
mudflows from Volcán de Agua in late September. Taken together, these testimonies 
represent a remarkable historical record of social and scientific significance. From a 
scientific perspective, they provide important insight into a rare example of triggered 
(cascading) hazards, where activity at one volcano triggers activity at a neighboring 
volcano. From a social science perspective, the (over-) reaction that prompted this 
interesting early example of hazard data collection derived explicitly from memories of 
the catastrophic (defining) event in 1541. 
 
3. Methods 
 
The Autos comprise 45 separate documents that record written and oral accounts 
provided by testimonies of 20 individuals, including municipal officials, eyewitnesses, 
and residents with experience of prior similar events.  Given the motives that led to their 
production – namely, to support the cabildo’s  case for relocation of the capital city – we 
address the issue of credibility at the outset (Leroy, 2006), specifically the possibility the 
experience, impact and consequences of the events that took place in 1717 may have 
been exaggerated for the purpose of enhancing the case for relocation. The similarity 
between the accounts that discuss the timing and nature of the activity leads us to 
conclude, however, that this bias did not affect the accuracy of reporting in this regard. At 
the same time, we are interested in the witness bias from the perspective of assessing the 
ways in which the response of the community was affected by the longer history of prior 
damaging events, and most particularly by the memory of the disaster that destroyed the 
original city of Santiago de los Caballeros in 1541.  
Extracting specific geologic information from the Autos required first reading and 
translating the accounts, and then a second translation from the descriptive original 
language to modern geologic terminology. The formulaic nature of the process of 
evidence-gathering – a characteristic of Spanish colonial judicial processes – enables us 
to place the witnesses in specific locations at the time the events they describe occurred, 
and to record these in a GIS database, which in turn allows us to assess the spatial as well 
as temporal reach of the events experienced (Fig. 3). Other testimonies provide 
information about events witnessed from afar, or told to the witness by someone else. 
Testimonies by witnesses who traveled extensively to collect data are attached to multiple 
locations on the maps. Each testimony was then reviewed for (1) geologic information, 
(2) timing of events and (3) information about event impact. In the text below, we 
reference individual testimonies using the testimony number (T1, etc.), which is keyed to 
witness locations shown in Figure 3 and included in Table S1 (Supplementary Material).  
 
4. Results 
 
The Autos describe a sequence of natural events that began with a large eruption 
at Fuego on August 27-29, 1717, and ended with a destructive local earthquake on 
September 29 and subsequent south-traveling mudflows from Agua. Below we 
summarize observations from the Autos of the eruption, the subsequent geophysical 
activity, and the events of late September.  
 
4.1 Eruption of Fuego, August 27-28, 1717  
Eighteen of the documents in the Autos describe the eruption of Fuego. All concur 
that the eruption occurred on August 27th and 28th (e.g., T5), although some witnesses say 
that it continued into August 29th (e.g., T7, T8 and T14). The first signs of activity were 
small ash pulses on the evening of August 27th (T14); the main phase started on the 
evening of August 27th (T11, T16, T34). For many of the witnesses, the first indications 
of activity were not visual, but instead were estruendos (crashing sounds) that were 
particularly loud later that evening (T8). By the following day, emitted ash obscured the 
daylight   and   witnesses   described   “rivers   of   fire”   from   the   summit   that   contained 
variously sized rocks that traveled with so much force that they uprooted trees (T44). We 
interpret these to be pyroclastic flows produced by collapse of advancing lava flows, as 
seen in 1974 (Rose et al., 1978). 
Predictably, accounts of the activity vary with witness location (Fig. 4). Witnesses 
who were relatively close to the volcano (T1, T34, T44) focused on the plume that 
reached   “high”   into   the   air,   starting   on   August   27th. They also described estruendos, 
retumbos (rumbles), temblores (tremors), and shaking of the ground during the eruptive 
activity (T1, T5, T34). In Santiago de Guatemala, it was claimed that the eruption 
deposited so much ash that people had to cover their eyes to walk through the streets 
(T34). Witnesses in the capital city also reported  that  the  ‘fire’  from  the  volcano  could  be  
seen at night from <40 (T17) to >100 leagues (222 – 556 km) away (T44). Confirmation 
comes from a witness in San Miguel (El Salvador; located approximately 50 leagues 
from Santiago de Guatemala), who reported tall llamas (flames) of fire on the night of 
August 28th (T11). Retumbos were also heard at great distances from the volcano, as 
reported  by  the  two  witnesses  in  El  Salvador,  who  either  ‘experienced’  (T13)  or  ‘heard’  
(T11) retumbos during August 27-28 eruptive activity.  
Direct damage from the eruption was worst in the valley between Fuego and 
Agua, including the pueblos of Siquinala, Santa Lucia, and Alotenango (T26). Although 
the vecinos (inhabitants) of Santiago de Guatemala were not directly affected by the 
eruption, many were terrified by the combination of the fire, rocks, smoke and ash: 
 
“…  Que  es  cierto  …  que   los   terremotos  y  otros  graves  perjuicios,  que  se  
han experimentado en esta ciudad, provienen de los volcanes inmediatos a 
ella, como se ha experimentado en muchas ocasiones, y especialmente la 
noche del día viente y siete de Agosto pasado de este presente año, y el día 
siguiente en que el uno de ellos abortó voraces lenguas de fuego y humo, 
cuyo estruendo aterrorizó a todos los habitadores de esta  ciudad…”   
 
“It   is   true  …   that   the   earthquakes  and  other   serious  afflictions   that  have  
been experienced in this city, derive from the volcanoes which lie nearby, 
as has been experienced on many occasions, and especially on the night of 
27 August of this year and the following day when one of these aborted 
voracious tongues of fire and smoke, making crashing sounds that 
terrorized  all  of  the  inhabitants  of  this  city.” 
(T5) 
 
4.2 Post-eruptive activity – August 29 – September 29, 1717 
 
During, and for at least 33 days following, the eruption of Fuego on August 
27th, the volcano showed signs of unrest, particularly in the form of both 
retumbos and temblores (T1, T8, T14, T44). According to accounts in the Autos, 
retumbos were primarily heard (T5, T10), although in some instances they were 
also felt (T1, T14); the temblores often mentioned in the same context were 
always felt (ground shaking). Witnesses in proximal locations insisted that both 
were from sources near (T10), or  even  “inside”  (T5),  the  volcano. 
During the same period, the Autos also provide numerous descriptions of 
ground fissures, or barrancas (ravines), that increased from meters to tens to 
hundreds of meters in width and depth (T2, T5, T14, T15). It is unclear from the 
accounts whether these fissures formed during, or shortly after, the August 27-28 
eruption. At the same time a brecha (breach) opened on Fuego from the summit 
to the east (toward Alotenango; T5, T7, T17):  
 
“…      con   la   ocasión   del   reconocimiento que hizo del dicho Volcán de 
Fuego, temiendo el que sus piedras no atajasen el dicho rio desagüe de 
esta ciudad y de dichas haciendas, subió parte de el arriba como hasta más 
que medio volcán, y vio una barranca que corre a la cima para abajo, tan 
profunda que le causó terror y miedo, que al parecer tendrá como hasta 
cien varas de hondura, y de ancho como media cuadra, la cual le dijo un 
indio que llevaba en su compañía que era nuevamente abierta con la 
ocasión del fuego que había echado porque antes de él solo era una 
pequeña barranquilla de vara y media de hondo, por donde con facilidad 
bajaban  y  conducían  madera…” 
 
“…at  the  time  of  the  survey  of  Volcán  de  Fuego  which  he  conducted,  [and]  
fearing that the rocks might block the river drainage of this city and 
[surrounding] haciendas, he climbed more than half-way up the volcano 
and saw a ravine that ran from the summit downwards, so deep that [on 
seeing it] he felt terror and fear.  It appears to be up to 100 varas in depth 
[~83m], and about a half cuadra in width [125m], and according to an 
Indian who accompanied him, it had opened recently, at the same time as 
the fire spewed [by the volcano], because previously it was only a shallow 
ravine, 1.5 varas in depth, down which they comfortably transported 
wood…”   
(T5) 
 
This witness also noted that the barranca must have carried a large current of water 
because of the branches and trees that it had transported to the river. Other witnesses 
claimed that another barranca had  formed  from  the  volcano’s  summit  to  the  south  (T14, 
T17), and that additional openings produced smoke or steam, and emanated heat and a 
stench that made people ill (T14, T15).   
 During the same period, seven of the accounts in Autos describe an unusual 
sensation that they felt when traveling near the volcano, which they likened to walking on 
hollow ground, or the way the ground sounds when horses or carriages were in motion 
(T1, T7, T14, T17, T29, T44). A report from the eastern slopes of Fuego (T15) recounts 
more specifically the sensation that a subterranean bóveda (cellar) existed beneath the 
volcano: 
 
“…y   que  …las   cabalgaduras  …   con   su   piso   parecía   pisaban   sobre   una  
bóveda y así mismo vieron salir algún humo del centro de dicho barranca 
como de unos  ronroneos  expeliendo  tanto  calor  y  hedor…” 
 
“…And  ..  it  appeared  [to  those]  on  horseback  that  with  each  step  they  were  
treading over a vault and they also saw some steam rise from the said 
ravine,  like  purrs  releasing  a  lot  of  heat  and  odor…”   
 
Importantly, this account links the sensation of hollow ground directly to the formation 
of a barranca that was releasing both heat and pungent steam.  
 
4.3 Earthquake of September 29, 1717 
 
On the evening of September 29, 1717, several large earthquakes destroyed much 
of Santiago de Guatemala and the surrounding pueblos, and took many lives (T1). The 
earthquakes clearly had a local origin (T10, T11, T13, T18), although they were also felt 
on the Costa de Escuintla (then called Costa de Esquintlapeque), about 70 km south of 
Santiago de Guatemala (Fig. 4). Critically, all witnesses (T5, T14, T15) were convinced 
that the earthquakes were caused by the volcanoes:   
 
“…Y   que   el   asentar   que   dichos   terremotos   provienen   de   los   volcanes   es  
porque tiene el declarante su residencia en las haciendas que fueron del 
Capitán Don Joseph de Castillo, que están casi en la falda del Volcán de 
Fuego por un lado, y por el otro lado con inmediación al de Agua, y por ello 
hallándose en el campo le cogieron dichos terremotos, en el, los cuales 
sintió con imponderable fuerza, o estrépito, y tal que fue preciso arrodillado 
acercarse de un palo para poderse mantener, y como estaba en la frente del 
dicho Volcán de Fuego, sintió que el ruido y fuerza de los terremotos salían 
de él, cuya presunción le confirman los retumbos que hacen mover la tierra 
porque los oye en el dicho volcán, el que tiene profundas barrancas, o abras 
recientes…”  
 “...   Because   the   witness   resides   in   the   haciendas   …   which   on   one   side  
extend almost to the slopes of Volcán de Fuego, and on the other lie close 
to [Volcán] de Agua, he can assert that said earthquakes come from the 
volcanoes  …  he   found  himself   in  his      fields when the earthquakes struck, 
with   such   strength     …   that,   kneeling,  he  had   to   lean  on  a   stick   to   steady  
himself. And as he was in front of Volcán de Fuego, he felt that the noise 
and force of the earthquakes came from it [the volcano]. His assumption is 
confirmed by the retumbos that make the earth move, because he hears 
them in said volcano [Fuego] which has [formed] new deep barrancas or 
openings…”   
(T5) 
 
The interpretation of a local source is supported by the severe damage reported in 
Alotenango and Ciudad Vieja, which lie between, and close to, both volcanoes (T10, 
T12, T29; Fig. 4). The earthquakes also caused significant damage within Santiago de 
Guatemala - one eyewitness estimated that the earthquake destroyed half the city (T31) – 
although here the bias of the witnesses would tend to exaggerate the impacts.  That said, 
one account provides a detailed and specific list of the damages to important religious 
and government buildings (T32). 
4.4  Mudflow from Volcán de Agua, September 29, 1717  
The impact of the September 29 earthquakes was compounded by mudflows from 
Agua that were apparently triggered by the seismic activity. The flows originated high on 
the southwest slopes of the volcano and travelled south, away from the primary 
population centers, and, it was said, eventually reached the ocean (Fig. 5). Not 
surprisingly, the pueblos Masagua and Mistlan on the Rio Guacalate were most impacted 
by the mudflows (T12). The most detailed description of the source of the mudflows 
comes from a witness from  the  pueblo  of  Esquintlapeque  (T23).  He  was  ‘four  leagues’  up  
the slopes of Volcán de Agua when the flows prevented him from continuing, so he 
climbed a small hill to get a better view. He describes three separate flows from upslope 
that first combined, and then split, around the high point where he was standing. The two 
resulting flows eventually merged into a single flow south and downslope from his 
location (Fig. 6) and continued down the southwest flank of the volcano to join the Rio 
Guacalate near Escuintla. This account provides the critical observation that the flows 
originated   from  new   ‘abras’   (openings)  on   the  upper   slopes  of   the  volcano   that  hadn’t  
been there before; for this reason the witnesses attributed the flows directly to the 
September 29th earthquake (e.g., T12).  
Several witnesses assert that the mudflow moved with great force and was very 
large, and that it carried sizeable sticks and rocks that were deposited along its path (T12, 
T15,  T21).   In   this   it   sounds   like  a   ‘normal’  debris   flow.  However, some witnesses also 
noted that the mudflows had unusual properties: they were yellow, they had a distinctive 
and repugnant sulphurous smell, and they were hot enough to kill all of the fish in the 
river (T14, T15, T17, T18, T19, T21, T22, T25, T36, T39, T44). These descriptions 
demonstrate that, in both their source and their character, the mudflows of September 29-
30 were different from typical rainfall-triggered mudflows at Agua, which originate at the 
volcano’s  summit  and  travel  north  toward  Ciudad Vieja.  
Retumbos were also heard during the mudflows (T14). This association led 
witnesses to relate the September 29 earthquakes, the mudflows, and activity of both 
volcanoes: 
 
“…y  que  los  retumbos  que  hacen  mover  la  tierra  y  se  continúan  hasta  hoy  
los tiene causados del dicho volcán, por la dicha razón de la inmediación 
con que está la casa de su habitación, y así por esto como por las abras 
que tiene dicho volcán de agua y la que por ellas se dice ha arrojado así a 
la  banda  del  sur…”   
 
“…And  that  the  retumbos  that  make  the  earth  move  and  which  continue  to  
this day are caused by the said volcano [which he knows] because the 
house   in  which  he   lives   is  near   to   it  and  …  because  of   the  openings   that  
have appeared on Volcán de Agua and down which it has expelled 
[material]  towards  the  south  …”  (T10) 
 
Additional tremors (T11) and mudflows (T22, T23) were reported in October, 
although clearly the peak of the activity was on September 29-30. These events prompted 
great concerns, particularly that Agua  volcano  would  “entirely  burst”  and  flood  the  city  
(T18); for this reason, two government officials were instructed to survey both volcanoes, 
while paying particular attention to Agua (reported in T19-T30). Of most concern to the 
citizens of Santiago de Guatemala was the possibility that additional disturbances to 
either Volcán de Agua or Volcán de Fuego could trigger a collapse from the slopes of one 
volcano   that   that   would   block   the   city’s   only   drainage,   Rio   de  Magdalena.   They   also  
considered that if Agua experienced another mudflow of the same magnitude but directed 
to  the  north,  it  would  “undoubtedly”  inundate  the  city  (T6,  T7,  T8).     
 
5. Discussion 
 As described above, the Autos provide detailed spatial and temporal information 
about the cascading hazards that commenced with the late August awakening of Volcán 
de Fuego and ended with the damaging local earthquake and mudflows from Volcán de 
Agua. They also provide important insight into the (mis)perceptions of some of the 
population about the nature of those hazards and their potential impact on the capital city. 
Here we first provide a geologic interpretation of the volcanic activity, the subsequent 
earthquakes and the culminating mudflows from Volcán de Agua. We then examine the 
local response to these events, particularly the perception of the people of Santiago de 
Guatemala that their city was in an unsafe location. 
 
5.1 Interpretation of the events of August-September 1717 
 The evidence provided above supports previous interpretations of the August 27-
29, 1717 eruption as a VEI 4 event (GVP), particularly when compared with detailed 
descriptions of the most recent VEI 4 eruption in 1974 (Rose et al., 1978). Similarities 
between the two eruptions include the small precursory episodes of ash release, the high 
ash   plumes   that   characterized   the   peak   activity,   and   the   accompanying   ‘rivers   of   fire’  
(pyroclastic flows). Eruptive activity in 1717 appears, however, to have peaked more 
quickly (between August 27 and 29), and decayed more rapidly, than the 1974 activity, 
which continued for two weeks. Another similarity is the formation of numerous hot and 
steaming abras (openings,   fissures)  on   the  volcano’s   flanks.   In  1717,   fissures  appeared 
on both the south flank and on the east flank (toward Agua). In 1974, a dominant 
structural trend was identified along a NNE-SSW axis, while a weakness to the east was 
suggested by microseismicity trends after the 1974 activity (Rose et al., 1978). 
Importantly, near-surface magma migration continued after the end of the visible 
eruption. Evidence for continued magmatic activity includes both the numerous reported 
retumbos (heard) and temblores (felt) earthquakes in September, as well as descriptions 
of barrancas and   ‘hollow   ground’   in   the   region   between   Fuego   and   Agua   (Fig.   3).    
Together, these data suggest that subsurface magma intrusion may have created both 
surface and near-surface openings, perhaps caused by extension above a propagating 
dyke. Similarly, the several months of microseismicity recorded after the 1974 Volcán de 
Fuego eruption were interpreted to result from continued activity of the dike-like conduit 
responsible for feeding the eruptive activity.  
The post-eruption unrest culminated in a strong earthquake on September 29, 
1717. Testimonies in the Autos unambiguously demonstrate that this was a local, not a 
regional, earthquake. Moreover, although the earthquake clearly affected parts of the 
capital city Santiago de Guatemala and was felt to a lesser degree along the Costa de 
Escuintla (over 70 km to the south), the earthquake was felt most intensely in Alotenango 
and Ciudad Vieja (that is between Volcán de Agua and Volcán de Fuego; T5; Fig. 4). In 
fact, some testimonies state explicitly that the earthquake was hardly experienced outside 
of those towns (e.g., T10), and that the towns most severely affected were those on the 
slopes of Volcán de Agua (T12). This pattern of impact strongly suggests that the 
earthquake was caused by faulting related to magma intrusion along a fissure or dyke 
system propagating east from Volcán de Fuego toward Volcán de Agua, consistent with 
evidence for eastward propagating dykes during the month of September.  
Further evidence for lateral magma propagation lies in the mudflows, which 
several witnesses thought were triggered by the seismic activity. Evidence for triggering 
includes emanation of the mudflows from new abras on the SW flanks of the volcano 
(Fig. 6), and descriptions of steaming avenidas of water and yellow mud that smelled of 
sulphur,   both   of   which   suggest   involvement   of   a   hydrothermal   system   within   Agua’s  
edifice. The mudflows were also accompanied by estruendos (crashing, or exploding 
sounds), which suggests that small phreatic explosions may have occurred in conjunction 
with vent formation. These observations, together with the absence of reports of heavy 
rain, show that the mudflows were not generated by excessive rainfall, but instead by 
groundwater emerging from within the volcano. Taken together, we conclude that there is 
overwhelming evidence that a magmatic intrusion from Fuego (probably in the form of a 
dyke) triggered both the September 29 earthquake and the mudflows from Agua.  
 
5.2 Other examples of cascading volcano hazards involving hydrothermal systems 
Magma-induced changes in subsurface hydrologic systems are not uncommon. 
Manifestations of such changes include phreatic (steam-driven) explosions, changes in 
hydrothermal systems, groundwater-triggered mudflows and elevated fluxes in local 
rivers (e.g., Gadow, 1930; Roobol and Smith, 1975; Witze and Kanipe, 2014) or even 
large landslides (e.g., Voight et al., 1981, 1983; Siebert, 2002). Less common, although 
not unheard of, is disturbance of a hydrothermal system in one volcano by magmatic 
activity at a neighboring volcano. Perhaps the most dramatic example of such triggered 
activity is provided by the 1792 eruption of Unzen volcano, Japan (e.g., Siebert et al., 
1987; Siebert, 2002).  
Mount Unzen is a volcanic complex that includes the active peak – Fugen-dake – 
and an older (dormant) peak, the Mayu-yama dome. Fugen-dake erupted on February 10, 
1792, after three months of precursory seismicity and phreatic eruptions. Explosive 
activity gave way to lava flows on March 1; by late April, seismic activity (both felt and 
heard) propagated to Mayu-yama, 5 km to the east. An earthquake on April 29 caused the 
dome to slide 200m, and prompted evacuation of the local population. Three weeks later, 
on May 21, two strong earthquakes triggered a debris avalanche from Mayu-yama that 
traveled to the sea; the resulting tsunami killed ~15,000 people, making it the most 
devastating volcanic disaster in Japanese history (e.g., Siebert et al., 1987). In the weeks 
following the collapse, hot water continued to flow from the scarp, consistent with 
release of a pressurized hydrothermal system (Siebert, 2002).  
The collapse of Mayu-yama dome was probably caused by saturation of the 
volcanic edifice as hydrothermal waters migrated in front of advancing magma. We 
suggest a similar scenario for the 1717 mudflows from Agua volcano. As in Japan, both 
seismic activity and fissure formation provide evidence of subterranean magma migration 
between the late August Fuego eruption and the late September earthquakes and 
mudflows from Agua. Also similar is the emission of over-pressured water (sufficient to 
form new outlets on the flanks of Agua) from a hydrothermal system (evidenced by the 
temperature, color and smell of the mud). Importantly, this event was sufficiently unusual 
that it must have added to the anxiety of the local communities, who were already 
stressed by the rather severe eruption and the 33 days of subsequent unrest. 
 
5.3 The long shadow of 1541 
 The events of August-September 1717, although clearly disruptive, were not 
catastrophic, or even disastrous. Citizens of the area had been living with frequent 
volcanic and seismic activity since the time of settlement, and some recognized the links 
between these geophysical events (T36). Why, then, did these events prompt a call from 
many of the inhabitants of Santiago de Guatemala to relocate the capital city farther away 
from Volcán de Agua? We address this question by first reviewing the types of 
information provided by the eyewitnesses and municipal officials regarding previous 
destructive events related to both eruptions from Fuego and regional seismic activity. We 
then focus on the specific nature of threats posed by Agua, particularly when placed in 
the context of the catastrophic 1541 debris avalanche and mudflow. 
Volcán de Fuego is frequently active, and has been since the Spanish conquest; in 
fact, Fuego may have been erupting when the Spanish first arrived in the region (Restall 
and Asselbergs, 2007). The Autos demonstrate that the residents of the area were very 
familiar with Fuego’s   eruptive   history.   For   example,   witnesses   T7   and   T8   explicitly  
mention eruptions earlier in the century, and municipal officials recognize that much of 
the   land  was   “made   by   volcanoes”   (T17).  More   importantly,   official   reports   about   the 
1717 events also include copies of reports made after the 1705 Fuego eruption, with 
descriptions  of   the  “exceptional  quantity  of  sand  and  ash   that  obscured   the  sun  and   the  
daylight”,   and   the   statement   that   more   residents   of   Guatemala   have   been   killed   by 
“fuegos  del  volcán”  than  died  from  human  conflict  (T46).   
Several of the testimonies in the Autos also relate to seismic activity. One witness 
(T17) states that the city of Santiago de Guatemala had to be rebuilt three times since the 
16th century because of numerous eruptions and earthquakes, and another (T30) notes that 
the   terrain   is   ‘sandy’   (covered   with   volcanic   ash)   and   therefore   unstable.   Accounts  
documenting damage caused by the earthquake of September 29 include descriptions of 
the unusual places where Mass was being celebrated because of damage to churches (T2, 
T30), the total destruction of Alotenango (T29), the estimated costs of rebuilding 
Santiago de Guatemala (T32, T41), the decline in taxes collected (T40, T46) and the 
prominent families who, in December 1717, were still living on the streets because of 
earthquake damage and fear of further tremors (T37, T44). These statements provide the 
sound  economic  argument  for  relocating  the  city  farther  away  from  the  “pernicious”  and  
“nearby  enemy  volcanoes”. 
It is clear from the Autos, however, that the mudflows from Agua were considered 
not only unusual but terrifying. Moreover, the testimonies show that the fears provoked 
by the mudflows were inflated relative to the actual hazard, and were deeply rooted in 
memories of the devastating mudflows that destroyed the original capital city in 1541. 
The 1541 event is specifically invoked by three accounts in the Autos (T6, T36, T44), all 
of which refer to the >600 casualties from that event. Importantly, it is clear that this 
information was transmitted in both written and form, the latter of which is documented 
by T36, which are extracts from a book written in 1714 by Fray Francisco Vasquez, a 
Franciscan friar and historian. In the book he reviews natural disasters that had affected 
the  city  since  its  founding,  beginning  with  the  “fatal  flood”  of  1541.  In  his  description  of  
the event he emphasized the heavy hurricane-generated rainfall that preceded the 1541 
mudflows, as well as the terrible noises and ground shaking that accompanied the 
collapse. Several other witnesses (T6, T7, T8, T10, T12, T13, T15, T16, T18, T21) do not 
refer specifically to the events of 1541, but did express fears of inundation during the 
night of September 29. More specifically, witnesses worried about spontaneous 
generation of mudflows from the flanks of Agua, and consequent blockage of the only 
drainage from the city (Rio de Magdalena), which ran between the two volcanoes (Fuego 
and Agua). These fears prompted many to consider moving farther from the volcanoes 
(T8, T12, T16, T17) and underpinned the consensus of a public meeting on October 20 to 
request permission to relocate the capital city (T42).  
 
5.4 Social memory and hazard perception 
 The critical importance of the 1541 events in the community interpretation of, and 
response to, the cascading hazards of August-September 1717 provides a clear example 
of   ‘social  memory’   (McIntosh   et   al.,   2000)   and   the   role   of   past   events   in   determining  
what is perceived to be a disaster (Slovic, 2000; Bankoff, 2004; Perez, 2001). The time 
frame of community memory and vulnerability has been recognized (e.g., Oliver-Smith 
1986; 2002; Bankoff, 2004) but commonly does not find a place within theoretical 
frameworks of disaster and change (e.g., Birkmann et al., 2010). This omission reflects 
(1) recent theoretical advances in disaster studies, which focus on either modern disasters 
or catastrophic collapse of ancient empires, neither of which provide the time resolution 
required for studies of the impacts of social memories (e.g., Diamond and Robinson 
2010; Cooper et al., 2012); (2) the limited number of historical studies of regions prone to 
repeated events (e.g., Chester et al., 2012); and (3) neglect, until recently, of social 
memories preserved within oral traditions (e.g., Masse et al., 2007; Cronin and Cashman 
2008; Cashman and Cronin, 2008; Cashman and Giordano, 2008 and references therein).  
 The 1717 example also shows the power of social memory to drive hazard 
mitigation. Population displacement (migration) has been a common response to recent 
disastrous events (Witham, 2005); it also represents an effective long-term strategy for 
coping with hazards (Riede, 2014). From this perspective, we can view the inhabitants of 
Santiago de Guatemala as engaging in a response driven not by irrational fears or 
misperceptions of the actual hazards, but by attempts to employ a rational strategy to 
reduce their vulnerability to future events. That they are attempting to do this within the 
restrictions imposed by a colonial structure – restrictions that required extensive 
evidence-based documentation of the natural events and their impacts – provides a unique 
window into the workings of social memory in a pre-industrial and semi-autonomous 
community.  
The Autos also provide an example of an early systematic survey of both a 
cascade of hazardous events and their impact. The Autos are systematic in the formulaic 
structure of each testimony, which imposes uniformity on eyewitness data collection that 
presages the format of social science surveys developed more than three centuries later. 
Of critical importance to our study are data related to the position of each witness, and 
the extent to which the accounts are based on first hand observations or second hand 
consultation of eyewitnesses. Also interesting is the application of scientific methods to 
establish, for example, the local origin of the September 29 earthquake, which they did 
by soliciting accounts from both local and distant (El Salvador) observers. The Autos thus 
provide systematic documentation of hazardous events and their impacts for the purpose 
of improving both scientific understanding and resilience in the face of future events. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
 Here we have demonstrated ways in which Spanish archival sources provide key 
information about both the physical nature of a cascading sequence of natural hazards 
and a long-term cascade of responses triggered by memories of an early catastrophic 
event. We have also shown that documentation of the 1717 activity in the form of the 
Autos is unusual from the perspective of natural hazard studies, in that it provides an 
early example of both a systematic survey of the physical nature and impact of a complex 
sequence of natural events, as well as a social science survey of human responses to this 
activity.  
The scientific importance of the events of 1717 lies in the clear evidence that 
magmatic (and associated seismic) activity at Fuego triggered a disturbance of the 
hydrothermal system at neighbouring Agua. Although not unprecedented (e.g., Siebert et 
al., 1987), remote triggering of hydrothermal activity is unusual, and raises important 
questions about hazard assessment of apparently dormant volcanoes such as Agua (e.g., 
Schilling et al., 2001). Our interpretation of a cascading sequence of hazards transferred 
from Fuego to Agua also provides a new and integrated perspective of these events. This 
integrated view contrasts with previous geologic and historic interpretations of the 1717 
activity, which consider, separately, the volcanic (e.g., Vallance et al., 2001; Martin and 
Rose, 1981), seismic (e.g., Feldman, 1993) and hydrologic (e.g., Schilling et al., 2001) 
events. More broadly, our analysis places the August-September, 1717, activity at Fuego 
and Agua within a larger framework of volcano-triggered hydrologic hazards that include 
the under-appreciated hazard posed by interactions between volcanic systems. 
The historical importance of this work, from a scientific perspective, lies in the 
systematic eyewitness accounts assembled in the Autos. Organized scientific responses to 
volcanic eruptions can be dated to the 1883 eruption of Krakatau, which was followed by 
detailed studies of both regional and global impacts of the event (e.g., Simkin and Fiske, 
1983). Modern social science studies of natural hazards, in contrast, start with seminal 
work in the 1960s that was summarized by Burton et al. (1978). From this perspective, 
the Autos represent a surprisingly detailed response to a series of cascading natural 
hazards, particularly given the low physical impact of the events (they did not create a 
natural   disaster).   From   the   ‘long   shadow’   perspective,   the   key   observation   is   that   this  
response – systematic collection of witness accounts from a broad geographic region – 
can be linked directly to the still-vivid memories of a catastrophic mudflow 176 years 
earlier. The strength of these memories, as demonstrated by the extremity of the response 
(a plea by many citizens to relocate the capital city), not only  supports  Slovic’s   (2000)  
emphasis on memorability as a key element of risk perception, but also shows the 
potential complexity of responses of past societies to hazardous events. This view 
supports the idea that natural disasters may be viewed as both historical processes and 
sequential events (Bankoff, 2004).  
Finally, this research also illustrates the limitations of working with archival data. 
Although the witness accounts provide valuable (and often thoughtful) geologic 
observations, the descriptions are qualitative and of varying detail. In part this derives 
from their historical context, and the lack of formal scientific nomenclature for the events 
described. The language is descriptive and often metaphorical, and thus requires 
(necessarily subjective) translation into modern scientific language. Additionally, 
information gleaned from historical sources requires detailed contextual knowledge of the 
source. In the case of the Autos, the critical context is that these witness accounts were 
collected for the express intent of providing documentation for the Spanish government 
to   support   the  municipal  government’s   request   to   relocate   the  capital   city,  which   raises  
the concern that the accounts may be exaggerated. Surprisingly, however, this does not 
seem to have compromised the veracity of the observations of the events themselves. 
Moreover, this context likely encouraged the witnesses to include key historical details 
(about past eruptions, earthquakes and mudflows) that help to explain what appears, 
initially, to be an extreme over-reaction to a moderate eruption and strong, but not 
unprecedented, earthquakes and mudflows.  
In  summary,  recent  studies  have  shown  the  importance  of  employing  the  “usable  
past”   (Stump,   2013)   to   provide   immediacy   to   both   hazard forecast scenarios and 
evidence-based policy recommendations (Reide, 2014). The mudflows from Agua that 
were triggered by magmatic activity at Fuego provide such an example, and suggest the 
importance of assessing volcanic hazard from regional, as well as the more typical single-
volcano, perspectives. At the same time, this work illustrates the role of memory in risk 
perception. Understanding communal memories is crucial not only for effective risk 
communication and improved resilience, but also for inferring causal relationships 
between hazardous events and apparent responses in historical and archaeological 
records. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1  Location map showing the three capital cities of Guatemala and the nearby 
volcanoes. The cities are currently known as Ciudad Vieja (formerly Santiago de los 
Caballeros, founded in 1527), Antigua (formerly Santiago de Guatemala, relocated in 
1542), and Guatemala City (relocated in 1773 following a large regional earthquake). The 
volcanoes Atitlan, Fuego, Agua and Pacaya lie along the Central America volcanic arc. 
All have been active during historical times except Agua. 
 
Figure 2  Eruptive history of Fuego volcano since 1524, when the Spanish first arrived in 
the area. Data are from the Smithsonian Global Volcanism Program database 
[http://www.volcano.si.edu/] and provide a measure of the eruption size using the 
Volcano Explosivity Index [http://volcanoes.usgs.gov/images/pglossary/vei.php]. VEI 4 
eruptions of 1717 and 1974 are highlighted, as is the only other VEI 4 eruption between 
1524 and 1717, in 1581. 
 
Figure 3  Map showing the approximate location of witness testimonies. Where the 
witnesses traveled to survey the effects of the different events, they are placed in all 
relevant locations. See Table S1 (Supplementary Material) for details. 
 
Figure 4  Map showing the witness locations and inferred intensity (yellow, low intensity 
to orange, high intensity) of the September 29, 1717 earthquake. Key is the evidence 
from witnesses in El Salvador that they did not feel this event, which means that it was 
local. Also important is the evidence that the damage was most severe in Alotenango, 
which lies between the two volcanoes. 
 
Figure 5  Map showing the witness locations and inferred intensity (pale green, low 
intensity to blue, high intensity) of the September 29 mudflows from Agua. Importantly 
these flows emanated from the southwest slopes of Agua and traveled south, and thus did 
not affect the capital city. 
 
Figure 6  Sketch map from the Autos showing the new boccas formed on the flanks of 
Agua that fed the September 29 mudflows (from witness T23). The witness shows the 
flows merging upslope of him, splitting around high ground and converging down slope; 
the flow eventually fed into the Rio Guacalate near Escuintla. 
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Abstract 
 
Assessing and communicating the risks posed by natural hazards requires not only a 
thorough understanding of the hazards but also an understanding of the spatial and 
temporal impact of successive events from the same source(s). This 4 dimensional 
approach requires the lens of time, which is often missing from modern responses to 
recent hazards, but also details of the event chronology and immediate human impact, 
which must be inferred from archaeological studies. Here we provide an example to 
illustrate the use of historical documents to fill this gap. We focus on the volcanically and 
seismically active region that hosts the capital city of Guatemala, which has be relocated 
twice in response to hazardous events since its original founding in 1524. More 
specifically, we examine documents, entitled “Autos Hechos Sobre el Lastimoso, Estrago 
y Ruina que Padecio esta Ciudad de Guatemala   …"  [Autos] that were collected in 
response to a cascading sequence of volcanic, seismic and mudflow events in 1717 to 
support a request to the Spanish government to relocate the second capital city. These 
documents provide exceptional detail about the location of the witnesses, the nature of 
the hazardous activity and the response of local communities to individual events. This 
detail allows us not only to reconstruct the sequence of events but also to link volcanic 
activity at Volcán de Fuego to both local seismicity and mudflows from Volcán de Agua, 
which we interpret as triggered by intruding magma from Fuego. Additionally, the long 
and well documented history of the region shows how a single catastrophic event – in this 
case a large rainfall-triggered debris flow from Agua in 1541, which destroyed the first 
capital city – can reverberate through the centuries and affect the response of the local 
community almost 200 years later, in 1717, even though the origin and affected area of 
the mudflow hazard was very different in the two cases. This example thus illustrates the 
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importance   of   “memorability”   in   both   the   perception   of,   and   response to, hazardous 
events (e.g., Slovic, 2000). 
 
1. Introduction 
 Recent volcanic eruptions, such as that of Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland in 
2010, have stimulated important interactions among scientists, social scientists and 
emergency managers. However, such studies of recent events tend naturally to focus on 
immediate impacts, with the result that hazard management aims to improve immediate 
physical impacts of hazard (vulnerability), often at the expense of developing long-term 
(and sustainable) strategies for hazard mitigation (resilience; e.g., White et al., 2001). 
This  approach,  however,  ignores  the  ‘long  shadow’  (e.g.,  Grattan  and  Torrence,  2007)  of  
such  disasters,  where  ‘long’   refers   to   time  scales   relevant   for  either  political  or  cultural  
change (e.g., Birkmann et al., 2010; Diamond and Robinson, 2010). A long view is 
provided, in contrast, by archaeological studies of the impact of past volcanic disasters on 
human societies (e.g., Sheets and Grayson, 1979). A challenge to archaeological studies, 
however, is causality must be assumed rather than proven (Coombes and Barber 2005; 
Leroy 2006). The time gap between archaeological and present day research is the realm 
of history, which can contribute robust chronologies that allow cause and effect to be 
linked (e.g., Vittori et al., 2007).  
Here we use the historical record of Spanish colonial Guatemala to improve 
fundamental understanding of volcano-related hazards in the region, and to examine the 
role of past events on the response of the local population to an unusual cascading 
sequence of hazards in August and September of 1717. The written record of the area is 
extensive, because the events of interest occurred near the second location of the capital 
city of Guatemala, Santiago de Guatemala (now known as Antigua; Fig. 1), which lies 
close to the active Volcán de Fuego and dormant Volcán de Agua. Importantly, the first 
capital city – Santiago de los Caballeros – was destroyed by a disastrous mudflow from 
nearby Volcán de Agua in 1541, only 17 years after it was founded. The immediate 
consequence was relocation of the city to higher ground; the much more profound, and 
longer lasting, consequence was not only extended scientific debate about the mudflow 
origin (e.g., Maudsley, 1899; Anderson, 1908; Carmak, 1973), but also the extent to 
which the destruction of Santiago de los Caballeros still looms large in the minds of local 
inhabitants. Here we examine the impact of the 1541 mudflow as viewed through the lens 
of a cascading sequence of hazardous events involving both Volcán de Agua and 
neighboring Volcán de Fuego in 1717 almost two centuries later, events that prompted 
local citizens to demand relocation of the capital city for a second time. 
 
2. Background 
It is well known that disastrous events can act as natural experiments (Diamond 
and Robinson, 2010) and/or catalysts of change (e.g., Burby et al., 2000; Perez, 2001; 
Birkmann et al., 2010). Change may occur by migration (abandoning the hazardous 
location) or adaptation, such as risk-based land use planning. To be effective, such 
planning must balance the benefits, as well as the drawbacks, of living in hazardous areas 
(e.g., White et al. 2001; Glavovic et al., 2010), and engage both community members and 
government officials (e.g., Cronin et al., 2004; Cashman and Cronin, 2008; Ricci et al., 
2013). A key factor that affects community perceptions of risk is the memorability (and 
imaginability) of individual hazards (e.g., Slovic, 2000), such that an event that is 
memorable within the community for its real or perceived impact will be weighted more 
heavily in planning decisions than an event that is not as easily imagined. A modern 
example is the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear accident and the effect of that accident on 
perceptions of risk related to nuclear power (e.g., Slovic et al., 1982; Kasperson et al., 
1988). A different perspective on memorability can be found in studies of oral traditions. 
When stories must be passed orally from generation to generation, a community disaster 
may  become  “a  defining   experience   that  passes   into   shared  memory”   (Perez,  2001).   In  
this way, inherited stories, whether oral or written, are often preserved where the 
knowledge contained is critical to community survival (e.g., Barber and Barber, 2006), 
and thus may critically influence community planning of future generations.  
 The long history (~ 300 years) of Spanish occupation of the area around Volcán 
de Fuego [Fuego] and neighboring Volcán de Agua [Agua] provides an unusual 
opportunity to evaluate both the behavior of the volcanoes and the communities that have 
grown up in their shadows. Both volcanoes form part of the central Guatemala arc (Fig. 
1). Fuego has been one of the most persistently active of the Guatemalan volcanoes, with 
57 confirmed eruptions, and several more unconfirmed, since the arrival of Spanish 
colonists in 1524 (Smithsonian Institute, Global Volcanism Program [GVP] database). 
Documentation   of   Fuego’s   activity   is   reasonably   good   because   of   its   proximity   to   the  
original capital city of Santiago de los Caballeros, and to the relocated city of Santiago de 
Guatemala. Agua, in contrast, has no documented eruptions in the Holocene (Bonis and 
Salazar, 1973; Schilling et al., 2001; GVP). It has had, instead, numerous mudflows that 
have affected the area to the north of the volcano, including the area occupied by the first 
capital city (now Ciudad Vieja). 
 Fuego is basaltic andesite in composition, and most of its eruptions have been 
moderate in size and intensity (VEI 2 or 3; GVP). At the extremes are periods of 
persistent  low  level  ‘open  vent’  activity  (Lyons  et  al., 2010), and larger (VEI 4) eruptions 
(Rose et al., 1978; Lyons et al., 2010; GVP). Recorded activity is episodic, with four 20-
70 year periods of high activity accounting for 75% of the total (Fig. 2).  Interestingly, 
this episodicity appears to be regional, such that activity at Fuego mirrors the rest of the 
Central American volcanoes (Martin and Rose, 1981). More importantly, by 1717, 
inhabitants  of  Santiago  de  Guatemala  were  very  familiar  with  Fuego’s  range  of  volcanic  
activity. 
 Mudflows from Agua also vary in intensity, with the most severe being that of 
September 1541. The mudflow was caused by a debris flow that originated from the 
volcano’s   summit   after   unusually   heavy   rainfall.   In this the event was similar to the 
devastating debris avalanche and resulting debris flow from dormant Casitas volcano, 
Nicaragua, in 1998, that was caused by intense rainfall associated with Hurricane Mitch 
(e.g., Schilling et al., 2001; Scott et al., 2005). The most recent mudflow to affect the area 
was caused by heavy rains associated with Tropical Storm Agatha in 2010. Much more 
unusual are mudflows that affect other sectors of the volcano. One such event occurred in 
September 1717, when mudflows associated with a large regional earthquake devastated 
areas on the southwest flank of the volcano. It is this event – both its cause and its impact 
on the local communities – that are the subject of this paper. 
In 1717, Guatemala was part of the Spanish Empire; it was ruled by the Spanish 
monarch, but governed by a complex hierarchy of royal officials at the regional and local 
level. The historical sources that we analyze here were produced by municipal officials in 
Santiago de Guatemala (Antigua) in the aftermath of the events of August-September of 
that year, and in response to demands by many of its residents that the city be relocated. 
Officials within the cabildo, or municipal government, themselves residents of long-
standing, shared the view that in the light of the extent of the damage suffered by the city 
as a result of the recent earthquake, it was imperative to obtain the required formal royal 
approval to initiate the process of relocation. It was with this purpose in mind that the 
cabildo empowered alcalde ordinario Juan de Rubayo Morante to carry out 
investigations in the local area, to interview key witnesses, and to dispatch their 
testimonies, along with other evidence in support of their case, to Spain. The resulting 
file, comprising nearly 180 densely-written and bound pages, was entitled “Autos Hechos 
Sobre el Lastimoso, Estrago y Ruina que Padecio esta Ciudad de Guatemala   …"  
(henceforth, Autos), a copy of which is housed in the Archivo General de Centro América 
(AGCA) in Guatemala City.  
Individual testimonies contained in the Autos describe a succession of natural 
disasters, beginning with a VEI 4 eruption (GVP) of Volcán de Fuego on August 27th 
and 28th of 1717 and culminating with a series of severe local earthquakes and major 
mudflows from Volcán de Agua in late September. Taken together, these testimonies 
represent a remarkable historical record of social and scientific significance. From a 
scientific perspective, they provide important insight into a rare example of triggered 
(cascading) hazards, where activity at one volcano triggers activity at a neighboring 
volcano. From a social science perspective, the (over-) reaction that prompted this 
interesting early example of hazard data collection derived explicitly from memories of 
the catastrophic (defining) event in 1541. 
 
3. Methods 
 
The Autos comprise 45 separate documents that record written and oral accounts 
provided by testimonies of 20 individuals, including municipal officials, eyewitnesses, 
and residents with experience of prior similar events.  Given the motives that led to their 
production – namely, to support the cabildo’s  case for relocation of the capital city – we 
address the issue of credibility at the outset (Leroy, 2006), specifically the possibility the 
experience, impact and consequences of the events that took place in 1717 may have 
been exaggerated for the purpose of enhancing the case for relocation. The similarity 
between the accounts that discuss the timing and nature of the activity leads us to 
conclude, however, that this bias did not affect the accuracy of reporting in this regard. At 
the same time, we are interested in the witness bias from the perspective of assessing the 
ways in which the response of the community was affected by the longer history of prior 
damaging events, and most particularly by the memory of the disaster that destroyed the 
original city of Santiago de los Caballeros in 1541.  
Extracting specific geologic information from the Autos required first reading and 
translating the accounts, and then a second translation from the descriptive original 
language to modern geologic terminology. The formulaic nature of the process of 
evidence-gathering – a characteristic of Spanish colonial judicial processes – enables us 
to place the witnesses in specific locations at the time the events they describe occurred, 
and to record these in a GIS database, which in turn allows us to assess the spatial as well 
as temporal reach of the events experienced (Fig. 3). Other testimonies provide 
information about events witnessed from afar, or told to the witness by someone else. 
Testimonies by witnesses who traveled extensively to collect data are attached to multiple 
locations on the maps. Each testimony was then reviewed for (1) geologic information, 
(2) timing of events and (3) information about event impact. In the text below, we 
reference individual testimonies using the testimony number (T1, etc.), which is keyed to 
witness locations shown in Figure 3 and included in Table S1 (Supplementary Material).  
 
4. Results 
 
The Autos describe a sequence of natural events that began with a large eruption 
at Fuego on August 27-29, 1717, and ended with a destructive local earthquake on 
September 29 and subsequent south-traveling mudflows from Agua. Below we 
summarize observations from the Autos of the eruption, the subsequent geophysical 
activity, and the events of late September.  
 
4.1 Eruption of Fuego, August 27-28, 1717  
Eighteen of the documents in the Autos describe the eruption of Fuego. All concur 
that the eruption occurred on August 27th and 28th (e.g., T5), although some witnesses say 
that it continued into August 29th (e.g., T7, T8 and T14). The first signs of activity were 
small ash pulses on the evening of August 27th (T14); the main phase started on the 
evening of August 27th (T11, T16, T34). For many of the witnesses, the first indications 
of activity were not visual, but instead were estruendos (crashing sounds) that were 
particularly loud later that evening (T8). By the following day, emitted ash obscured the 
daylight   and   witnesses   described   “rivers   of   fire”   from   the   summit   that   contained 
variously sized rocks that traveled with so much force that they uprooted trees (T44). We 
interpret these to be pyroclastic flows produced by collapse of advancing lava flows, as 
seen in 1974 (Rose et al., 1978). 
Predictably, accounts of the activity vary with witness location (Fig. 4). Witnesses 
who were relatively close to the volcano (T1, T34, T44) focused on the plume that 
reached   “high”   into   the   air,   starting   on   August   27th. They also described estruendos, 
retumbos (rumbles), temblores (tremors), and shaking of the ground during the eruptive 
activity (T1, T5, T34). In Santiago de Guatemala, it was claimed that the eruption 
deposited so much ash that people had to cover their eyes to walk through the streets 
(T34). Witnesses in the capital city also reported  that  the  ‘fire’  from  the  volcano  could  be  
seen at night from <40 (T17) to >100 leagues (222 – 556 km) away (T44). Confirmation 
comes from a witness in San Miguel (El Salvador; located approximately 50 leagues 
from Santiago de Guatemala), who reported tall llamas (flames) of fire on the night of 
August 28th (T11). Retumbos were also heard at great distances from the volcano, as 
reported  by  the  two  witnesses  in  El  Salvador,  who  either  ‘experienced’  (T13)  or  ‘heard’  
(T11) retumbos during August 27-28 eruptive activity.  
Direct damage from the eruption was worst in the valley between Fuego and 
Agua, including the pueblos of Siquinala, Santa Lucia, and Alotenango (T26). Although 
the vecinos (inhabitants) of Santiago de Guatemala were not directly affected by the 
eruption, many were terrified by the combination of the fire, rocks, smoke and ash: 
 
“…  Que  es  cierto  …  que   los   terremotos  y  otros  graves  perjuicios,  que  se  
han experimentado en esta ciudad, provienen de los volcanes inmediatos a 
ella, como se ha experimentado en muchas ocasiones, y especialmente la 
noche del día viente y siete de Agosto pasado de este presente año, y el día 
siguiente en que el uno de ellos abortó voraces lenguas de fuego y humo, 
cuyo estruendo aterrorizó a todos los habitadores de esta  ciudad…”   
 
“It   is   true  …   that   the   earthquakes  and  other   serious  afflictions   that  have  
been experienced in this city, derive from the volcanoes which lie nearby, 
as has been experienced on many occasions, and especially on the night of 
27 August of this year and the following day when one of these aborted 
voracious tongues of fire and smoke, making crashing sounds that 
terrorized  all  of  the  inhabitants  of  this  city.” 
(T5) 
 
4.2 Post-eruptive activity – August 29 – September 29, 1717 
 
During, and for at least 33 days following, the eruption of Fuego on August 
27th, the volcano showed signs of unrest, particularly in the form of both 
retumbos and temblores (T1, T8, T14, T44). According to accounts in the Autos, 
retumbos were primarily heard (T5, T10), although in some instances they were 
also felt (T1, T14); the temblores often mentioned in the same context were 
always felt (ground shaking). Witnesses in proximal locations insisted that both 
were from sources near (T10), or  even  “inside”  (T5),  the  volcano. 
During the same period, the Autos also provide numerous descriptions of 
ground fissures, or barrancas (ravines), that increased from meters to tens to 
hundreds of meters in width and depth (T2, T5, T14, T15). It is unclear from the 
accounts whether these fissures formed during, or shortly after, the August 27-28 
eruption. At the same time a brecha (breach) opened on Fuego from the summit 
to the east (toward Alotenango; T5, T7, T17):  
 
“…      con   la   ocasión   del   reconocimiento que hizo del dicho Volcán de 
Fuego, temiendo el que sus piedras no atajasen el dicho rio desagüe de 
esta ciudad y de dichas haciendas, subió parte de el arriba como hasta más 
que medio volcán, y vio una barranca que corre a la cima para abajo, tan 
profunda que le causó terror y miedo, que al parecer tendrá como hasta 
cien varas de hondura, y de ancho como media cuadra, la cual le dijo un 
indio que llevaba en su compañía que era nuevamente abierta con la 
ocasión del fuego que había echado porque antes de él solo era una 
pequeña barranquilla de vara y media de hondo, por donde con facilidad 
bajaban  y  conducían  madera…” 
 
“…at  the  time  of  the  survey  of  Volcán  de  Fuego  which  he  conducted,  [and]  
fearing that the rocks might block the river drainage of this city and 
[surrounding] haciendas, he climbed more than half-way up the volcano 
and saw a ravine that ran from the summit downwards, so deep that [on 
seeing it] he felt terror and fear.  It appears to be up to 100 varas in depth 
[~83m], and about a half cuadra in width [125m], and according to an 
Indian who accompanied him, it had opened recently, at the same time as 
the fire spewed [by the volcano], because previously it was only a shallow 
ravine, 1.5 varas in depth, down which they comfortably transported 
wood…”   
(T5) 
 
This witness also noted that the barranca must have carried a large current of water 
because of the branches and trees that it had transported to the river. Other witnesses 
claimed that another barranca had  formed  from  the  volcano’s  summit  to  the  south  (T14, 
T17), and that additional openings produced smoke or steam, and emanated heat and a 
stench that made people ill (T14, T15).   
 During the same period, seven of the accounts in Autos describe an unusual 
sensation that they felt when traveling near the volcano, which they likened to walking on 
hollow ground, or the way the ground sounds when horses or carriages were in motion 
(T1, T7, T14, T17, T29, T44). A report from the eastern slopes of Fuego (T15) recounts 
more specifically the sensation that a subterranean bóveda (cellar) existed beneath the 
volcano: 
 
“…y   que  …las   cabalgaduras  …   con   su   piso   parecía   pisaban   sobre   una  
bóveda y así mismo vieron salir algún humo del centro de dicho barranca 
como de unos  ronroneos  expeliendo  tanto  calor  y  hedor…” 
 
“…And  ..  it  appeared  [to  those]  on  horseback  that  with  each  step  they  were  
treading over a vault and they also saw some steam rise from the said 
ravine,  like  purrs  releasing  a  lot  of  heat  and  odor…”   
 
Importantly, this account links the sensation of hollow ground directly to the formation 
of a barranca that was releasing both heat and pungent steam.  
 
4.3 Earthquake of September 29, 1717 
 
On the evening of September 29, 1717, several large earthquakes destroyed much 
of Santiago de Guatemala and the surrounding pueblos, and took many lives (T1). The 
earthquakes clearly had a local origin (T10, T11, T13, T18), although they were also felt 
on the Costa de Escuintla (then called Costa de Esquintlapeque), about 70 km south of 
Santiago de Guatemala (Fig. 4). Critically, all witnesses (T5, T14, T15) were convinced 
that the earthquakes were caused by the volcanoes:   
 
“…Y   que   el   asentar   que   dichos   terremotos   provienen   de   los   volcanes   es  
porque tiene el declarante su residencia en las haciendas que fueron del 
Capitán Don Joseph de Castillo, que están casi en la falda del Volcán de 
Fuego por un lado, y por el otro lado con inmediación al de Agua, y por ello 
hallándose en el campo le cogieron dichos terremotos, en el, los cuales 
sintió con imponderable fuerza, o estrépito, y tal que fue preciso arrodillado 
acercarse de un palo para poderse mantener, y como estaba en la frente del 
dicho Volcán de Fuego, sintió que el ruido y fuerza de los terremotos salían 
de él, cuya presunción le confirman los retumbos que hacen mover la tierra 
porque los oye en el dicho volcán, el que tiene profundas barrancas, o abras 
recientes…”  
 “...   Because   the   witness   resides   in   the   haciendas   …   which   on   one   side  
extend almost to the slopes of Volcán de Fuego, and on the other lie close 
to [Volcán] de Agua, he can assert that said earthquakes come from the 
volcanoes  …  he   found  himself   in  his      fields when the earthquakes struck, 
with   such   strength     …   that,   kneeling,  he  had   to   lean  on  a   stick   to   steady  
himself. And as he was in front of Volcán de Fuego, he felt that the noise 
and force of the earthquakes came from it [the volcano]. His assumption is 
confirmed by the retumbos that make the earth move, because he hears 
them in said volcano [Fuego] which has [formed] new deep barrancas or 
openings…”   
(T5) 
 
The interpretation of a local source is supported by the severe damage reported in 
Alotenango and Ciudad Vieja, which lie between, and close to, both volcanoes (T10, 
T12, T29; Fig. 4). The earthquakes also caused significant damage within Santiago de 
Guatemala - one eyewitness estimated that the earthquake destroyed half the city (T31) – 
although here the bias of the witnesses would tend to exaggerate the impacts.  That said, 
one account provides a detailed and specific list of the damages to important religious 
and government buildings (T32). 
4.4  Mudflow from Volcán de Agua, September 29, 1717  
The impact of the September 29 earthquakes was compounded by mudflows from 
Agua that were apparently triggered by the seismic activity. The flows originated high on 
the southwest slopes of the volcano and travelled south, away from the primary 
population centers, and, it was said, eventually reached the ocean (Fig. 5). Not 
surprisingly, the pueblos Masagua and Mistlan on the Rio Guacalate were most impacted 
by the mudflows (T12). The most detailed description of the source of the mudflows 
comes from a witness from  the  pueblo  of  Esquintlapeque  (T23).  He  was  ‘four  leagues’  up  
the slopes of Volcán de Agua when the flows prevented him from continuing, so he 
climbed a small hill to get a better view. He describes three separate flows from upslope 
that first combined, and then split, around the high point where he was standing. The two 
resulting flows eventually merged into a single flow south and downslope from his 
location (Fig. 6) and continued down the southwest flank of the volcano to join the Rio 
Guacalate near Escuintla. This account provides the critical observation that the flows 
originated   from  new   ‘abras’   (openings)  on   the  upper   slopes  of   the  volcano   that  hadn’t  
been there before; for this reason the witnesses attributed the flows directly to the 
September 29th earthquake (e.g., T12).  
Several witnesses assert that the mudflow moved with great force and was very 
large, and that it carried sizeable sticks and rocks that were deposited along its path (T12, 
T15,  T21).   In   this   it   sounds   like  a   ‘normal’  debris   flow.  However, some witnesses also 
noted that the mudflows had unusual properties: they were yellow, they had a distinctive 
and repugnant sulphurous smell, and they were hot enough to kill all of the fish in the 
river (T14, T15, T17, T18, T19, T21, T22, T25, T36, T39, T44). These descriptions 
demonstrate that, in both their source and their character, the mudflows of September 29-
30 were different from typical rainfall-triggered mudflows at Agua, which originate at the 
volcano’s  summit  and  travel  north  toward  Ciudad Vieja.  
Retumbos were also heard during the mudflows (T14). This association led 
witnesses to relate the September 29 earthquakes, the mudflows, and activity of both 
volcanoes: 
 
“…y  que  los  retumbos  que  hacen  mover  la  tierra  y  se  continúan  hasta  hoy  
los tiene causados del dicho volcán, por la dicha razón de la inmediación 
con que está la casa de su habitación, y así por esto como por las abras 
que tiene dicho volcán de agua y la que por ellas se dice ha arrojado así a 
la  banda  del  sur…”   
 
“…And  that  the  retumbos  that  make  the  earth  move  and  which  continue  to  
this day are caused by the said volcano [which he knows] because the 
house   in  which  he   lives   is  near   to   it  and  …  because  of   the  openings   that  
have appeared on Volcán de Agua and down which it has expelled 
[material]  towards  the  south  …”  (T10) 
 
Additional tremors (T11) and mudflows (T22, T23) were reported in October, 
although clearly the peak of the activity was on September 29-30. These events prompted 
great concerns, particularly that Agua  volcano  would  “entirely  burst”  and  flood  the  city  
(T18); for this reason, two government officials were instructed to survey both volcanoes, 
while paying particular attention to Agua (reported in T19-T30). Of most concern to the 
citizens of Santiago de Guatemala was the possibility that additional disturbances to 
either Volcán de Agua or Volcán de Fuego could trigger a collapse from the slopes of one 
volcano   that   that   would   block   the   city’s   only   drainage,   Rio   de  Magdalena.   They   also  
considered that if Agua experienced another mudflow of the same magnitude but directed 
to  the  north,  it  would  “undoubtedly”  inundate  the  city  (T6,  T7,  T8).     
 
5. Discussion 
 As described above, the Autos provide detailed spatial and temporal information 
about the cascading hazards that commenced with the late August awakening of Volcán 
de Fuego and ended with the damaging local earthquake and mudflows from Volcán de 
Agua. They also provide important insight into the (mis)perceptions of some of the 
population about the nature of those hazards and their potential impact on the capital city. 
Here we first provide a geologic interpretation of the volcanic activity, the subsequent 
earthquakes and the culminating mudflows from Volcán de Agua. We then examine the 
local response to these events, particularly the perception of the people of Santiago de 
Guatemala that their city was in an unsafe location. 
 
5.1 Interpretation of the events of August-September 1717 
 The evidence provided above supports previous interpretations of the August 27-
29, 1717 eruption as a VEI 4 event (GVP), particularly when compared with detailed 
descriptions of the most recent VEI 4 eruption in 1974 (Rose et al., 1978). Similarities 
between the two eruptions include the small precursory episodes of ash release, the high 
ash   plumes   that   characterized   the   peak   activity,   and   the   accompanying   ‘rivers   of   fire’  
(pyroclastic flows). Eruptive activity in 1717 appears, however, to have peaked more 
quickly (between August 27 and 29), and decayed more rapidly, than the 1974 activity, 
which continued for two weeks. Another similarity is the formation of numerous hot and 
steaming abras (openings,   fissures)  on   the  volcano’s   flanks.   In  1717,   fissures  appeared 
on both the south flank and on the east flank (toward Agua). In 1974, a dominant 
structural trend was identified along a NNE-SSW axis, while a weakness to the east was 
suggested by microseismicity trends after the 1974 activity (Rose et al., 1978). 
Importantly, near-surface magma migration continued after the end of the visible 
eruption. Evidence for continued magmatic activity includes both the numerous reported 
retumbos (heard) and temblores (felt) earthquakes in September, as well as descriptions 
of barrancas and   ‘hollow   ground’   in   the   region   between   Fuego   and   Agua   (Fig.   3).    
Together, these data suggest that subsurface magma intrusion may have created both 
surface and near-surface openings, perhaps caused by extension above a propagating 
dyke. Similarly, the several months of microseismicity recorded after the 1974 Volcán de 
Fuego eruption were interpreted to result from continued activity of the dike-like conduit 
responsible for feeding the eruptive activity.  
The post-eruption unrest culminated in a strong earthquake on September 29, 
1717. Testimonies in the Autos unambiguously demonstrate that this was a local, not a 
regional, earthquake. Moreover, although the earthquake clearly affected parts of the 
capital city Santiago de Guatemala and was felt to a lesser degree along the Costa de 
Escuintla (over 70 km to the south), the earthquake was felt most intensely in Alotenango 
and Ciudad Vieja (that is between Volcán de Agua and Volcán de Fuego; T5; Fig. 4). In 
fact, some testimonies state explicitly that the earthquake was hardly experienced outside 
of those towns (e.g., T10), and that the towns most severely affected were those on the 
slopes of Volcán de Agua (T12). This pattern of impact strongly suggests that the 
earthquake was caused by faulting related to magma intrusion along a fissure or dyke 
system propagating east from Volcán de Fuego toward Volcán de Agua, consistent with 
evidence for eastward propagating dykes during the month of September.  
Further evidence for lateral magma propagation lies in the mudflows, which 
several witnesses thought were triggered by the seismic activity. Evidence for triggering 
includes emanation of the mudflows from new abras on the SW flanks of the volcano 
(Fig. 6), and descriptions of steaming avenidas of water and yellow mud that smelled of 
sulphur,   both   of   which   suggest   involvement   of   a   hydrothermal   system   within   Agua’s  
edifice. The mudflows were also accompanied by estruendos (crashing, or exploding 
sounds), which suggests that small phreatic explosions may have occurred in conjunction 
with vent formation. These observations, together with the absence of reports of heavy 
rain, show that the mudflows were not generated by excessive rainfall, but instead by 
groundwater emerging from within the volcano. Taken together, we conclude that there is 
overwhelming evidence that a magmatic intrusion from Fuego (probably in the form of a 
dyke) triggered both the September 29 earthquake and the mudflows from Agua.  
 
5.2 Other examples of cascading volcano hazards involving hydrothermal systems 
Magma-induced changes in subsurface hydrologic systems are not uncommon. 
Manifestations of such changes include phreatic (steam-driven) explosions, changes in 
hydrothermal systems, groundwater-triggered mudflows and elevated fluxes in local 
rivers (e.g., Gadow, 1930; Roobol and Smith, 1975; Witze and Kanipe, 2014) or even 
large landslides (e.g., Voight et al., 1981, 1983; Siebert, 2002). Less common, although 
not unheard of, is disturbance of a hydrothermal system in one volcano by magmatic 
activity at a neighboring volcano. Perhaps the most dramatic example of such triggered 
activity is provided by the 1792 eruption of Unzen volcano, Japan (e.g., Siebert et al., 
1987; Siebert, 2002).  
Mount Unzen is a volcanic complex that includes the active peak – Fugen-dake – 
and an older (dormant) peak, the Mayu-yama dome. Fugen-dake erupted on February 10, 
1792, after three months of precursory seismicity and phreatic eruptions. Explosive 
activity gave way to lava flows on March 1; by late April, seismic activity (both felt and 
heard) propagated to Mayu-yama, 5 km to the east. An earthquake on April 29 caused the 
dome to slide 200m, and prompted evacuation of the local population. Three weeks later, 
on May 21, two strong earthquakes triggered a debris avalanche from Mayu-yama that 
traveled to the sea; the resulting tsunami killed ~15,000 people, making it the most 
devastating volcanic disaster in Japanese history (e.g., Siebert et al., 1987). In the weeks 
following the collapse, hot water continued to flow from the scarp, consistent with 
release of a pressurized hydrothermal system (Siebert, 2002).  
The collapse of Mayu-yama dome was probably caused by saturation of the 
volcanic edifice as hydrothermal waters migrated in front of advancing magma. We 
suggest a similar scenario for the 1717 mudflows from Agua volcano. As in Japan, both 
seismic activity and fissure formation provide evidence of subterranean magma migration 
between the late August Fuego eruption and the late September earthquakes and 
mudflows from Agua. Also similar is the emission of over-pressured water (sufficient to 
form new outlets on the flanks of Agua) from a hydrothermal system (evidenced by the 
temperature, color and smell of the mud). Importantly, this event was sufficiently unusual 
that it must have added to the anxiety of the local communities, who were already 
stressed by the rather severe eruption and the 33 days of subsequent unrest. 
 
5.3 The long shadow of 1541 
 The events of August-September 1717, although clearly disruptive, were not 
catastrophic, or even disastrous. Citizens of the area had been living with frequent 
volcanic and seismic activity since the time of settlement, and some recognized the links 
between these geophysical events (T36). Why, then, did these events prompt a call from 
many of the inhabitants of Santiago de Guatemala to relocate the capital city farther away 
from Volcán de Agua? We address this question by first reviewing the types of 
information provided by the eyewitnesses and municipal officials regarding previous 
destructive events related to both eruptions from Fuego and regional seismic activity. We 
then focus on the specific nature of threats posed by Agua, particularly when placed in 
the context of the catastrophic 1541 debris avalanche and mudflow. 
Volcán de Fuego is frequently active, and has been since the Spanish conquest; in 
fact, Fuego may have been erupting when the Spanish first arrived in the region (Restall 
and Asselbergs, 2007). The Autos demonstrate that the residents of the area were very 
familiar with Fuego’s   eruptive   history.   For   example,   witnesses   T7   and   T8   explicitly  
mention eruptions earlier in the century, and municipal officials recognize that much of 
the   land  was   “made   by   volcanoes”   (T17).  More   importantly,   official   reports   about   the 
1717 events also include copies of reports made after the 1705 Fuego eruption, with 
descriptions  of   the  “exceptional  quantity  of  sand  and  ash   that  obscured   the  sun  and   the  
daylight”,   and   the   statement   that   more   residents   of   Guatemala   have   been   killed   by 
“fuegos  del  volcán”  than  died  from  human  conflict  (T46).   
Several of the testimonies in the Autos also relate to seismic activity. One witness 
(T17) states that the city of Santiago de Guatemala had to be rebuilt three times since the 
16th century because of numerous eruptions and earthquakes, and another (T30) notes that 
the   terrain   is   ‘sandy’   (covered   with   volcanic   ash)   and   therefore   unstable.   Accounts  
documenting damage caused by the earthquake of September 29 include descriptions of 
the unusual places where Mass was being celebrated because of damage to churches (T2, 
T30), the total destruction of Alotenango (T29), the estimated costs of rebuilding 
Santiago de Guatemala (T32, T41), the decline in taxes collected (T40, T46) and the 
prominent families who, in December 1717, were still living on the streets because of 
earthquake damage and fear of further tremors (T37, T44). These statements provide the 
sound  economic  argument  for  relocating  the  city  farther  away  from  the  “pernicious”  and  
“nearby  enemy  volcanoes”. 
It is clear from the Autos, however, that the mudflows from Agua were considered 
not only unusual but terrifying. Moreover, the testimonies show that the fears provoked 
by the mudflows were inflated relative to the actual hazard, and were deeply rooted in 
memories of the devastating mudflows that destroyed the original capital city in 1541. 
The 1541 event is specifically invoked by three accounts in the Autos (T6, T36, T44), all 
of which refer to the >600 casualties from that event. Importantly, it is clear that this 
information was transmitted in both written and form, the latter of which is documented 
by T36, which are extracts from a book written in 1714 by Fray Francisco Vasquez, a 
Franciscan friar and historian. In the book he reviews natural disasters that had affected 
the  city  since  its  founding,  beginning  with  the  “fatal  flood”  of  1541.  In  his  description  of  
the event he emphasized the heavy hurricane-generated rainfall that preceded the 1541 
mudflows, as well as the terrible noises and ground shaking that accompanied the 
collapse. Several other witnesses (T6, T7, T8, T10, T12, T13, T15, T16, T18, T21) do not 
refer specifically to the events of 1541, but did express fears of inundation during the 
night of September 29. More specifically, witnesses worried about spontaneous 
generation of mudflows from the flanks of Agua, and consequent blockage of the only 
drainage from the city (Rio de Magdalena), which ran between the two volcanoes (Fuego 
and Agua). These fears prompted many to consider moving farther from the volcanoes 
(T8, T12, T16, T17) and underpinned the consensus of a public meeting on October 20 to 
request permission to relocate the capital city (T42).  
 
5.4 Social memory and hazard perception 
 The critical importance of the 1541 events in the community interpretation of, and 
response to, the cascading hazards of August-September 1717 provides a clear example 
of   ‘social  memory’   (McIntosh   et   al.,   2000)   and   the   role   of   past   events   in   determining  
what is perceived to be a disaster (Slovic, 2000; Bankoff, 2004; Perez, 2001). The time 
frame of community memory and vulnerability has been recognized (e.g., Oliver-Smith 
1986; 2002; Bankoff, 2004) but commonly does not find a place within theoretical 
frameworks of disaster and change (e.g., Birkmann et al., 2010). This omission reflects 
(1) recent theoretical advances in disaster studies, which focus on either modern disasters 
or catastrophic collapse of ancient empires, neither of which provide the time resolution 
required for studies of the impacts of social memories (e.g., Diamond and Robinson 
2010; Cooper et al., 2012); (2) the limited number of historical studies of regions prone to 
repeated events (e.g., Chester et al., 2012); and (3) neglect, until recently, of social 
memories preserved within oral traditions (e.g., Masse et al., 2007; Cronin and Cashman 
2008; Cashman and Cronin, 2008; Cashman and Giordano, 2008 and references therein).  
 The 1717 example also shows the power of social memory to drive hazard 
mitigation. Population displacement (migration) has been a common response to recent 
disastrous events (Witham, 2005); it also represents an effective long-term strategy for 
coping with hazards (Riede, 2014). From this perspective, we can view the inhabitants of 
Santiago de Guatemala as engaging in a response driven not by irrational fears or 
misperceptions of the actual hazards, but by attempts to employ a rational strategy to 
reduce their vulnerability to future events. That they are attempting to do this within the 
restrictions imposed by a colonial structure – restrictions that required extensive 
evidence-based documentation of the natural events and their impacts – provides a unique 
window into the workings of social memory in a pre-industrial and semi-autonomous 
community.  
The Autos also provide an example of an early systematic survey of both a 
cascade of hazardous events and their impact. The Autos are systematic in the formulaic 
structure of each testimony, which imposes uniformity on eyewitness data collection that 
presages the format of social science surveys developed more than three centuries later. 
Of critical importance to our study are data related to the position of each witness, and 
the extent to which the accounts are based on first hand observations or second hand 
consultation of eyewitnesses. Also interesting is the application of scientific methods to 
establish, for example, the local origin of the September 29 earthquake, which they did 
by soliciting accounts from both local and distant (El Salvador) observers. The Autos thus 
provide systematic documentation of hazardous events and their impacts for the purpose 
of improving both scientific understanding and resilience in the face of future events. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
 Here we have demonstrated ways in which Spanish archival sources provide key 
information about both the physical nature of a cascading sequence of natural hazards 
and a long-term cascade of responses triggered by memories of an early catastrophic 
event. We have also shown that documentation of the 1717 activity in the form of the 
Autos is unusual from the perspective of natural hazard studies, in that it provides an 
early example of both a systematic survey of the physical nature and impact of a complex 
sequence of natural events, as well as a social science survey of human responses to this 
activity.  
The scientific importance of the events of 1717 lies in the clear evidence that 
magmatic (and associated seismic) activity at Fuego triggered a disturbance of the 
hydrothermal system at neighbouring Agua. Although not unprecedented (e.g., Siebert et 
al., 1987), remote triggering of hydrothermal activity is unusual, and raises important 
questions about hazard assessment of apparently dormant volcanoes such as Agua (e.g., 
Schilling et al., 2001). Our interpretation of a cascading sequence of hazards transferred 
from Fuego to Agua also provides a new and integrated perspective of these events. This 
integrated view contrasts with previous geologic and historic interpretations of the 1717 
activity, which consider, separately, the volcanic (e.g., Vallance et al., 2001; Martin and 
Rose, 1981), seismic (e.g., Feldman, 1993) and hydrologic (e.g., Schilling et al., 2001) 
events. More broadly, our analysis places the August-September, 1717, activity at Fuego 
and Agua within a larger framework of volcano-triggered hydrologic hazards that include 
the under-appreciated hazard posed by interactions between volcanic systems. 
The historical importance of this work, from a scientific perspective, lies in the 
systematic eyewitness accounts assembled in the Autos. Organized scientific responses to 
volcanic eruptions can be dated to the 1883 eruption of Krakatau, which was followed by 
detailed studies of both regional and global impacts of the event (e.g., Simkin and Fiske, 
1983). Modern social science studies of natural hazards, in contrast, start with seminal 
work in the 1960s that was summarized by Burton et al. (1978). From this perspective, 
the Autos represent a surprisingly detailed response to a series of cascading natural 
hazards, particularly given the low physical impact of the events (they did not create a 
natural   disaster).   From   the   ‘long   shadow’   perspective,   the   key   observation   is   that   this  
response – systematic collection of witness accounts from a broad geographic region – 
can be linked directly to the still-vivid memories of a catastrophic mudflow 176 years 
earlier. The strength of these memories, as demonstrated by the extremity of the response 
(a plea by many citizens to relocate the capital city), not only  supports  Slovic’s   (2000)  
emphasis on memorability as a key element of risk perception, but also shows the 
potential complexity of responses of past societies to hazardous events. This view 
supports the idea that natural disasters may be viewed as both historical processes and 
sequential events (Bankoff, 2004).  
Finally, this research also illustrates the limitations of working with archival data. 
Although the witness accounts provide valuable (and often thoughtful) geologic 
observations, the descriptions are qualitative and of varying detail. In part this derives 
from their historical context, and the lack of formal scientific nomenclature for the events 
described. The language is descriptive and often metaphorical, and thus requires 
(necessarily subjective) translation into modern scientific language. Additionally, 
information gleaned from historical sources requires detailed contextual knowledge of the 
source. In the case of the Autos, the critical context is that these witness accounts were 
collected for the express intent of providing documentation for the Spanish government 
to   support   the  municipal  government’s   request   to   relocate   the  capital   city,  which   raises  
the concern that the accounts may be exaggerated. Surprisingly, however, this does not 
seem to have compromised the veracity of the observations of the events themselves. 
Moreover, this context likely encouraged the witnesses to include key historical details 
(about past eruptions, earthquakes and mudflows) that help to explain what appears, 
initially, to be an extreme over-reaction to a moderate eruption and strong, but not 
unprecedented, earthquakes and mudflows.  
In  summary,  recent  studies  have  shown  the  importance  of  employing  the  “usable  
past”   (Stump,   2013)   to   provide   immediacy   to   both   hazard forecast scenarios and 
evidence-based policy recommendations (Reide, 2014). The mudflows from Agua that 
were triggered by magmatic activity at Fuego provide such an example, and suggest the 
importance of assessing volcanic hazard from regional, as well as the more typical single-
volcano, perspectives. At the same time, this work illustrates the role of memory in risk 
perception. Understanding communal memories is crucial not only for effective risk 
communication and improved resilience, but also for inferring causal relationships 
between hazardous events and apparent responses in historical and archaeological 
records. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1  Location map showing the three capital cities of Guatemala and the nearby 
volcanoes. The cities are currently known as Ciudad Vieja (formerly Santiago de los 
Caballeros, founded in 1527), Antigua (formerly Santiago de Guatemala, relocated in 
1542), and Guatemala City (relocated in 1773 following a large regional earthquake). The 
volcanoes Atitlan, Fuego, Agua and Pacaya lie along the Central America volcanic arc. 
All have been active during historical times except Agua. 
 
Figure 2  Eruptive history of Fuego volcano since 1524, when the Spanish first arrived in 
the area. Data are from the Smithsonian Global Volcanism Program database 
[http://www.volcano.si.edu/] and provide a measure of the eruption size using the 
Volcano Explosivity Index [http://volcanoes.usgs.gov/images/pglossary/vei.php]. VEI 4 
eruptions of 1717 and 1974 are highlighted, as is the only other VEI 4 eruption between 
1524 and 1717, in 1581. 
 
Figure 3  Map showing the approximate location of witness testimonies. Where the 
witnesses traveled to survey the effects of the different events, they are placed in all 
relevant locations. See Table S1 (Supplementary Material) for details. 
 
Figure 4  Map showing the witness locations and inferred intensity (yellow, low intensity 
to orange, high intensity) of the September 29, 1717 earthquake. Key is the evidence 
from witnesses in El Salvador that they did not feel this event, which means that it was 
local. Also important is the evidence that the damage was most severe in Alotenango, 
which lies between the two volcanoes. 
 
Figure 5  Map showing the witness locations and inferred intensity (pale green, low 
intensity to blue, high intensity) of the September 29 mudflows from Agua. Importantly 
these flows emanated from the southwest slopes of Agua and traveled south, and thus did 
not affect the capital city. 
 
Figure 6  Sketch map from the Autos showing the new boccas formed on the flanks of 
Agua that fed the September 29 mudflows (from witness T23). The witness shows the 
flows merging upslope of him, splitting around high ground and converging down slope; 
the flow eventually fed into the Rio Guacalate near Escuintla. 
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Abstract 
 
Assessing and communicating the risks posed by natural hazards requires not only a 
thorough understanding of the hazards but also an understanding of the spatial and 
temporal impact of successive events from the same source(s). This 4 dimensional 
approach requires the lens of time, which is often missing from modern responses to 
recent hazards, but also details of the event chronology and immediate human impact, 
which must be inferred from archaeological studies. Here we provide an example to 
illustrate the use of historical documents to fill this gap. We focus on the volcanically and 
seismically active region that hosts the capital city of Guatemala, which has be relocated 
twice in response to hazardous events since its original founding in 1524. More 
specifically, we examine documents, entitled “Autos Hechos Sobre el Lastimoso, Estrago 
y Ruina que Padecio esta Ciudad de Guatemala   …"  [Autos] that were collected in 
response to a cascading sequence of volcanic, seismic and mudflow events in 1717 to 
support a request to the Spanish government to relocate the second capital city. These 
documents provide exceptional detail about the location of the witnesses, the nature of 
the hazardous activity and the response of local communities to individual events. This 
detail allows us not only to reconstruct the sequence of events but also to link volcanic 
activity at Volcán de Fuego to both local seismicity and mudflows from Volcán de Agua, 
which we interpret as triggered by intruding magma from Fuego. Additionally, the long 
and well documented history of the region shows how a single catastrophic event – in this 
case a large rainfall-triggered debris flow from Agua in 1541, which destroyed the first 
capital city – can reverberate through the centuries and affect the response of the local 
community almost 200 years later, in 1717, even though the origin and affected area of 
the mudflow hazard was very different in the two cases. This example thus illustrates the 
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importance   of   “memorability”   in   both   the   perception   of,   and   response to, hazardous 
events (e.g., Slovic, 2000). 
 
1. Introduction 
 Recent volcanic eruptions, such as that of Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland in 
2010, have stimulated important interactions among scientists, social scientists and 
emergency managers. However, such studies of recent events tend naturally to focus on 
immediate impacts, with the result that hazard management aims to improve immediate 
physical impacts of hazard (vulnerability), often at the expense of developing long-term 
(and sustainable) strategies for hazard mitigation (resilience; e.g., White et al., 2001). 
This  approach,  however,  ignores  the  ‘long  shadow’  (e.g.,  Grattan  and  Torrence,  2007)  of  
such  disasters,  where  ‘long’   refers   to   time  scales   relevant   for  either  political  or  cultural  
change (e.g., Birkmann et al., 2010; Diamond and Robinson, 2010). A long view is 
provided, in contrast, by archaeological studies of the impact of past volcanic disasters on 
human societies (e.g., Sheets and Grayson, 1979). A challenge to archaeological studies, 
however, is causality must be assumed rather than proven (Coombes and Barber 2005; 
Leroy 2006). The time gap between archaeological and present day research is the realm 
of history, which can contribute robust chronologies that allow cause and effect to be 
linked (e.g., Vittori et al., 2007).  
Here we use the historical record of Spanish colonial Guatemala to improve 
fundamental understanding of volcano-related hazards in the region, and to examine the 
role of past events on the response of the local population to an unusual cascading 
sequence of hazards in August and September of 1717. The written record of the area is 
extensive, because the events of interest occurred near the second location of the capital 
city of Guatemala, Santiago de Guatemala (now known as Antigua; Fig. 1), which lies 
close to the active Volcán de Fuego and dormant Volcán de Agua. Importantly, the first 
capital city – Santiago de los Caballeros – was destroyed by a disastrous mudflow from 
nearby Volcán de Agua in 1541, only 17 years after it was founded. The immediate 
consequence was relocation of the city to higher ground; the much more profound, and 
longer lasting, consequence was not only extended scientific debate about the mudflow 
origin (e.g., Maudsley, 1899; Anderson, 1908; Carmak, 1973), but also the extent to 
which the destruction of Santiago de los Caballeros still looms large in the minds of local 
inhabitants. Here we examine the impact of the 1541 mudflow as viewed through the lens 
of a cascading sequence of hazardous events involving both Volcán de Agua and 
neighboring Volcán de Fuego in 1717 almost two centuries later, events that prompted 
local citizens to demand relocation of the capital city for a second time. 
 
2. Background 
It is well known that disastrous events can act as natural experiments (Diamond 
and Robinson, 2010) and/or catalysts of change (e.g., Burby et al., 2000; Perez, 2001; 
Birkmann et al., 2010). Change may occur by migration (abandoning the hazardous 
location) or adaptation, such as risk-based land use planning. To be effective, such 
planning must balance the benefits, as well as the drawbacks, of living in hazardous areas 
(e.g., White et al. 2001; Glavovic et al., 2010), and engage both community members and 
government officials (e.g., Cronin et al., 2004; Cashman and Cronin, 2008; Ricci et al., 
2013). A key factor that affects community perceptions of risk is the memorability (and 
imaginability) of individual hazards (e.g., Slovic, 2000), such that an event that is 
memorable within the community for its real or perceived impact will be weighted more 
heavily in planning decisions than an event that is not as easily imagined. A modern 
example is the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear accident and the effect of that accident on 
perceptions of risk related to nuclear power (e.g., Slovic et al., 1982; Kasperson et al., 
1988). A different perspective on memorability can be found in studies of oral traditions. 
When stories must be passed orally from generation to generation, a community disaster 
may  become  “a  defining   experience   that  passes   into   shared  memory”   (Perez,  2001).   In  
this way, inherited stories, whether oral or written, are often preserved where the 
knowledge contained is critical to community survival (e.g., Barber and Barber, 2006), 
and thus may critically influence community planning of future generations.  
 The long history (~ 300 years) of Spanish occupation of the area around Volcán 
de Fuego [Fuego] and neighboring Volcán de Agua [Agua] provides an unusual 
opportunity to evaluate both the behavior of the volcanoes and the communities that have 
grown up in their shadows. Both volcanoes form part of the central Guatemala arc (Fig. 
1). Fuego has been one of the most persistently active of the Guatemalan volcanoes, with 
57 confirmed eruptions, and several more unconfirmed, since the arrival of Spanish 
colonists in 1524 (Smithsonian Institute, Global Volcanism Program [GVP] database). 
Documentation   of   Fuego’s   activity   is   reasonably   good   because   of   its   proximity   to   the  
original capital city of Santiago de los Caballeros, and to the relocated city of Santiago de 
Guatemala. Agua, in contrast, has no documented eruptions in the Holocene (Bonis and 
Salazar, 1973; Schilling et al., 2001; GVP). It has had, instead, numerous mudflows that 
have affected the area to the north of the volcano, including the area occupied by the first 
capital city (now Ciudad Vieja). 
 Fuego is basaltic andesite in composition, and most of its eruptions have been 
moderate in size and intensity (VEI 2 or 3; GVP). At the extremes are periods of 
persistent  low  level  ‘open  vent’  activity  (Lyons  et  al., 2010), and larger (VEI 4) eruptions 
(Rose et al., 1978; Lyons et al., 2010; GVP). Recorded activity is episodic, with four 20-
70 year periods of high activity accounting for 75% of the total (Fig. 2).  Interestingly, 
this episodicity appears to be regional, such that activity at Fuego mirrors the rest of the 
Central American volcanoes (Martin and Rose, 1981). More importantly, by 1717, 
inhabitants  of  Santiago  de  Guatemala  were  very  familiar  with  Fuego’s  range  of  volcanic  
activity. 
 Mudflows from Agua also vary in intensity, with the most severe being that of 
September 1541. The mudflow was caused by a debris flow that originated from the 
volcano’s   summit   after   unusually   heavy   rainfall.   In this the event was similar to the 
devastating debris avalanche and resulting debris flow from dormant Casitas volcano, 
Nicaragua, in 1998, that was caused by intense rainfall associated with Hurricane Mitch 
(e.g., Schilling et al., 2001; Scott et al., 2005). The most recent mudflow to affect the area 
was caused by heavy rains associated with Tropical Storm Agatha in 2010. Much more 
unusual are mudflows that affect other sectors of the volcano. One such event occurred in 
September 1717, when mudflows associated with a large regional earthquake devastated 
areas on the southwest flank of the volcano. It is this event – both its cause and its impact 
on the local communities – that are the subject of this paper. 
In 1717, Guatemala was part of the Spanish Empire; it was ruled by the Spanish 
monarch, but governed by a complex hierarchy of royal officials at the regional and local 
level. The historical sources that we analyze here were produced by municipal officials in 
Santiago de Guatemala (Antigua) in the aftermath of the events of August-September of 
that year, and in response to demands by many of its residents that the city be relocated. 
Officials within the cabildo, or municipal government, themselves residents of long-
standing, shared the view that in the light of the extent of the damage suffered by the city 
as a result of the recent earthquake, it was imperative to obtain the required formal royal 
approval to initiate the process of relocation. It was with this purpose in mind that the 
cabildo empowered alcalde ordinario Juan de Rubayo Morante to carry out 
investigations in the local area, to interview key witnesses, and to dispatch their 
testimonies, along with other evidence in support of their case, to Spain. The resulting 
file, comprising nearly 180 densely-written and bound pages, was entitled “Autos Hechos 
Sobre el Lastimoso, Estrago y Ruina que Padecio esta Ciudad de Guatemala   …"  
(henceforth, Autos), a copy of which is housed in the Archivo General de Centro América 
(AGCA) in Guatemala City.  
Individual testimonies contained in the Autos describe a succession of natural 
disasters, beginning with a VEI 4 eruption (GVP) of Volcán de Fuego on August 27th 
and 28th of 1717 and culminating with a series of severe local earthquakes and major 
mudflows from Volcán de Agua in late September. Taken together, these testimonies 
represent a remarkable historical record of social and scientific significance. From a 
scientific perspective, they provide important insight into a rare example of triggered 
(cascading) hazards, where activity at one volcano triggers activity at a neighboring 
volcano. From a social science perspective, the (over-) reaction that prompted this 
interesting early example of hazard data collection derived explicitly from memories of 
the catastrophic (defining) event in 1541. 
 
3. Methods 
 
The Autos comprise 45 separate documents that record written and oral accounts 
provided by testimonies of 20 individuals, including municipal officials, eyewitnesses, 
and residents with experience of prior similar events.  Given the motives that led to their 
production – namely, to support the cabildo’s  case for relocation of the capital city – we 
address the issue of credibility at the outset (Leroy, 2006), specifically the possibility the 
experience, impact and consequences of the events that took place in 1717 may have 
been exaggerated for the purpose of enhancing the case for relocation. The similarity 
between the accounts that discuss the timing and nature of the activity leads us to 
conclude, however, that this bias did not affect the accuracy of reporting in this regard. At 
the same time, we are interested in the witness bias from the perspective of assessing the 
ways in which the response of the community was affected by the longer history of prior 
damaging events, and most particularly by the memory of the disaster that destroyed the 
original city of Santiago de los Caballeros in 1541.  
Extracting specific geologic information from the Autos required first reading and 
translating the accounts, and then a second translation from the descriptive original 
language to modern geologic terminology. The formulaic nature of the process of 
evidence-gathering – a characteristic of Spanish colonial judicial processes – enables us 
to place the witnesses in specific locations at the time the events they describe occurred, 
and to record these in a GIS database, which in turn allows us to assess the spatial as well 
as temporal reach of the events experienced (Fig. 3). Other testimonies provide 
information about events witnessed from afar, or told to the witness by someone else. 
Testimonies by witnesses who traveled extensively to collect data are attached to multiple 
locations on the maps. Each testimony was then reviewed for (1) geologic information, 
(2) timing of events and (3) information about event impact. In the text below, we 
reference individual testimonies using the testimony number (T1, etc.), which is keyed to 
witness locations shown in Figure 3 and included in Table S1 (Supplementary Material).  
 
4. Results 
 
The Autos describe a sequence of natural events that began with a large eruption 
at Fuego on August 27-29, 1717, and ended with a destructive local earthquake on 
September 29 and subsequent south-traveling mudflows from Agua. Below we 
summarize observations from the Autos of the eruption, the subsequent geophysical 
activity, and the events of late September.  
 
4.1 Eruption of Fuego, August 27-28, 1717  
Eighteen of the documents in the Autos describe the eruption of Fuego. All concur 
that the eruption occurred on August 27th and 28th (e.g., T5), although some witnesses say 
that it continued into August 29th (e.g., T7, T8 and T14). The first signs of activity were 
small ash pulses on the evening of August 27th (T14); the main phase started on the 
evening of August 27th (T11, T16, T34). For many of the witnesses, the first indications 
of activity were not visual, but instead were estruendos (crashing sounds) that were 
particularly loud later that evening (T8). By the following day, emitted ash obscured the 
daylight   and   witnesses   described   “rivers   of   fire”   from   the   summit   that   contained 
variously sized rocks that traveled with so much force that they uprooted trees (T44). We 
interpret these to be pyroclastic flows produced by collapse of advancing lava flows, as 
seen in 1974 (Rose et al., 1978). 
Predictably, accounts of the activity vary with witness location (Fig. 4). Witnesses 
who were relatively close to the volcano (T1, T34, T44) focused on the plume that 
reached   “high”   into   the   air,   starting   on   August   27th. They also described estruendos, 
retumbos (rumbles), temblores (tremors), and shaking of the ground during the eruptive 
activity (T1, T5, T34). In Santiago de Guatemala, it was claimed that the eruption 
deposited so much ash that people had to cover their eyes to walk through the streets 
(T34). Witnesses in the capital city also reported  that  the  ‘fire’  from  the  volcano  could  be  
seen at night from <40 (T17) to >100 leagues (222 – 556 km) away (T44). Confirmation 
comes from a witness in San Miguel (El Salvador; located approximately 50 leagues 
from Santiago de Guatemala), who reported tall llamas (flames) of fire on the night of 
August 28th (T11). Retumbos were also heard at great distances from the volcano, as 
reported  by  the  two  witnesses  in  El  Salvador,  who  either  ‘experienced’  (T13)  or  ‘heard’  
(T11) retumbos during August 27-28 eruptive activity.  
Direct damage from the eruption was worst in the valley between Fuego and 
Agua, including the pueblos of Siquinala, Santa Lucia, and Alotenango (T26). Although 
the vecinos (inhabitants) of Santiago de Guatemala were not directly affected by the 
eruption, many were terrified by the combination of the fire, rocks, smoke and ash: 
 
“…  Que  es  cierto  …  que   los   terremotos  y  otros  graves  perjuicios,  que  se  
han experimentado en esta ciudad, provienen de los volcanes inmediatos a 
ella, como se ha experimentado en muchas ocasiones, y especialmente la 
noche del día viente y siete de Agosto pasado de este presente año, y el día 
siguiente en que el uno de ellos abortó voraces lenguas de fuego y humo, 
cuyo estruendo aterrorizó a todos los habitadores de esta  ciudad…”   
 
“It   is   true  …   that   the   earthquakes  and  other   serious  afflictions   that  have  
been experienced in this city, derive from the volcanoes which lie nearby, 
as has been experienced on many occasions, and especially on the night of 
27 August of this year and the following day when one of these aborted 
voracious tongues of fire and smoke, making crashing sounds that 
terrorized  all  of  the  inhabitants  of  this  city.” 
(T5) 
 
4.2 Post-eruptive activity – August 29 – September 29, 1717 
 
During, and for at least 33 days following, the eruption of Fuego on August 
27th, the volcano showed signs of unrest, particularly in the form of both 
retumbos and temblores (T1, T8, T14, T44). According to accounts in the Autos, 
retumbos were primarily heard (T5, T10), although in some instances they were 
also felt (T1, T14); the temblores often mentioned in the same context were 
always felt (ground shaking). Witnesses in proximal locations insisted that both 
were from sources near (T10), or  even  “inside”  (T5),  the  volcano. 
During the same period, the Autos also provide numerous descriptions of 
ground fissures, or barrancas (ravines), that increased from meters to tens to 
hundreds of meters in width and depth (T2, T5, T14, T15). It is unclear from the 
accounts whether these fissures formed during, or shortly after, the August 27-28 
eruption. At the same time a brecha (breach) opened on Fuego from the summit 
to the east (toward Alotenango; T5, T7, T17):  
 
“…      con   la   ocasión   del   reconocimiento que hizo del dicho Volcán de 
Fuego, temiendo el que sus piedras no atajasen el dicho rio desagüe de 
esta ciudad y de dichas haciendas, subió parte de el arriba como hasta más 
que medio volcán, y vio una barranca que corre a la cima para abajo, tan 
profunda que le causó terror y miedo, que al parecer tendrá como hasta 
cien varas de hondura, y de ancho como media cuadra, la cual le dijo un 
indio que llevaba en su compañía que era nuevamente abierta con la 
ocasión del fuego que había echado porque antes de él solo era una 
pequeña barranquilla de vara y media de hondo, por donde con facilidad 
bajaban  y  conducían  madera…” 
 
“…at  the  time  of  the  survey  of  Volcán  de  Fuego  which  he  conducted,  [and]  
fearing that the rocks might block the river drainage of this city and 
[surrounding] haciendas, he climbed more than half-way up the volcano 
and saw a ravine that ran from the summit downwards, so deep that [on 
seeing it] he felt terror and fear.  It appears to be up to 100 varas in depth 
[~83m], and about a half cuadra in width [125m], and according to an 
Indian who accompanied him, it had opened recently, at the same time as 
the fire spewed [by the volcano], because previously it was only a shallow 
ravine, 1.5 varas in depth, down which they comfortably transported 
wood…”   
(T5) 
 
This witness also noted that the barranca must have carried a large current of water 
because of the branches and trees that it had transported to the river. Other witnesses 
claimed that another barranca had  formed  from  the  volcano’s  summit  to  the  south  (T14, 
T17), and that additional openings produced smoke or steam, and emanated heat and a 
stench that made people ill (T14, T15).   
 During the same period, seven of the accounts in Autos describe an unusual 
sensation that they felt when traveling near the volcano, which they likened to walking on 
hollow ground, or the way the ground sounds when horses or carriages were in motion 
(T1, T7, T14, T17, T29, T44). A report from the eastern slopes of Fuego (T15) recounts 
more specifically the sensation that a subterranean bóveda (cellar) existed beneath the 
volcano: 
 
“…y   que  …las   cabalgaduras  …   con   su   piso   parecía   pisaban   sobre   una  
bóveda y así mismo vieron salir algún humo del centro de dicho barranca 
como de unos  ronroneos  expeliendo  tanto  calor  y  hedor…” 
 
“…And  ..  it  appeared  [to  those]  on  horseback  that  with  each  step  they  were  
treading over a vault and they also saw some steam rise from the said 
ravine,  like  purrs  releasing  a  lot  of  heat  and  odor…”   
 
Importantly, this account links the sensation of hollow ground directly to the formation 
of a barranca that was releasing both heat and pungent steam.  
 
4.3 Earthquake of September 29, 1717 
 
On the evening of September 29, 1717, several large earthquakes destroyed much 
of Santiago de Guatemala and the surrounding pueblos, and took many lives (T1). The 
earthquakes clearly had a local origin (T10, T11, T13, T18), although they were also felt 
on the Costa de Escuintla (then called Costa de Esquintlapeque), about 70 km south of 
Santiago de Guatemala (Fig. 4). Critically, all witnesses (T5, T14, T15) were convinced 
that the earthquakes were caused by the volcanoes:   
 
“…Y   que   el   asentar   que   dichos   terremotos   provienen   de   los   volcanes   es  
porque tiene el declarante su residencia en las haciendas que fueron del 
Capitán Don Joseph de Castillo, que están casi en la falda del Volcán de 
Fuego por un lado, y por el otro lado con inmediación al de Agua, y por ello 
hallándose en el campo le cogieron dichos terremotos, en el, los cuales 
sintió con imponderable fuerza, o estrépito, y tal que fue preciso arrodillado 
acercarse de un palo para poderse mantener, y como estaba en la frente del 
dicho Volcán de Fuego, sintió que el ruido y fuerza de los terremotos salían 
de él, cuya presunción le confirman los retumbos que hacen mover la tierra 
porque los oye en el dicho volcán, el que tiene profundas barrancas, o abras 
recientes…”  
 “...   Because   the   witness   resides   in   the   haciendas   …   which   on   one   side  
extend almost to the slopes of Volcán de Fuego, and on the other lie close 
to [Volcán] de Agua, he can assert that said earthquakes come from the 
volcanoes  …  he   found  himself   in  his      fields when the earthquakes struck, 
with   such   strength     …   that,   kneeling,  he  had   to   lean  on  a   stick   to   steady  
himself. And as he was in front of Volcán de Fuego, he felt that the noise 
and force of the earthquakes came from it [the volcano]. His assumption is 
confirmed by the retumbos that make the earth move, because he hears 
them in said volcano [Fuego] which has [formed] new deep barrancas or 
openings…”   
(T5) 
 
The interpretation of a local source is supported by the severe damage reported in 
Alotenango and Ciudad Vieja, which lie between, and close to, both volcanoes (T10, 
T12, T29; Fig. 4). The earthquakes also caused significant damage within Santiago de 
Guatemala - one eyewitness estimated that the earthquake destroyed half the city (T31) – 
although here the bias of the witnesses would tend to exaggerate the impacts.  That said, 
one account provides a detailed and specific list of the damages to important religious 
and government buildings (T32). 
4.4  Mudflow from Volcán de Agua, September 29, 1717  
The impact of the September 29 earthquakes was compounded by mudflows from 
Agua that were apparently triggered by the seismic activity. The flows originated high on 
the southwest slopes of the volcano and travelled south, away from the primary 
population centers, and, it was said, eventually reached the ocean (Fig. 5). Not 
surprisingly, the pueblos Masagua and Mistlan on the Rio Guacalate were most impacted 
by the mudflows (T12). The most detailed description of the source of the mudflows 
comes from a witness from  the  pueblo  of  Esquintlapeque  (T23).  He  was  ‘four  leagues’  up  
the slopes of Volcán de Agua when the flows prevented him from continuing, so he 
climbed a small hill to get a better view. He describes three separate flows from upslope 
that first combined, and then split, around the high point where he was standing. The two 
resulting flows eventually merged into a single flow south and downslope from his 
location (Fig. 6) and continued down the southwest flank of the volcano to join the Rio 
Guacalate near Escuintla. This account provides the critical observation that the flows 
originated   from  new   ‘abras’   (openings)  on   the  upper   slopes  of   the  volcano   that  hadn’t  
been there before; for this reason the witnesses attributed the flows directly to the 
September 29th earthquake (e.g., T12).  
Several witnesses assert that the mudflow moved with great force and was very 
large, and that it carried sizeable sticks and rocks that were deposited along its path (T12, 
T15,  T21).   In   this   it   sounds   like  a   ‘normal’  debris   flow.  However, some witnesses also 
noted that the mudflows had unusual properties: they were yellow, they had a distinctive 
and repugnant sulphurous smell, and they were hot enough to kill all of the fish in the 
river (T14, T15, T17, T18, T19, T21, T22, T25, T36, T39, T44). These descriptions 
demonstrate that, in both their source and their character, the mudflows of September 29-
30 were different from typical rainfall-triggered mudflows at Agua, which originate at the 
volcano’s  summit  and  travel  north  toward  Ciudad Vieja.  
Retumbos were also heard during the mudflows (T14). This association led 
witnesses to relate the September 29 earthquakes, the mudflows, and activity of both 
volcanoes: 
 
“…y  que  los  retumbos  que  hacen  mover  la  tierra  y  se  continúan  hasta  hoy  
los tiene causados del dicho volcán, por la dicha razón de la inmediación 
con que está la casa de su habitación, y así por esto como por las abras 
que tiene dicho volcán de agua y la que por ellas se dice ha arrojado así a 
la  banda  del  sur…”   
 
“…And  that  the  retumbos  that  make  the  earth  move  and  which  continue  to  
this day are caused by the said volcano [which he knows] because the 
house   in  which  he   lives   is  near   to   it  and  …  because  of   the  openings   that  
have appeared on Volcán de Agua and down which it has expelled 
[material]  towards  the  south  …”  (T10) 
 
Additional tremors (T11) and mudflows (T22, T23) were reported in October, 
although clearly the peak of the activity was on September 29-30. These events prompted 
great concerns, particularly that Agua  volcano  would  “entirely  burst”  and  flood  the  city  
(T18); for this reason, two government officials were instructed to survey both volcanoes, 
while paying particular attention to Agua (reported in T19-T30). Of most concern to the 
citizens of Santiago de Guatemala was the possibility that additional disturbances to 
either Volcán de Agua or Volcán de Fuego could trigger a collapse from the slopes of one 
volcano   that   that   would   block   the   city’s   only   drainage,   Rio   de  Magdalena.   They   also  
considered that if Agua experienced another mudflow of the same magnitude but directed 
to  the  north,  it  would  “undoubtedly”  inundate  the  city  (T6,  T7,  T8).     
 
5. Discussion 
 As described above, the Autos provide detailed spatial and temporal information 
about the cascading hazards that commenced with the late August awakening of Volcán 
de Fuego and ended with the damaging local earthquake and mudflows from Volcán de 
Agua. They also provide important insight into the (mis)perceptions of some of the 
population about the nature of those hazards and their potential impact on the capital city. 
Here we first provide a geologic interpretation of the volcanic activity, the subsequent 
earthquakes and the culminating mudflows from Volcán de Agua. We then examine the 
local response to these events, particularly the perception of the people of Santiago de 
Guatemala that their city was in an unsafe location. 
 
5.1 Interpretation of the events of August-September 1717 
 The evidence provided above supports previous interpretations of the August 27-
29, 1717 eruption as a VEI 4 event (GVP), particularly when compared with detailed 
descriptions of the most recent VEI 4 eruption in 1974 (Rose et al., 1978). Similarities 
between the two eruptions include the small precursory episodes of ash release, the high 
ash   plumes   that   characterized   the   peak   activity,   and   the   accompanying   ‘rivers   of   fire’  
(pyroclastic flows). Eruptive activity in 1717 appears, however, to have peaked more 
quickly (between August 27 and 29), and decayed more rapidly, than the 1974 activity, 
which continued for two weeks. Another similarity is the formation of numerous hot and 
steaming abras (openings,   fissures)  on   the  volcano’s   flanks.   In  1717,   fissures  appeared 
on both the south flank and on the east flank (toward Agua). In 1974, a dominant 
structural trend was identified along a NNE-SSW axis, while a weakness to the east was 
suggested by microseismicity trends after the 1974 activity (Rose et al., 1978). 
Importantly, near-surface magma migration continued after the end of the visible 
eruption. Evidence for continued magmatic activity includes both the numerous reported 
retumbos (heard) and temblores (felt) earthquakes in September, as well as descriptions 
of barrancas and   ‘hollow   ground’   in   the   region   between   Fuego   and   Agua   (Fig.   3).    
Together, these data suggest that subsurface magma intrusion may have created both 
surface and near-surface openings, perhaps caused by extension above a propagating 
dyke. Similarly, the several months of microseismicity recorded after the 1974 Volcán de 
Fuego eruption were interpreted to result from continued activity of the dike-like conduit 
responsible for feeding the eruptive activity.  
The post-eruption unrest culminated in a strong earthquake on September 29, 
1717. Testimonies in the Autos unambiguously demonstrate that this was a local, not a 
regional, earthquake. Moreover, although the earthquake clearly affected parts of the 
capital city Santiago de Guatemala and was felt to a lesser degree along the Costa de 
Escuintla (over 70 km to the south), the earthquake was felt most intensely in Alotenango 
and Ciudad Vieja (that is between Volcán de Agua and Volcán de Fuego; T5; Fig. 4). In 
fact, some testimonies state explicitly that the earthquake was hardly experienced outside 
of those towns (e.g., T10), and that the towns most severely affected were those on the 
slopes of Volcán de Agua (T12). This pattern of impact strongly suggests that the 
earthquake was caused by faulting related to magma intrusion along a fissure or dyke 
system propagating east from Volcán de Fuego toward Volcán de Agua, consistent with 
evidence for eastward propagating dykes during the month of September.  
Further evidence for lateral magma propagation lies in the mudflows, which 
several witnesses thought were triggered by the seismic activity. Evidence for triggering 
includes emanation of the mudflows from new abras on the SW flanks of the volcano 
(Fig. 6), and descriptions of steaming avenidas of water and yellow mud that smelled of 
sulphur,   both   of   which   suggest   involvement   of   a   hydrothermal   system   within   Agua’s  
edifice. The mudflows were also accompanied by estruendos (crashing, or exploding 
sounds), which suggests that small phreatic explosions may have occurred in conjunction 
with vent formation. These observations, together with the absence of reports of heavy 
rain, show that the mudflows were not generated by excessive rainfall, but instead by 
groundwater emerging from within the volcano. Taken together, we conclude that there is 
overwhelming evidence that a magmatic intrusion from Fuego (probably in the form of a 
dyke) triggered both the September 29 earthquake and the mudflows from Agua.  
 
5.2 Other examples of cascading volcano hazards involving hydrothermal systems 
Magma-induced changes in subsurface hydrologic systems are not uncommon. 
Manifestations of such changes include phreatic (steam-driven) explosions, changes in 
hydrothermal systems, groundwater-triggered mudflows and elevated fluxes in local 
rivers (e.g., Gadow, 1930; Roobol and Smith, 1975; Witze and Kanipe, 2014) or even 
large landslides (e.g., Voight et al., 1981, 1983; Siebert, 2002). Less common, although 
not unheard of, is disturbance of a hydrothermal system in one volcano by magmatic 
activity at a neighboring volcano. Perhaps the most dramatic example of such triggered 
activity is provided by the 1792 eruption of Unzen volcano, Japan (e.g., Siebert et al., 
1987; Siebert, 2002).  
Mount Unzen is a volcanic complex that includes the active peak – Fugen-dake – 
and an older (dormant) peak, the Mayu-yama dome. Fugen-dake erupted on February 10, 
1792, after three months of precursory seismicity and phreatic eruptions. Explosive 
activity gave way to lava flows on March 1; by late April, seismic activity (both felt and 
heard) propagated to Mayu-yama, 5 km to the east. An earthquake on April 29 caused the 
dome to slide 200m, and prompted evacuation of the local population. Three weeks later, 
on May 21, two strong earthquakes triggered a debris avalanche from Mayu-yama that 
traveled to the sea; the resulting tsunami killed ~15,000 people, making it the most 
devastating volcanic disaster in Japanese history (e.g., Siebert et al., 1987). In the weeks 
following the collapse, hot water continued to flow from the scarp, consistent with 
release of a pressurized hydrothermal system (Siebert, 2002).  
The collapse of Mayu-yama dome was probably caused by saturation of the 
volcanic edifice as hydrothermal waters migrated in front of advancing magma. We 
suggest a similar scenario for the 1717 mudflows from Agua volcano. As in Japan, both 
seismic activity and fissure formation provide evidence of subterranean magma migration 
between the late August Fuego eruption and the late September earthquakes and 
mudflows from Agua. Also similar is the emission of over-pressured water (sufficient to 
form new outlets on the flanks of Agua) from a hydrothermal system (evidenced by the 
temperature, color and smell of the mud). Importantly, this event was sufficiently unusual 
that it must have added to the anxiety of the local communities, who were already 
stressed by the rather severe eruption and the 33 days of subsequent unrest. 
 
5.3 The long shadow of 1541 
 The events of August-September 1717, although clearly disruptive, were not 
catastrophic, or even disastrous. Citizens of the area had been living with frequent 
volcanic and seismic activity since the time of settlement, and some recognized the links 
between these geophysical events (T36). Why, then, did these events prompt a call from 
many of the inhabitants of Santiago de Guatemala to relocate the capital city farther away 
from Volcán de Agua? We address this question by first reviewing the types of 
information provided by the eyewitnesses and municipal officials regarding previous 
destructive events related to both eruptions from Fuego and regional seismic activity. We 
then focus on the specific nature of threats posed by Agua, particularly when placed in 
the context of the catastrophic 1541 debris avalanche and mudflow. 
Volcán de Fuego is frequently active, and has been since the Spanish conquest; in 
fact, Fuego may have been erupting when the Spanish first arrived in the region (Restall 
and Asselbergs, 2007). The Autos demonstrate that the residents of the area were very 
familiar with Fuego’s   eruptive   history.   For   example,   witnesses   T7   and   T8   explicitly  
mention eruptions earlier in the century, and municipal officials recognize that much of 
the   land  was   “made   by   volcanoes”   (T17).  More   importantly,   official   reports   about   the 
1717 events also include copies of reports made after the 1705 Fuego eruption, with 
descriptions  of   the  “exceptional  quantity  of  sand  and  ash   that  obscured   the  sun  and   the  
daylight”,   and   the   statement   that   more   residents   of   Guatemala   have   been   killed   by 
“fuegos  del  volcán”  than  died  from  human  conflict  (T46).   
Several of the testimonies in the Autos also relate to seismic activity. One witness 
(T17) states that the city of Santiago de Guatemala had to be rebuilt three times since the 
16th century because of numerous eruptions and earthquakes, and another (T30) notes that 
the   terrain   is   ‘sandy’   (covered   with   volcanic   ash)   and   therefore   unstable.   Accounts  
documenting damage caused by the earthquake of September 29 include descriptions of 
the unusual places where Mass was being celebrated because of damage to churches (T2, 
T30), the total destruction of Alotenango (T29), the estimated costs of rebuilding 
Santiago de Guatemala (T32, T41), the decline in taxes collected (T40, T46) and the 
prominent families who, in December 1717, were still living on the streets because of 
earthquake damage and fear of further tremors (T37, T44). These statements provide the 
sound  economic  argument  for  relocating  the  city  farther  away  from  the  “pernicious”  and  
“nearby  enemy  volcanoes”. 
It is clear from the Autos, however, that the mudflows from Agua were considered 
not only unusual but terrifying. Moreover, the testimonies show that the fears provoked 
by the mudflows were inflated relative to the actual hazard, and were deeply rooted in 
memories of the devastating mudflows that destroyed the original capital city in 1541. 
The 1541 event is specifically invoked by three accounts in the Autos (T6, T36, T44), all 
of which refer to the >600 casualties from that event. Importantly, it is clear that this 
information was transmitted in both written and form, the latter of which is documented 
by T36, which are extracts from a book written in 1714 by Fray Francisco Vasquez, a 
Franciscan friar and historian. In the book he reviews natural disasters that had affected 
the  city  since  its  founding,  beginning  with  the  “fatal  flood”  of  1541.  In  his  description  of  
the event he emphasized the heavy hurricane-generated rainfall that preceded the 1541 
mudflows, as well as the terrible noises and ground shaking that accompanied the 
collapse. Several other witnesses (T6, T7, T8, T10, T12, T13, T15, T16, T18, T21) do not 
refer specifically to the events of 1541, but did express fears of inundation during the 
night of September 29. More specifically, witnesses worried about spontaneous 
generation of mudflows from the flanks of Agua, and consequent blockage of the only 
drainage from the city (Rio de Magdalena), which ran between the two volcanoes (Fuego 
and Agua). These fears prompted many to consider moving farther from the volcanoes 
(T8, T12, T16, T17) and underpinned the consensus of a public meeting on October 20 to 
request permission to relocate the capital city (T42).  
 
5.4 Social memory and hazard perception 
 The critical importance of the 1541 events in the community interpretation of, and 
response to, the cascading hazards of August-September 1717 provides a clear example 
of   ‘social  memory’   (McIntosh   et   al.,   2000)   and   the   role   of   past   events   in   determining  
what is perceived to be a disaster (Slovic, 2000; Bankoff, 2004; Perez, 2001). The time 
frame of community memory and vulnerability has been recognized (e.g., Oliver-Smith 
1986; 2002; Bankoff, 2004) but commonly does not find a place within theoretical 
frameworks of disaster and change (e.g., Birkmann et al., 2010). This omission reflects 
(1) recent theoretical advances in disaster studies, which focus on either modern disasters 
or catastrophic collapse of ancient empires, neither of which provide the time resolution 
required for studies of the impacts of social memories (e.g., Diamond and Robinson 
2010; Cooper et al., 2012); (2) the limited number of historical studies of regions prone to 
repeated events (e.g., Chester et al., 2012); and (3) neglect, until recently, of social 
memories preserved within oral traditions (e.g., Masse et al., 2007; Cronin and Cashman 
2008; Cashman and Cronin, 2008; Cashman and Giordano, 2008 and references therein).  
 The 1717 example also shows the power of social memory to drive hazard 
mitigation. Population displacement (migration) has been a common response to recent 
disastrous events (Witham, 2005); it also represents an effective long-term strategy for 
coping with hazards (Riede, 2014). From this perspective, we can view the inhabitants of 
Santiago de Guatemala as engaging in a response driven not by irrational fears or 
misperceptions of the actual hazards, but by attempts to employ a rational strategy to 
reduce their vulnerability to future events. That they are attempting to do this within the 
restrictions imposed by a colonial structure – restrictions that required extensive 
evidence-based documentation of the natural events and their impacts – provides a unique 
window into the workings of social memory in a pre-industrial and semi-autonomous 
community.  
The Autos also provide an example of an early systematic survey of both a 
cascade of hazardous events and their impact. The Autos are systematic in the formulaic 
structure of each testimony, which imposes uniformity on eyewitness data collection that 
presages the format of social science surveys developed more than three centuries later. 
Of critical importance to our study are data related to the position of each witness, and 
the extent to which the accounts are based on first hand observations or second hand 
consultation of eyewitnesses. Also interesting is the application of scientific methods to 
establish, for example, the local origin of the September 29 earthquake, which they did 
by soliciting accounts from both local and distant (El Salvador) observers. The Autos thus 
provide systematic documentation of hazardous events and their impacts for the purpose 
of improving both scientific understanding and resilience in the face of future events. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
 Here we have demonstrated ways in which Spanish archival sources provide key 
information about both the physical nature of a cascading sequence of natural hazards 
and a long-term cascade of responses triggered by memories of an early catastrophic 
event. We have also shown that documentation of the 1717 activity in the form of the 
Autos is unusual from the perspective of natural hazard studies, in that it provides an 
early example of both a systematic survey of the physical nature and impact of a complex 
sequence of natural events, as well as a social science survey of human responses to this 
activity.  
The scientific importance of the events of 1717 lies in the clear evidence that 
magmatic (and associated seismic) activity at Fuego triggered a disturbance of the 
hydrothermal system at neighbouring Agua. Although not unprecedented (e.g., Siebert et 
al., 1987), remote triggering of hydrothermal activity is unusual, and raises important 
questions about hazard assessment of apparently dormant volcanoes such as Agua (e.g., 
Schilling et al., 2001). Our interpretation of a cascading sequence of hazards transferred 
from Fuego to Agua also provides a new and integrated perspective of these events. This 
integrated view contrasts with previous geologic and historic interpretations of the 1717 
activity, which consider, separately, the volcanic (e.g., Vallance et al., 2001; Martin and 
Rose, 1981), seismic (e.g., Feldman, 1993) and hydrologic (e.g., Schilling et al., 2001) 
events. More broadly, our analysis places the August-September, 1717, activity at Fuego 
and Agua within a larger framework of volcano-triggered hydrologic hazards that include 
the under-appreciated hazard posed by interactions between volcanic systems. 
The historical importance of this work, from a scientific perspective, lies in the 
systematic eyewitness accounts assembled in the Autos. Organized scientific responses to 
volcanic eruptions can be dated to the 1883 eruption of Krakatau, which was followed by 
detailed studies of both regional and global impacts of the event (e.g., Simkin and Fiske, 
1983). Modern social science studies of natural hazards, in contrast, start with seminal 
work in the 1960s that was summarized by Burton et al. (1978). From this perspective, 
the Autos represent a surprisingly detailed response to a series of cascading natural 
hazards, particularly given the low physical impact of the events (they did not create a 
natural   disaster).   From   the   ‘long   shadow’   perspective,   the   key   observation   is   that   this  
response – systematic collection of witness accounts from a broad geographic region – 
can be linked directly to the still-vivid memories of a catastrophic mudflow 176 years 
earlier. The strength of these memories, as demonstrated by the extremity of the response 
(a plea by many citizens to relocate the capital city), not only  supports  Slovic’s   (2000)  
emphasis on memorability as a key element of risk perception, but also shows the 
potential complexity of responses of past societies to hazardous events. This view 
supports the idea that natural disasters may be viewed as both historical processes and 
sequential events (Bankoff, 2004).  
Finally, this research also illustrates the limitations of working with archival data. 
Although the witness accounts provide valuable (and often thoughtful) geologic 
observations, the descriptions are qualitative and of varying detail. In part this derives 
from their historical context, and the lack of formal scientific nomenclature for the events 
described. The language is descriptive and often metaphorical, and thus requires 
(necessarily subjective) translation into modern scientific language. Additionally, 
information gleaned from historical sources requires detailed contextual knowledge of the 
source. In the case of the Autos, the critical context is that these witness accounts were 
collected for the express intent of providing documentation for the Spanish government 
to   support   the  municipal  government’s   request   to   relocate   the  capital   city,  which   raises  
the concern that the accounts may be exaggerated. Surprisingly, however, this does not 
seem to have compromised the veracity of the observations of the events themselves. 
Moreover, this context likely encouraged the witnesses to include key historical details 
(about past eruptions, earthquakes and mudflows) that help to explain what appears, 
initially, to be an extreme over-reaction to a moderate eruption and strong, but not 
unprecedented, earthquakes and mudflows.  
In  summary,  recent  studies  have  shown  the  importance  of  employing  the  “usable  
past”   (Stump,   2013)   to   provide   immediacy   to   both   hazard forecast scenarios and 
evidence-based policy recommendations (Reide, 2014). The mudflows from Agua that 
were triggered by magmatic activity at Fuego provide such an example, and suggest the 
importance of assessing volcanic hazard from regional, as well as the more typical single-
volcano, perspectives. At the same time, this work illustrates the role of memory in risk 
perception. Understanding communal memories is crucial not only for effective risk 
communication and improved resilience, but also for inferring causal relationships 
between hazardous events and apparent responses in historical and archaeological 
records. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1  Location map showing the three capital cities of Guatemala and the nearby 
volcanoes. The cities are currently known as Ciudad Vieja (formerly Santiago de los 
Caballeros, founded in 1527), Antigua (formerly Santiago de Guatemala, relocated in 
1542), and Guatemala City (relocated in 1773 following a large regional earthquake). The 
volcanoes Atitlan, Fuego, Agua and Pacaya lie along the Central America volcanic arc. 
All have been active during historical times except Agua. 
 
Figure 2  Eruptive history of Fuego volcano since 1524, when the Spanish first arrived in 
the area. Data are from the Smithsonian Global Volcanism Program database 
[http://www.volcano.si.edu/] and provide a measure of the eruption size using the 
Volcano Explosivity Index [http://volcanoes.usgs.gov/images/pglossary/vei.php]. VEI 4 
eruptions of 1717 and 1974 are highlighted, as is the only other VEI 4 eruption between 
1524 and 1717, in 1581. 
 
Figure 3  Map showing the approximate location of witness testimonies. Where the 
witnesses traveled to survey the effects of the different events, they are placed in all 
relevant locations. See Table S1 (Supplementary Material) for details. 
 
Figure 4  Map showing the witness locations and inferred intensity (yellow, low intensity 
to orange, high intensity) of the September 29, 1717 earthquake. Key is the evidence 
from witnesses in El Salvador that they did not feel this event, which means that it was 
local. Also important is the evidence that the damage was most severe in Alotenango, 
which lies between the two volcanoes. 
 
Figure 5  Map showing the witness locations and inferred intensity (pale green, low 
intensity to blue, high intensity) of the September 29 mudflows from Agua. Importantly 
these flows emanated from the southwest slopes of Agua and traveled south, and thus did 
not affect the capital city. 
 
Figure 6  Sketch map from the Autos showing the new boccas formed on the flanks of 
Agua that fed the September 29 mudflows (from witness T23). The witness shows the 
flows merging upslope of him, splitting around high ground and converging down slope; 
the flow eventually fed into the Rio Guacalate near Escuintla. 
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Figure 6 
Testimo
ny No.
Folios Witness
Date 
(1717)
Occupation; age (if known)
Location at time of events described 
(where specified)
Location from where reporting on 
impacts (where specified)
Key points made in evidence
T1 1r-2v Don Juan Rubayo Morante 25-Oct
Alcalde ordinario, 
corregidor (municipal 
official)
Tasked with conducting the investigation into the events of 1717, and 
collecting evidence in support of the case for relocation
T2 3r-5v Don Juan Rubayo Morante 25-Oct Santiago de Guatemala
Reported actions taken in relation to measuring the distance from the 
centre of the city to the flanks of Agua; describe some of the unusual 
locations where Mass was having to be celebrated due to earthquake 
damage
T3 5v-6v Don Juan Rubayo Morante 26-Oct Santiago de Guatemala
Reported on measured distance from the centre of the city to the 
flanks of Fuego
T4 7r-7v Petition and Licence 26-Oct Santiago de Guatemala Permission granted to clergy to give evidence in case
T5 8r-11r Don Bernardo Valdés 26-Oct
natural y vecino de esta 
ciudad (native-born 
resident), aged 39
On his property - located on the 
slopes of Volcán de Fuego, close to 
Volcán de Agua, alongside the 
'camino real', the main road 
connecting the city to the coast
Described how the earthquake felt, and other effects and impacts; 
inspected Fuego; described water debris flow down Agua and Fuego
T6 11r-15r
Don Pedro de la Barreda y 
Castillo
27-Oct
native-born; resident in 
the city; aged 31
Reported repeated eruptions of Fuego culminating in that of 1717; 
carried out inspections; reported concern regarding the potential for 
debris from Fuego/Agua to block the River Madalena and to cause it to 
overflow and inundate the city; reported deep sinkholes formed in 
Alotenango as a result of the 29 September earthquake (a common 
occurrence); memory of 1541 event leading to the death of 600 
inhabitants of Ciudad Vieja
T7 15r-17v Don Felipe Ximénez 27-Oct
Spaniard; settled in the 
city since at least 1702
Santiago de Guatemala
Made reference to the 1702 earthquake; eruptions of Fuego in 1705, 
1710, 1717; reported rumours in the aftermath of the 29/9 earthquake 
that Agua had 'burst' at several points, and the fears of inundation that 
prompted mass evacuation; reported concerns that the city would 
'sink' due to terrain sounding hollow
T8 17v-19r Don Juan Santos 27-Oct
vecino; resident in city for 
14 years; 42
Santiago de Guatemala
Made reference to two 1705 eruptions (8 'fingers' of ash deposited on 
rooftops), and that of 1710; new 'mouths' opened on Agua in 1717; 
flows/floods in southerly direction
T9 19r-21v Don Diego Arias de Miranda 27-Oct
priest of San Pedro Caluco, 
district of Sonsonate; 41
Yzalco
Testified to having seen flames high in the sky on the night of 27 
August; experienced no more than a slight tremor on night of 29/9, but 
a much stronger and longer one on 3/10, the latter considered to have 
been general (i.e. not attributed to volcanoes)
Table - Supplementary
Testimo
ny No.
Folios Witness Date
Occupation;                      
age (if known)
Location * Key points made in evidence (dates in 1717 unless otherwise stated)
T1 1r-2v Don Juan Rubayo Morante 25/10/1717
Alcalde ordinario, 
corregidor (municipal 
official)
Tasked with conducting the investigation into the events of 1717, and collecting 
declarations to present as evidence in the case for relocation
T2 3r-5v Don Juan Rubayo Morante 25/10/1717 Santiago de Guatemala
Reported on procedures followed by officials in measuring the distance from the centre of 
the city to the flanks of Agua; described some of the unusual (deemed unacceptable) 
locations where Mass was having to be celebrated as a result of the damage caused to the 
city's churches by the 29/9 earthquake
T3 5v-6v Don Juan Rubayo Morante 26/10/1717 Santiago de Guatemala
Reported on procedures followed in measuring the distance from the centre of the city to 
the flanks of Fuego
T4 7r-7v Petition and Licence 26/10/1717 Santiago de Guatemala Recorded permission granted to clergy to give evidence
T5 8r-11r Don Bernardo Valdés 26/10/1717
natural y vecino de esta 
ciudad (native-born 
resident); aged 39
On his property on the slopes of 
Volcán de Fuego and near Volcán de 
Agua, alongside the main road 
connecting the city to the coast
Witness experienced the earthquake and retumbos prior to and after the event; inspected 
Fuego; described water debris flow down Agua and Fuego volcanoes
T6 11r-15r
Don Pedro de la Barreda y 
Castillo
27/10/1717
native-born; resident in 
the city; aged 31
Alotenango
Witness reported repeated eruptions of Fuego culminating in that of 1717; carried out 
inspections; reported concerns regarding the potential for debris from Fuego/Agua to 
block the River Madalena and cause it to overflow and inundate the city; noted that deep 
sinkholes had formed in Alotenango as a result of the 29/9 earthquake (a common 
occurrence); mentioned the 1541 event, and that it had led to the deaths of 600 
inhabitants of Ciudad Vieja
T7 15r-17v Don Felipe Ximénez 27/10/1717
Spaniard; settled in the 
city since at least 1702
Santiago de Guatemala
Witness made reference to the earthquake of 1702, and to eruptions of Fuego in 1705, 
1710, 1717; reported rumours in the aftermath of the 29/9 earthquake that Agua had 
'burst' at several points, as well as widespread fear of inundation which prompted a mass 
evacuation; noted that the primary concern related to the possibility that the city could 
'sink' due to the terrain sounding hollow
T8 17v-19r Don Juan Santos 27/10/1717
vecino; resident in city for 
14 years; aged 42
Santiago de Guatemala
Witness made reference to two 1705 eruptions (noting that 8 'fingers' of ash had been 
deposited on rooftops), and to a further eruption in 1710; noted that in 1717 new 
'mouths' had opened on Agua, the flows/floods from which travelled in a southerly 
direction
T9 19r-21v Don Diego Arias de Miranda 27/10/1717
priest of San Pedro Caluco, 
district of Sonsonate; aged 
41
Yzalco
Witness reported seeing high flames in the sky on the night of 27/8, and experiencing no 
more than a slight tremor on the night of 29/9, but a much stronger and longer one on 
3/10; noted that this latter one was considered to have been general (rather than being 
attributed to the volcanoes)
T10 21v-23v
Don Joseph de Sierra y 
Rebolorio
27/10/1717 vecino; aged 45
Ciudad Vieja on night of 29/9 
earthquake; Agua
Witness testified to hearing a loud noise from Agua Volcano on 29/9, such that he 
believed it to have 'burst'; inspected Agua on 27/10, and reported that an old 'abra' or 
'barranca' looking towards Valdes' property [T5] had become significantly wider and 
deeper, and carried a current of water and debris
Table S1 Supplementary Materia
Response to reviewers: 
 
Reviewer #1:  
 
This paper represents an ambitious cross-disciplinary effort to understand human and community 
decision making in the context of natural disasters, or, in this case, a near natural disaster 
perceived as an actionable portent of future disaster. The method outlined for the research is 
compelling in that it attempts to interweave multiple timelines--geological, human (decadal), 
human (centenary)--within a discussion of community risk perception grounded in a specific 
historical case study. To tease out the relationship between an environmental event such as the 
1717 volcanic episode, the "long" historical sequence to which it belongs, and community 
perception of the relationship between event and sequence, is no small task, and the authors do a 
commendably lucid and detailed job of explaining why an apparent "over-reaction" to an 
environmental hazard in fact represented rational risk assessment and logical, adaptive decision-
making. The combination of volcanological literature, a social-science framework, and historical 
data works well, and it is to be hope will be replicated broadly in disaster studies, and related 
environmental fields. What is missing from the paper is the next chapter of the story, i.e. the 
response of the Spanish authorities to the application for the city's relocation. Did the authorities 
perceive the request as an over-reaction, or as rational and compelling? With this added 
dimension to the socio-historical narrative, the authors might speculate upon differences, if such 
exist, between local decision-making processes and the conclusions reached by remote governing 
bodies based on the "same" evidence. Can risk--particularly the complex, calculated assessment 
of risk in the 1717 Autos, arriving at a non-intuitive decision--be communicated across 
distances? In short, what was the fate of the report, and what were the filters through which it 
was read at imperial headquarters? 
 
While we agree with Reviewer 1 that the next part of the story represents a 
fascinating question, we specifically do not take the question any further because we 
know that there are literally at 5 boxes of documents related to the events of 1717 in the 
archives of Seville alone; these documents are certainly a target for future research (in 
fact, we hope to find funds to do this) but are also a reason that we are uncomfortable 
about going beyond our analysis of the Autos, which we see as a nicely contained story in 
itself. For this reason, we merely state at the end of the Background section that “the  
1717 evidence-gathering  exercise  failed  to  gain  the  Crown’s  support  for  relocation;;  it  was  
the major earthquake of 1773 that forced the move of the capital to its current location 
(Guatemala  City;;  Lutz,  1994)”. 
 
Reviewer #2:  
 
The ms by Hutchinson et al. relates a sequence of volcanological and seismological events that 
impacted the region of Guatemala City in 1717. The authors base their reconstruction on Spanish 
chronicles describing the succession of events that occurred from August to September 1717, with 
a VEI 4 eruption at Fuego volcano, a significant earthquake, and a damaging lahar that 
descended the flank of Agua volcano. Examination of written archives leads the authors to 
propose a geological interpretation of the sequence of events, and to elaborate on social 
memorization processes after the 1524 mudflow at Agua volcano. The manuscript provides a rare 
and nice exercise in which historical narratives are used to infer a scenario for an unusual 
sequence of events. On the other hand, I have to confess that I'm not fully convinced by the 
*Detailed Response to Reviewers
resulting geological interpretations, and I suggest considering other options. I list below some 
points that the authors might want to consider before resubmitting their ms.  
 
1. First of all, the lack of page and line numbers on the PDF file renders reviewing 
uncomfortable. My comments below come with the PDF page number (P. xx) and paragraph (§. 
xx) number in the page.  
 
2. A major issue of this work is based on the quality of the translation from old Spanish to current 
English. The narratives are written in Spanish of early 18th century, with a formulation and a 
style typically used in administrative colonial documents. As admitted by the authors (P. 21 
second §), obtaining a clear view of the 1717 events requires good linguistic skills of colonial 
Spanish, as well as a robust geological-volcanological background. I think this § should have 
come much earlier, e.g. in the methodology section, in order to prepare the reader with 
uncertainties when translating this type of documents. The authors should clarify how the 
translation was made (who did it?) in light of the above comment.  
For example, the term "estruendos" is translated as "crashing, or exploding sounds", but for me 
"estruendos" would be better translated as "rumbling noises", which makes a significant 
difference when attempting to interpret the description in terms of source phenomenon. I list 
other key examples below.  
 
We have adopted this suggestion, and now include an extensive paragraph on language in 
the Methods section. We pay  particular  attention  to  the  word  “estruendos”  throughout  the 
manuscript, not only because this word was highlighted by Reviewer 2 but also because 
the word is sufficiently vague that it requires context for interpretive translation. In fact, 
we thank this reviewer for prodding us to focus more on the language, which we find 
more fascinating as we dig into it more deeply. Not only are there issues of popular vs. 
scientific language, but also there are instances where words had different connotations in 
the 18th century than in the 21st century. We discuss some (although not all) of these 
words, and use them to underline our point that historical research in volcanology 
requires an interdisciplinary effort between scientists and historians. 
 
3. A second point is that the ms provides no evidence that basic field works have been carried out 
to check/assess some descriptions given in the cited historical narratives. The authors provide no 
data/constraints/descriptions to show the importance and the dispersal pattern of the 1717 tephra 
fall from Fuego. Is there any historical record or field evidence that yield information on these 
points? Was Volcan de Agua also blanketed by the tephra fall? Similarly, it would be important 
to recognize evidences of surface fracturing and dyke emplacement on the eastern flank of Fuego 
volcano and on the western flank of Agua volcano, to support the interpretation proposed in the 
ms. In addition, basic field research focusing on chief volcanological-geological features between 
Fuego and Agua would bring valuable constraints to help interpreting historical archives. This is 
lacking in the ms.  
 
We have not done field work. We note, however, that with the frequent activity of Fuego 
(including 5 VEI 4 events since 1717) and the frequent heavy rainfall in the area, it is unlikely 
that we would be able to identify and map the specific tephra fall from 1717; it is for this reason 
that we use the detailed work on the 1974 event, together with the detailed descriptions in the 
Autos, to define the activity. It is possible that field work could be used to identify deposits from 
the 1717 mudflows, although these may also be overprinted by more recent events, and mudflows 
are notoriously difficult to date (e.g., Pistolesi et al., 2013).  
 
4. The term "barrancas" is translate as "ravines" in the ms (P. 9), but is essentially interpreted as 
ground fissures (P. 9). However, in Latin America (and in colonial texts) this term is typically 
used for "gullies" or "ravines" formed by running waters and torrents, while the term "grietas" is 
preferred to describe open fractures/fissures. To me, the "barrancas" described in the ms are not 
the surface expression of a propagating dyke, but typical gullies and ravines that were formed or 
modified during and after the 1717 eruption of Fuego.  
 We agree with this interpretation and have modified the text accordingly. 
 
Major morphological changes are extremely common during and after VEI 4 eruptions at 
tropical steep-sided volcanoes, as ravine (bedrocks and sidewalls) erosion occur during 
pyroclastic density current (PDC) and later lahar emplacements. This leads to deeper and wider 
gullies on the edifice's upper slopes. Concomitantly, erosion and sedimentation on the lower 
slopes translate into valley filling/carving processes, overbanking effects, formation of new 
ravines, and finally to modification of the local drainage system. The steam reported in the 
archives could be as well interpreted as water vapor escaping from hot pyroclastic debris that 
accumulated in the "barrancas". The term "llamas" (flames above Fuego's summit crater as seen 
from Santiago de Guatemala) is classically used in colonial texts of Latin America to describe 
tall lava fountains that most likely generated scoria flows and ballistic ejecta on the slopes of the 
volcano.  Steaming of hot pyroclastic deposits in ravines for days to weeks after eruptions of 
substantial sizes is a common phenomenon, notably at volcanoes in humid countries. The fact 
that such "barrancas" formed on other sides of the volcano support a similar process, instead of 
another dyke that could have propagated at right angle to that between Fuego and Agua. The 
"brecha" (breach) that formed from the summit of the volcano to the east is interpreted as a 
fracture opened on the eastern side of the edifice. Indeed, the formation of a summit notch, in 
which the pyroclastic material is channelized during an eruption to flow downslope along a 
preferential pathway, is a common process at many conical (basaltic/andesitic) volcanoes 
worldwide, as at Semeru in Indonesia, Mayon in the Philippines etc. Examination of the eastern 
base of Fuego volcano on Goggle images reveals the existence of a conspicuous, geologically 
fresh-looking sedimentary fan just south of Alotenango village. This fan is likely made of PDC 
deposits and/or debris flow/laharic breccias, and was possibly (partly) formed during the recent 
1717 eruption. As written above, a field study should check these features to help interpreting the 
historical narratives. Similarly, "abras" is translated as "openings" and is interpreted as 
superficial pits and small collapse structures that formed as a result of dyke propagation. 
However, the term "abras" may as well describe the source areas of landslides where vegetation 
has been removed, leaving arcuate-shaped scarps similar to that of open pits. Again, this is 
common during eruptive periods at this kind of tropical volcanic edifices, when erosion is 
boosted/enhanced as a result of sedimentary disturbances related to the eruptive process.  
 
We agree with the reviewer that the gully widening   and   steam   reported   on   Fuego’s  
eastern flanks immediately after the 27-29 Aug eruption are likely the result of 
pyroclastic flows from the eruption itself (which we state clearly in our interpretation of 
the accounts). We also note that the widespread description of the sensation of walking 
on  “hollow  ground”  could  be  ascribed   to   the  same  pyroclastic   flows.  Our   interpretation  
that subterranean magmatic activity may also have been occurring during this time period 
derives from the clear evidence for continued seismic activity (both retumbos and 
temblores), as well as the subsequent events of September 29-30 (as described in the 
text). In  fact,  we  have  had  long  discussions  about  the  possible  meaning  of  ‘abras’,  which  
simply  means   ‘openings’.   In   the  witness   statements,   however,   it   is   clear   that   ‘abras’   is  
used specifically (and uniquely) to describe the source of the mudflows at Agua 
associated with the 29/9 earthquake; the word is associated with descriptions of Agua 
‘bursting’  (e.g.,  T7,  T10,  T18),  as  well  as descriptions  of  new  ‘mouths’  (vents)  on  Agua  
(T8)   and   the   instruction   to   ‘pay   particular   attention   to   Agua   and   the   matter   expelled  
therefrom’   (T18).   Taken   together,   we   find   the   language   to   indicate   that   the  mudflows  
from Agua were not rainfall-triggered mudflows of new ash but instead were internally 
generated (and therefore more terrifying to the inhabitants). We now support this 
interpretation more fully, and supply more detailed descriptions in the Table provided as 
Supplementary Material. We also add the observation that water continued to flow from 
these new openings for weeks (T22, T23), a feature that is not consistent with rainfall-
induced landslides/mudflows. 
 
5. If I understood well, the authors interpret the term "bóveda" mentioned by some people 
between Fuego and Agua volcanoes as hollows that reflected cavities formed as a result of dyke 
emplacement between both volcanoes. It is unclear to me how such cavities could have formed 
there without clear structural surface expressions, as usually happens at the tip of shallowly 
propagating dykes, and I wonder why this is not preserved in present-day geomorphological 
features of the area. I suggest another interpretation. Such impression of porous grounds is 
typically perceived when walking on fresh unconsolidated deposits of small-volume pyroclastic 
flows, and even more on non-compacted (but dewatered) debris flow and lahar deposits. Recently 
emplaced loose material can have acoustic properties that give the feeling of some open space 
below the surface. This is a strange sensation and the description given in the ms recalls several 
experiences I had on freshly emplaced, unconsolidated deposits at tropical volcanoes. Now, I 
speculate that such unconsolidated deposits may correspond to (a part of) the sedimentary fan 
south of Alotenango. I suggest that these deposits could have been the source of the strange 
sensation that the people perceived while crossing (may be with horses or cattle) the area 
between Fuego and Agua. 
 
We now include this interpretation in the text. 
 
6. According to the interpretation proposed in the ms the "estruendos" are produced by small 
phreatic explosions and opening of small vents along the path of the propagating dyke from 
Volcan de Fuego to Volcan de Agua. As indicated in my first comment above, I would translate 
"estruendos" as "rumbling noises" that are expected to occur when a large debris flow is in 
motion. Collisions/frictions of blocks and boulders in lahars and debris flows always produce an 
impressive acoustic signal (that can be heard kms away from the source) and ground shaking is 
commonly perceived by witnesses in the vicinity of the lahar/debris flow channel.  
 
We  now  discuss  our  interpretation  of  the  word  “estruendos”  in  much  more  detail  in  Sec.  
5.1. Importantly, we provide contextual information to suggest that the estruendos may 
refer to more than simply the noise of debris flows. We also note that the sketch provided 
in Figure 6 clearly demonstrates that the mudflows emerged from new vents on the SW 
side of Agua; whether or not those openings were accompanied by the noise of 
explosions is thus a detail (and not critical to our argument that opening new mudflow 
vents requires a disturbance to the hydrothermal system within Agua). For this reason we 
have omitted mention of phreatic explosions.  
 
7. The authors claim that the mudflows from Agua "were hot enough to kill all of the fish in the 
river". To me this sounds like an over-interpretation because it not know if other fishes were still 
alive, and actually the cause of death is not made clear: it could be the heat, but could be as well 
an excess of clay accumulation in the water, or a lethal concentration of poisonous elements that 
commonly accumulate in hydrothermal systems (notably halogens and heavy metals), or a 
combination of these different factors.  
 
We have removed this statement. 
 
8. The authors try to convince that the September 29 earthquake was local. However, from the 
material provided in the ms I'm not persuaded that the "Autos unambiguously demonstrate" that 
the event was local, instead of regional. An earthquake felt 70 km away on the Guatemalan coast 
with strong damages in Guatemala City is best explained by a tectonic event. The bias in the 
impression that the effects were stronger between Fuego and Agua may be due to the strongly 
non-homogenous distribution of the population at that time, giving rise to more detailed accounts 
in the region of Fuego and Agua volcanoes. I largely agree, on the other hand, that the 
earthquake might have played a major role in triggering the landslides and subsequent mudflows 
at Agua.  
 
First, there is explicit discussion in the Autos about the regional vs. local nature of the 
earthquake. The cabildos were clearly well acquainted with regional earthquakes – in fact 
it was the regional earthquake of 1773 that finally prompted relocation of the capital city 
of Guatemala to its current location – and therefore they explicitly set out to determine 
the earthquake origin. They conclude that the earthquake was local and not regional. 
Second, we report only mudflows from Agua, not landslides. Additionally, Figure 6 
makes it very clear that the source of the mudflows was not a landslide(s) caused by the 
local shaking; instead, the mudflows issued from discrete (and new) openings on the side 
of the volcano, without evidence for widespread slope destabilization. Moreover, 
seismically triggered landslides would not be expected to form mudflows until they 
reached (and mixed with) water in river valleys. The description of witness T23 are 
clearly of mudflows, and mudflows where he did not expect them. 
 
9. To me the hypothesis of a propagating dyke needs a much stronger substantiation, i.e. would 
require arguments that go beyond the (disputable) translation of colonial archives. Examination 
of Goggle Earth images suggest that there are no flank vents at Fuego and Agua volcanoes. 
Breaching Fuego's eastern flank without formation of a lateral vent on the slope of that volcano 
sounds like an uncommon volcanological situation. Extending a dyke more than 12-13 km to the 
east toward the top of Agua's edifice without meeting the topographic surface between both 
volcanoes is difficult to imagine. In addition, the authors provide no geophysical 
evidence/reference to check if the propagation of a dyke is consistent with the tectonic stress 
regime in the region. In fact the supposed dyke would be perpendicular to sigma 1 produced by 
the subduction stress field. Dyke formation along a North-South-trending fissure, sub-parallel the 
subduction velocity vector, looks more likely, as is corroborated by alignments of Fuego and 
Acatenango crater systems.  
 
We have softened the tone of our writing to present our hypothesis as just that – an 
hypothesis – that appears to fit the data provided by the witnesses. In particular, we 
emphasize (1) the period of unrest between the eruption of Fuego and the Sept 29-30 
earthquake and mudflow, (2) the coincidence of the earthquake and mudflow, (3) the 
severity of the damage in the region between the two volcanoes, (4) the unusual location 
of the (new) mudflow vents, and (5) descriptions of the mudflows (the   ‘bursting’   of  
Agua,   the   new   ‘openings’   and   the   continued   flow   of   water   from   those   openings   [‘the  
matter   expelled   from   within’)   that   suggest   that   they   involved   Agua’s   hydrothermal  
system. This interpretation relies on but does not affect the eyewitness accounts, which 
form the basis of our paper. Clearly they are open to other interpretations – it is for this 
reason that we provide Table S1 as a guide to anyone interested in doing more work on 
these documents. 
 
10. I found the section on social memorization of interest, and I concur with the authors that 
some historical descriptions might be exaggerated for the purpose of influencing the decision 
regarding the relocation of the second capital city. On the other hand, I was expecting a more 
general discussion in which other volcanic disasters could have been considered for comparison 
(e.g. Vesuvius 79, 1631 etc.) notably in Latin America (e.g. Mexico, Ecuador, Peru), where 
similar studies combining history/volcanology/natural disasters have been previously conducted. 
 
Although the use of historical documents elsewhere is interesting, we felt that a 
discussion of this would be a bit off topic. In most volcanological studies, historical 
documents have been employed only to determine the timing, and sometimes the nature, 
of eruptive activity (e.g., Siebert et al., 1987; Thouret et al., 2002; LePennec et al., 2008; 
Pistolesi et al., 2011). Alternatively, anthropological use of oral and written records has 
focused on the impact of and response to hazardous events, but without detailed 
assessment of the events themselves (e.g., Cashman and Giordano, 2008; Chester, 2012). 
Our study is unusual (1) in the nature of the documents, which are ain that, to our 
knowledge, they represent a unique (?) compilation of 18th century documents that 
combine multiple observations of both natural events and their impacts, and (2) the 
insight they provide into the long-term impact of a catastrophic event (here the 1541 
landslide) on a community. We have tried to make this point. 
 
In summary, while I really found the ms of interest, I have to say that I was not convinced by the 
geological interpretation proposed by the authors. I think the authors should reconsider the 
translation of key terms used in historical archives, check some speculative issues discussed in 
the text, and combine with additional volcanological and geophysical constraints to offer a 
stronger interpretation of this otherwise nice compilation of historical data.   
 
****************************** 
Below I list some other minor points.  
 
P. 3. Reference to Sheets and Grayson (1979) seems a bit outdated, more recent references on 
archeology and volcanology could be added here.  
 
We ignored, as instructed. 
 
P. 4. Background. End of §; well, here the considerations regarding "community planning and 
perception" do not consider (potentially animistic) beliefs and religious aspects of community 
cultures, which may largely contribute to explain how communities cope with volcanic disasters 
(e.g. acceptation of "fatality").  
 
We agree (and have considered this elsewhere) but it does not seem to be particularly relevant to 
this paper (the Autos, in fact, counter the concept of fatality in that members of the community 
are actively promoting relocation). 
 
P. 5. Background. End of 2d §.  "The mudflows have affected the area to the north of the 
volcano", does it mean that only the north has been affected? Or is it a biased impression owed to 
the fact that the witness was in Ciudad Vieja located north of the volcano? 
 
Although we have not done an exhaustive search of the documentary evidence, all recorded 
(including recent) rainfall-triggered mudflows do appear to derive from the north flank, 
exclusively. 
 
P. 5. Background. End of 3rd §.  The authors write that inhabitants were very familiar with 
fuego's activity. What does this mean precisely and how should this be interpreted in terms of 
community reaction when facing nuisance/danger from the volcanic activity?   
 
The  inhabitants’  familiarity  comes  out in the descriptions of the Autos; for this reason we prefer, 
in the Background, to simply point out the frequency of historic activity (that is, to provide direct 
documentary evidence that eruptions of Fuego were part of daily life). The supplementary Table 
also provides some explicit mentions of eruptions from Fuego in 1705 and 1710 (T7, T8). 
 
P. 5. What is the argument to write that the debris flow evolved downward to a mudflow? Any 
constraint on how much "unusual" the "heavy rain fall" was? Any quotation to support this 
assertion?  
 
We provide the reference of Schilling et al. (2001) for this interpretation. 
 
P.  5  .  end  of  3th  paragraph.  Last  sentence  "it  is  this  event  …  that  is  the  subject  of  this  paper".   
 
We are not sure what this comment means? 
 
P. 6. 2d §. Well, the study does not show that eruption at one volcano triggers activity at another 
volcano.  
 
As noted above, this is our interpretation (and we are clear that this is an interpretation). 
 
P. 8. The authors should say somewhere that Fuego's and Agua's summits are frequently 
obscured by meteorological clouds, and it is likely that the acoustic activity was described in 
more details when the volcanoes were cloudy.   
 
This is an interesting point but is also speculation. Instead of making this point we have expanded 
our explanation of all of the words used to describe sounds. 
 
P. 8. End of first §. Why collapse of the front of an "advancing lava flows"? Any evidence of these 
1717 lavas preserved in the geological record of the volcano? Why not typical "scoria flows" that 
are expected to occur during a strong VEI 4 lava fountaining event on a steep-sided volcano?  
 
We have modified this statement. 
 
P. 8. En of first §. "Relatively close", please provide approx. distances to help the reader 
interpret what "relatively close" means. 
 
We have modified. 
 
P. 8. Vecinos is usually used in Spanish for "neighbors".  
 
We now explain the colonial Spanish use of this term in the Methods. 
 
P 8 last line: veinte (instead of "viente") 
 
Now corrected. 
 
P. 9. Section 4.2. Apart from barrancas what are the original Spanish terms used in the archives 
to describe "ground fissures"?  
 
Again, we have explained the terminology more thoroughly. 
 
P 9. To me this section describes the enlargement of a ravine, not the emplacement of a dyke. The 
ravine was formed previously and the eruption gave the conditions for morphological changes 
(erosion, deepening and widening during PDC emplacement and lahar activity). The witness 
noted that the barranca was clearly the passage of lahars that transported tree logs and 
branches, as is common at tropical volcanoes.  
 
We agree and now say explicitly that the ground cracks may have had multiple origins. 
 
P. 10, last two paragraphs. The barranca to the south might well be a similar enlarged-deepened 
gully that contained still hot pyroclastic material to produce steam in the wet Guatemalan 
environment. To me this describes a typical PDC deposit in a ravine that cools and emits steam. 
That is fine – we now say this. 
 
P 12. Last § in section 4.3. What is the argument to infer that the witnesses in Santiago de 
Guatemala are exaggerating the intensity-destruction of the earthquake in the city (T32 gives 
detailed descriptions)? 
 
We only note that there could be bias, not necessarily that there was. 
 
Fig. 6 shows a series of 3 distinct "abras" from the summit area, as is expected to occur after 
local (potentially seismically-triggered) landslides, not really after emplacement of a dyke.  
 
Our interpretation is based on the clear description of these features as mudflows rather than 
earthquake-triggered landslides. We agree that this is an interpretation, and have provided data 
that we believe supports this interpretation. 
 
p. 13. What "typical rainfall-triggered" mud flows at Agua look like? Might be important to 
provide some original sources in Spanish here. 
 
We have not had the opportunity to go through the entire archives to look for this. We do have 
sources that describe rainfall-triggered mudflows in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, but feel 
that introducing these would stray from the focus on the Autos. Instead, we include a reference to 
the most recent rainfall-triggered mudflows from Agua, which occurred in response to intense 
rainfall produced by Hurricane Agatha and which traveled down valleys on the north flank of 
Agua, and into Ciudad Vieja (the site of the first capital city). 
 
P 14 first line. The term "tremors" has a precise meaning in volcano-seismology and sounds too 
interpretative here. A more descriptive term as "ground shakes" or "vibrations" sounds more 
appropriate here.  
 
We  disagree  that  “tremors”  has  a  precise  meaning  in  volcano  seismology  – it is the singular use 
of the term (i.e.   “tremor”) that is precise, referring to long-duration, low-frequency ground 
vibrations;;  this  specific  term  is  not  pluralized  to  “tremors”.  
 
P 14. End of first paragraph. "That" is repeated twice.  
 
Corrected. 
 
P 14 section 5.1. It would be useful to provide some elements about the dispersal of the tephra 
cloud from Fuego. Direction of the main dispersal axis? Lateral distribution? Any historical/field 
constraints on tephra thickness at some localities? Was Agua volcano blanketed by Fuego's 
tephra fall deposits? (Could facilitate the onset of mudflows). 
 
We have no data to make such estimates. We note that the tephra blanket from the 1974 eruption 
was dispersed toward the SW (that is, away from the communities surveyed for the Autos). In 
fact, it is an interesting point that although there is some mention of problems with ash in 
Santiago during the eruption, there is no other mention of ash problems, which might be expected 
if quantities of ash equivalent to those produced in 1974 had been deposited to the east. 
 
P 15. End of 3th paragraph. Which towns "on the slopes of Volcan de Agua" exactly? Currently 
all towns are located at the base of Agua, with a few villages on the lower slopes, and I wonder 
about the situation in 1717.   
We have only the descriptions in the Autos; we suspect that most of the villages were located 
close to the main valley between Fuego and Agua. 
 
P 15. Beginning of 3th paragraph. The new "abras" are not necessarily collapse pits at the tip of 
a propagating dyke, they may simply describe landslides that scorched the upper part of the 
volcano, as is common on steep-sided edifices in tropical countries. Steaming avenidas could be 
enlarged gullies and ravines filled with hot pyroclastic material, and not necessarily - in my 
reinterpretation of the material provided in the ms - the surface expression of a propagating dyke.  
P 15. End of page. I agree that these yellowish products and sulfur smells support involvement of 
material from a hydrothermal system. 
 
Here we have expanded our descriptions of the witness accounts and reserved our interpretation 
for the end of the section; we are glad that the reviewer does acknowledge the involvement of the 
hydrothermal system. 
 
P 16. Is the absence of "heavy rain" reports a good criteria? Could be raining on the top of the 
volcano, but not near its base.   
 
OK – absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, but other well documented mudflows from 
Agua have involved intense rainfall, which would have been recorded (particularly because at 
least some of the witnesses were clearly well aware of the sequence of events in 1541). For 
example, the torrential rains that preceded the 1541 disaster are well described. Additionally, rain 
at  the  mountain’s  summit  would  be  unlikely  to  produce  descriptions  of  bursting,  new  openings,  
and continued emission of water from these openings for weeks. 
 
P 16. Not clear in the text if the lava at Fugen Dake was a lava flow or a lava dome. No 
references to Japanese works here?  
 
The Siebert reference includes a summary of the Japanese accounts. 
 
P 17 section 5.3. First sentence. Well, the people who lost their houses and crops at that time may 
have a different assessment of whether these events were catastrophic or not.  
 
We  use  “catastrophic”  as  applied  to  the  community  as  a  whole  (the  common  use  of  catastrophic). 
 
P 18. 2d paragraph "Written and (oral?) form" 
 
Corrected. 
 
P 19. Some comparisons with well-documented volcanic disasters (e.g. Vesuvius) would be 
welcome here to discuss the social memorization process. 
 
Discussed above. Actually, Vesuvius is an interesting case because the catastrophe is not well 
recorded in Roman literature except by Pliny the Younger. In fact, there seems to have been very 
little  memory  of  that  event  (as  far  as  we  understand…  we  are  not  Italian  scholars).  David  Chester  
has worked extensively at Mt. Etna to examine changing perceptions of volcanic activity there – 
we do mention his work but not in the Discussion. However, our work does provide a case study 
that contrasts with his, which is the response of the state (as compared with local community) to 
an emergency. In fact, we plan to build on his Etna work when we have the opportunity to 
investigate the entire archive related to the 1717 events.  
